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Abstract
The  main  thesis  is  that  Introspection  is  recommended  for  the  development  of
anthropic AI. 
Human-like AI, distinct from rational AI, would suit robots for care for the elderly and
for other tasks that require interaction with naïve humans. “Anthropic AI” is a sub-type
of human-like AI, aiming for the pre-cultured, universal intelligence that is available to
healthy humans regardless of  time and civilisation.  This is  contrasted with western,
modern, well-trained and adult intelligence that is often the focus of AI. Anthropic AI
would  pick  up  local  cultures  and  habits,  ignoring  optimality.  Introspection  is
recommended for the AI developer, as a source of ideas for designing an artificial mind,
in the context of technology rather than science. Existing notions of introspection are
analysed, and the aspiration for “clean” or “good” introspection is exposed as a mirage.
Nonetheless,  introspection is  shown to be a legitimate source of  ideas  for AI using
considerations of the contexts of discovery vs. justification. Moreover, introspection is
shown  to  be  a  positively  plausible  basis  for  ideas  for  AI  since  if  a  teacher  uses
introspection to extract mental skills from themselves to transmit them to a student, an
AI developer can also use introspection to uncover the human skills that they want to
transfer to a computer. Methods and pitfalls of this approach are detailed, including the
common error  of polluting one's  introspection with highly-educated notions such as
mathematical methods.
Examples are coded and run, showing promising learning behaviour. This is interpreted
as a compromise between Classic AI and Dreyfus's tradition. So far AI practitioners
have largely ignored the subjective, while the Phenomenologists have not written code –
this  thesis  bridges  that  gap.  One  of  the  examples  is  shown  to  have  Gadamerian
characteristics, as recommended by  (Winograd & Flores, 1986). This serves also as a
response to Dreyfus's more recent publications critiquing AI (Dreyfus, 2007, 2012).
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My thesis is that “Introspection is recommended for developing anthropic AI”. The
term “anthropic” will only be defined in detail in section 3.2. Preliminarily it is the part
of human-like AI that approximates the un-enculturated part of the mind – The part that
allows culture and learning to arise. This is  opposed to the “western, modern, well-
trained and adult” mind.
This  chapter  opens  with  discussion  of  the  motivations  for  the  research,  and  gives
outlines of the document: How it fits in a larger project, an overview of the argument, a
list  of  antagonists,  an  overview of  the  document’s  structure,  and a  list  of  points  of
novelty.
To give some background to the entire argument, a discussion is due of the field of
philosophy of AI specifically and of technology in general (section 1.3), and out of that
come some concerns about various possible meanings of “truth” (section 1.4) (section
1.4.4 will discuss the type of truth I ascribe to the thesis itself). This is followed by a
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delineation of  the area within the field of AI that is being addressed (section 1.5).
In the next chapter there will be a literature review, and in chapter 3 the main terms of
the thesis are discussed, such as introspection (section  3.3), recommendation (section
3.1.1), something being a basis for a technology (section 3.1.2), and AI development as
such (section 3.1.3). Anthropic AI, the aim, is introduced in section 3.2.
1.1 Motivations
Much is being made in popular media about the recent successes of AI: computers are
now  the  world  champions  in  chess,  go,  and  “jeopardy”.  Handwriting  is  being
recognized, computer translation has improved, and many more aspects of AI that were
confined to research labs are now in many pockets. However, most if not all of these
recent achievements were done more by adding hardware and “brute force” to existing
AI concepts than by entirely new concepts.
This work is motivated by this dearth of ground-breaking new ideas in AI. The need for
this project can be illustrated by two frustrations and two opportunities:
The  first  frustration is,  as  mentioned  above,  that  AI  suffers  a  dearth  of  ground-
breaking new ideas. The opinion that AI has been “brain dead” since at least the 1970s
is supported by mainstream researchers such as Marvin Minsky  (McHugh & Minsky,
2003).
An illustrative parallel to my concern with AI could be a “30,000 feet view” of the
development of  fundamentally new ideas in wheeled transport. Though no-one would
doubt  that  wheeled  transport  has  made great  strides  in  the 20th century,  trains  were
invented in the early 19th century, and became widely deployed towards the end of that
century. Similarly, the bicycle was developed during most of the 19th century from an
early concept to models that we would recognise as quite modern by the end of that
period. Both the car and the motorbike are creatures of the late 19th century. Arguably
the next fundamental  conceptual  innovation in wheeled transport was the “Segway”,
introduced  in  2001.  So  surprisingly,  we  had  no  conceptual innovations  in  wheeled
transport in the entire period of the 20th century – only incremental progress. This is not
to belittle the efforts of automotive engineers in the 20 th century – just to point out that
there were few if any new fundamental ideas that caught on. The first frustration here is
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that from this same 30,000-feet view we have had very little progress in AI in recent
decades.
The fundamental ideas of symbolic AI were already in place in the 1950s (McCorduck,
2004). The basics of neural nets  are found in  (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943), and were
developed as a mainstay of AI by the PDP group in the 1970s (Nilsson, 2010, p. 339).
The ideas of statistical AI can be seen as an extension of symbolic and mathematical AI.
Conceptual innovations are few, far between, and not that successful, with the possible
exception of the work of Brooks on minimally-intelligent systems, but these make no
pretence to intelligence beyond that of an insect.
The second frustration (or perhaps a symptom of the first frustration) is that we have
been led by popular culture to expect some sort of sentience, or at least human-like
conduct from computers. This has completely failed to materialize. A case in point is
“Star Trek (The Next Generation)”, a TV series released in 1987 which included the
character  “Data”,  a  robot  that  though not  completely  human-like,  moved  in  human
society, and took on human roles.
The above complaint about the absence of human-like AI is not only motivated by some
romantic  notions.  Having  human-like  AI  available  to  us  would  allow  several
applications  of  robotics  that  have  a  strong  requirement  for  mutual  understanding
between untrained humans and robots. These applications require robots to think like
humans in order to understand humans and be understood by humans, consider robotic
care for the elderly (see section 3.2.2).
If  the  situation  of  AI  is  so  disappointing,  then  maybe  we ought  to  re-examine  the
boundaries  of  the  discussion,  so as  to  try  to  “think  outside  the  box”.  One of  these
boundaries is the way subjectivity and specifically introspection have been treated. 
Understanding human thinking as such is part of the science of psychology, and is a
long way in the future. But AI is a technological (and business) pursuit in the present, so
we cannot wait for a full understanding of the human psyche to emerge. There are two
sources of commentary on AI that make poignant points, yet have yet to lead to tangible
results. Perhaps exploring these will provide an opportunity to get out of the impasse in
the foundations of AI.
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The first and better known of these opportunities is the tradition of critiquing AI from
the standpoint of phenomenology  (Dreyfus, 1979) and other backgrounds alien to the
mainstream cognitive science  (Winograd & Flores, 1986). Much of the field ignores
these critiques (McCorduck, 2004, Chapter 9). Some of the literature review (chapter 2)
is  dedicated  to  understanding  why  the  dialogue  between  this  tradition  and  the
mainstream of AI was so fruitless (Dreyfus, 2007).
A second opportunity  is  examining more  closely  the  utterances  of  some central  AI
researchers  when  speaking  more  freely  than  seems  possible  in  the  peer-reviewed
literature, e.g.  (McCorduck, 2004; Turkle, 1984). When interviewed informally some
researchers reveal severe tensions in their positions on subjective thinking in general
and introspection in particular (see also sections  4.2 and 4.3). A revealing example of
the paradoxes endemic to our thinking about thinking is given by Seymour Papert. This
quote is key to understanding the context of this entire thesis:
We are to thinking as Victorians were to sex. We all know we have these horrible
moments of confusion when  we begin a new project, that nothing looks clear
and everything looks awful, that we work our way out using all sorts of odd
little rules of thumb, by going down blind alleys and coming back again, and so
on, but since everyone else seems to be thinking logically, or at least they claim
they do, then we figure we must be the only ones in the world with such murky
thought processes. We disclaim them, and make believe that we think in logical,
orderly  ways,   all  the  time knowing very  well  that  we don't.  And the  worst
offenders here are teachers, who present crisp, clean batches of knowledge to
their students, and look as if they themselves had learned that knowledge in a
crisp, clean way. It didn't happen that way, but the teachers don't admit it, and
the students groan inwardly, feeling so hopelessly dumb. (McCorduck, 2004, p.
339)
Papert describes a widespread tension in our culture, that we all pretend to be logical
and sensible, while being acutely aware that this is not the case “inside” (Goldie, 2012).
Moreover, he admits that this is also the case for  him, and therefore possibly also for
much of the AI research community. This is not only a theoretic tension between two
well-understood positions, but affects the very epistemic structure of our academic and
engineering  disciplines.  The  “logical”  side  of  this  tension  is  not  only  ascendant  in
present society at large, but is more ascendant the more one moves into academic and
specifically science/engineering discourse. Having such a tension in the heart of any
discipline is problematic, and arguably in the cognitive sciences (and AI) this can be
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positively harmful, at least in that it stops us looking in the less supposedly sensible
directions. There can be nothing scientific, scholarly, or even sincere about “making
believe” on such a grand scale. I have found no AI concepts based these insights by
Papert.
Note also that (Winograd, 1991) argues that “[t]he techniques of artificial intelligence
are to the mind what bureaucracy is to human social interaction”. Perhaps it is time to
loosen up the stricter aspects of said “bureaucracy”. Let us not “regiment” the mind, but
simulate it more like it is, like it is experienced by us as humans.
-
This thesis explores the intellectual space between Dreyfus (and his successors) and
mainstream AI, and between the logical and the subjective. But this is no idle patrol of
the  intellectual  terrain  –  the  worry  that  AI  (as  a  technology)  is  stuck  is  the  main
motivation. The conclusion will be a concrete recommended direction for AI – a newly-
defined method of invention through introspection. In order to concretely demonstrate
the  novelty  and  fecundity  of  the  approach,  programmed  examples  are  given  and
discussed (in chapter 7).
1.2 Outlines
This project aims for a third way between the phenomenological critique and classic AI.
These scholarly traditions have been antagonistic (see sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3). Untangling
the different stands of existing thought and formalizing this thesis in a linear manner
was one of the most challenging aspects of this work. Therefore, several different angles
on an overview are useful, in order to serve as a map of the arguments to come.
1.2.1 Scope
If  time  and word-count  were  no  object,  this  project  would  have  consisted  of  three
volumes:
1. A proper history of the assumptions underpinning much of AI research.
2. An argument for an alternative, providing new introspection-based avenues for
AI development.
3. A thorough set of examples and proper empirical evaluations of the resultant
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algorithms.
This  thesis  as  it  stands  concentrates  on  the  middle  part  of  this  enterprise.  Not  to
completely  neglect  the  other  parts,  a  taste  of  the  resultant  algorithms  with  some
preliminary empirical information in given in chapter 7, especially sections 7.3 and 7.5.
Writing the 1st and 3rd of these volumes is an urgent task, but is out of the scope of a
Ph.D. thesis.
1.2.2 Argument outline
The thesis is that “Introspection is recommended for anthropic AI”.
Technological  AI is  distinct  from scientific  AI.  The  first  aims  at  producing  useful
products, the second aims at understanding humans as they are as precisely as possible.
This difference calls for different strategies and stresses in these two diverse enterprises
(see sections 1.3.2, 1.5). This thesis is about technological AI. Its interest is pragmatic,
and short-term: years rather than decades. Since the type of truth required in technology
is different than in science (see sections 1.3.2, 1.4), a principal method employed in this
thesis is keeping track of the different kinds of truth involved at various junctures.
Human-like AI is distinct from ideal/rational AI (see section  3.2.1). This is like the
difference between a human being and some logical-mathematical demon. Most AI has
so  far  aimed at  the  ideal/rational,  perhaps  for  two reasons:  First  mathematics  is  an
excellent tool for exploring optimality, and mathematics is readily available – humanity
is more complex. Second, especially in looking for technology, the intuitive path is to
look  for  efficient  and  optimal  solutions  for  concrete  problems.  However,  there  are
applications where understanding the human way of doing things and fitting in with
those customs, sub-optimal as they may be, is precisely what is requisite (see section
3.2.2). Consider a delivery robot – it needs to navigate the inconsistent way that house
numbers are occasionally allocated, heed contradictory and partial signs, find the right
door without smashing any flowerpots or running over any sleeping cats, understand
handwritten notes such as “leave it with the neighbour”, etc. A similar conundrum faces
a robot dedicated to care for the elderly – we cannot trust an elder to understand how
algorithms work – we need the robot to understand (at least partially) the human habits
and culture.
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Anthropic AI is  a  new concept  (see section  3.2.4).  Building a  machine that  would
emulate a full-blown western, modern, well-trained and adult human is a daunting and
probably impossible task (at least in the near term). Even if we could produce the ideal
(say)  Californian,  they  would  be  utterly  lost  in  Bangkok.  Not  only  the  language is
different, but so are many other aspects of the culture. A more promising avenue would
be simulating the underlying human intelligence that allows one to acquire the diverse
cultures. This intelligence, allowing for culture but initially ignorant of any culture, is
the aim of anthropic AI. It is contrasted with the “western, modern, well-trained adult”.
It  is  trainable  to  become such a  cultured  intelligence  – but  it  has  the  flexibility  to
become “a Californian” or “a Thai”, according to the technological requirement.  By
emulating the lowest practical level we get a lot of flexibility, and we get much closer to
the real human than would a project aiming for “the perfect Californian”.
In  a  sense  this  research  is  half-way  between  proper  science  and  quick-and-dirty
technology. The aim is for AI that is not optimal, not getting the task done best-and-
fastest (that would be logical/ideal AI), but rather a technology that would do things the
human way, which could be slow and accident-prone. On the other hand this does not
aim  for  a  perfect  or  even  scientifically  correct  version  of  “being  human”.  The
motivations of technology demand that we use approximations and deliver a product on
an acceptable schedule.
-
In order to explore the different levels of human thought, we cannot afford to shun the
subjective point of view, nor do we need to (see section 3.3.1). 
The most direct access we have to subjectivity is by  introspection. This raises many
objections. The main objection is that introspection is non-scientific, wrong, misleading,
or otherwise not a legitimate source of information (sections  4.2.1,  4.2.2,  4.2.3). This
originates in (J. B. Watson, 1913). By introducing the distinction between the context of
discovery and the context of justification (from philosophy of science) I show that no
source  of  information  should  be  disallowed  as  a  source  of  ideas  (section  4.2.4).
Moreover, the level of truth required in technology is less demanding than that required
for science (section 4.2.5), so there is no reason to reject any source of ideas, especially
not for technology. 
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A second objection to  introspection-for-AI,  somewhat  contradicting the first,  is  that
introspection is already in widespread use, and therefore there is nothing new in the
above  argument.  This  is  counteracted  by  enumerating  the  various  cases  in  which
introspection was indeed used (section 4.3) and showing that introspection was always
used sparingly, shyly, as if there were something wrong with it (section 4.6).
Beyond being as legitimate as any other source of ideas, the thesis requires that I show
why  it  should  be  recommended  (not  just  acceptable),  so  I  need  to  show  that
introspection is an effective source of information in some other domain, hopefully a
related one.  This  is  done (in  section  5.2)  by pointing  out  that  introspection  is  used
widely in education. In teaching skills, the teacher could generate their narrative either
by recalling verbatim the text used to instruct themselves (decades before) or they could
self-observe how they do the skill, and report on that. If the skill is a mental skill, then
what we have here is mental self-observation – introspection. Thus the very survival of
civilisations  for  multiple  generations  stands  as  testimony  that  introspective  reports
somehow carry the gist of how a skill is performed. Introspection is not noise – it carries
information of how a skill can be applied – hopefully also by a computer.
The details of how this may be done are covered in chapter 6, including discussion of
the kinds of introspection that are more likely to yield interesting new AI. Examples are
given  in  chapter  7.  These  examples  include  a  novel  data  type  (tracking  “trains  of
thought”), which is further discussed as a basis for future work in chapter 8.
1.2.3 Main antagonists
As is often the case, one's nearest conceptual neighbours are also the antagonists that
one critiques most harshly. Here is a list of some of my “nearest neighbours”, a survey
of some of their positions is given in chapter 2.
• I shall agree with  Herbert Simon’s  (see sections  2.2 and  4.2) commitment to
programming and empirical, pragmatic research. I shall critique him for his lack
of imagination, and for his unjustified rejection of subjectivity and introspection
(in section  4.2). I concentrate mainly on Simon, but many of his students and
successors are very similar in their approach.
• I shall agree with Hubert Dreyfus (see sections 2.3 and 4.4) in his commitment
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to the subjective point-of-view, and in his general objection to the rationalist
views  of  Simon  and  the  other  cognitivists.  I  shall  object  to  his  lack  of
commitment to programming concrete positive examples, and shall show that
programming more phenomenological AI is possible (my examples are found in
chapter 7).
• I shall agree with Winograd & Flores (see section 2.4) in their recommendation
of Gadamer as a possible basis or inspiration for further AI development. I differ
with  them  in  their  veering  away  from  AI  and  the  lack  of  any  concrete
programmed AI examples (a bit like Dreyfus).
• My thinking parallels Wheeler's: I agree with his non-dogmatic pragmatism and
with many of his ideas, mainly his notion of action-oriented-representations (see
section 8.4.4). We differ in that his scope is broader – Wheeler (2005) deals with
“the  cognitive  world”  while  I  restrict  my  discussion  to  the  specific  field  of
human-like AI, as a technology.
• I agree with  (Brooks, Breazeal, Marjanović, Scassellati, & Williamson, 1999)
and others’ distinction in human-level intelligence of two levels – the “lower”
innate  ability  which  enables  the  accumulation  of  culture  and skills,  and  the
higher level of a cultured adult.  I  distinguish anthropic AI (the endeavour of
simulating human intelligence per se) from any commitment to the specifics of
our current, contingent  “western, modern, well-trained and adult” ideals about
how  thinking  supposedly  should  be  done.  I  disagree  with  Brooks  et  al's
contention that  the type of  intelligence they pre-program can support human
behaviour and culture. See also section 3.2.6 about COG and CYC.
This research belongs somewhere between Dreyfus’s and Simon’s schools of thought,
and uses elements of both together with Winograd & Flores's (1986) recommendation of
Gadamer as the intellectual context. Having developed some example AI programs, I
recognize Wheeler's action-oriented representations in them.
Note that Dreyfus and Simon (and their successors)  talk past each other: They each
“cannot believe” how the other side can be so misguided (McCorduck, 2004, Chapter
9). This has several causes: ontologically Simon (et  al)  are reductionist  physicalists,
while Dreyfus is ontologically either an idealist (insofar as he pushes phenomenology in
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general) or a Heideggerian (see section 2.5.1). Pragmatically Dreyfus is a philosopher
that views his role as writing insightful texts, Simon is an engineer – even a social
engineer (see section  2.2). This thesis achieves its goals inside the gap between these
thinkers.
1.2.4 Document structure
The first  two chapters  are  introductory  –  This  chapter  (introduction)  includes  some
context and preliminary clarifications. A literature review follows in chapter 2. 
The next three chapters are the main argument. Chapter 3 gives the entire argument, 
omitting many details and two main points. The detailed argument on why introspection
can have a legitimate role in AI  (but has been shunned as if it can not) is in chapter 4. 
The crucial argument that beyond being acceptable, introspection is to be expected to be
positively a good source of ideas for AI,  is in chapter 5.
The  next  two  chapters  complete  the  picture:  Chapter  6 fills  in  the  details  of  the
recommended methodology for AI development, and discusses some left-over points.
Chapter 7 presents working examples of the methodology in action.
Chapter  8 discusses the technical and philosophical consequences of this project, and
concludes.
The  Appendix  (9)  is US  Patent  No.  8,660,670  granted  for  the  main  technology
presented in chapter 7.
1.2.5 Novelty
This  thesis  re-evaluates  the  role  of  introspection  in  AI,  making use of  a  variety  of
perspectives. The main thesis is that “Introspection is Recommended for Developing
Anthropic  AI”,  i.e.  that  a  development  methodology  making  conscious  use  of
introspection  is  a  promising  source  of  ideas  for  building  the  human-like  intelligent
machines of the future. The main points of novelty are:
1. All  human learning,  and especially  skill  learning (section  5.2)  is  based on a
universal human foundation. Modelling this foundation in general is the aim of
anthropic AI (section 3.2). This can be achieved (for AI) by aiming to simulate
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in  software  the  human  intelligence  underpinning  but  excluding any  and  all
contingent culture, especially the western, modern, well-trained and adult type
of thinking aimed at by most of AI.
2. Existing  approaches  to  introspection  are  explored  (section  3.3.3),  and  a
conceptual confusion is uncovered, which when cleared up raises an alarming
spectre – there can be no such thing as “good” introspection (section  3.3.3.4).
The rest of the thesis continues with the understanding that we will always deal
with “bad” introspection.
3. The role of introspection in cognitive science and specifically in AI research is
explored in detail (chapter  4), and shown to have never been wholeheartedly
adopted  in  AI  (sections  4.3,  4.6).  Exploring  the  reasons  given  for  shunning
introspection, these do not stand to scrutiny, especially in the context of AI as a
technology (section 4.2).
4. Introspection is shown to be an important avenue for the transmittal of mental
skills  from  one  generation  to  the  next  in  humans,  and  hence  cannot  be
“nonsense” or “noise” but is rather an efficacious source of information on how
human  skills  work  (section  5.2).  Since  the  transferral  of  human  skills  to  a
computer (rather than to another human) is the very essence of the process of
developing human-like AI, introspection is recommended as a source of ideas
for designs.
In  other  words:  if  a  teacher  uses  introspection  to  extract  mental  skills  from
themselves  to  transmit  them  to  a  student,  an  AI  developer  can  also  use
introspection  to  uncover  the  human  skills  that  they  want  to  transfer  to  a
computer.
5. AI  practitioners  generally  shunned  subjectivity  (section  4.2),  but  produced
working systems, while critics of AI (mainly Dreyfus) extolled subjectivity, but
did not produce any such systems (section  4.4.3). In their writings, these two
communities talk past each other (chapter 2). In providing a working example of
AI based on introspection I provide a concrete manifestation of a compromise
between these camps: programmed subjectivity, through introspection (chapter
7).
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6. This  program implements  a  data  type that  (to the best  of  my knowledge)  is
unlike any that has been used in AI before (section 7.5). Further evidence of its
novelty is provided by the appendix, a US Patent on this technology.
7. From a  continental  perspective,  this  data  type  provides  the  first  concrete  AI
design  that  can  be  called  “Gadamerian”,  as  recommended  by  (Winograd  &
Flores, 1986). This is a novel step in analysing what “Heideggerian AI” could be
(Dreyfus, 2007), by isolating the hermeneutic aspect of Heidegger's philosophy
(as  detailed  by  Gadamer)  from  the  rest  of  Heidegger's  philosophy  (section
8.4.2). 
Some may view this thesis, “Introspection is recommended for developing anthropic
AI” as being weak or blurry. This critique, far from pointing out a fault in the project,
points to some main contributions: The mainstream AI community has been ignoring
the subjective while the mainstream critics (Dreyfus) have spoken of little other than
subjectivity (point 5 above).  Both made the same mistake of treating AI as a single
project,  to  be  examined  from  a  single  perspective.  In  delineating  anthropic  AI  as
separate  from  at  least  two  other  categories  (point  1  above),  and  in  showing  that
subjectivity (in the form of introspection) is useful for producing concrete AI systems
(point 4 above), this thesis not only provides a more advanced analysis of the field(s) of
AI,  but  also  makes  a  first  programmed  contribution  using  full-blooded  subjective
methods (points 6-7).
1.3 The specific field of this thesis
Before the literature review, we need to clarify some points regarding the specific field
of this thesis, and how different disciplines use different notions of truth. This will also
be a principal distinction in the rest of the thesis.
1.3.1 Philosophy of AI
This thesis is in the field of philosophy of AI. Being a relatively small field, this calls
for a discussion of the very nature of the field.
One way of looking at philosophy in general is as the all-encompassing love of wisdom.
The  specialised  fields (physics,  medicine,  architecture)  can  be  seen  as  spheres  of
knowledge from which philosophy-as-such has to a large degree retreated. Questions of
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the interaction of materials (for example) are no longer examined by philosophy, or
even “natural philosophy”, but are examined by chemistry and physics. So extending
the  graphic  metaphor  of  “spheres”  for  a  moment,  philosophy  (as  a  field)  is  left
responsible for a “Swiss cheese” - all that is left of knowledge after the specialists took
charge of their spheres – the areas between fields, and the areas far removed from any
specialised field of research.
But  this  “subcontracting”  of  the  specific  spheres  of  knowledge  to  their  respective
experts is not total. Difficult questions such as those raised by quantum mechanics are
discussed often by philosophers  (Ismael, 2015). Philosophers also reserve the right to
discuss the “meta” fields, such as philosophy-of-science, ethics-in-medicine, etc. In fact,
any questions that are seen as neglected within any of these specialised fields can be
taken up by a philosopher. In the case of AI, Dreyfus stands out as a philosopher who
intervened forcefully in a field in which he was not part of the research community.
Moreover,  issues  of  methodology  are  often  seen  as  “philosophical”  even  by
practitioners  of  the specialised fields  who would  otherwise be disinterested  or  even
hostile to philosophy as such.
The field of this thesis is philosophy-of-AI  as a technology in a sense to be clarified
through the rest of this thesis.  The concern is with the methodology of AI invention and
development – with how AI researchers come up with their ideas.
AI may be viewed as “the intellectual core of orthodox cognitive science”  (Wheeler,
2005, p. 68), or it may be viewed as a technological field (S. Russell & Norvig, 2013).
This thesis is interested in AI-as-technology. Any technological models may optionally
later inspire or form the basis for theories in psychology, but that is not the focus here.
More detail of this is found in sections 1.5 and 8.3.1.
It seems that “philosophy of AI” (at least AI as a technology, which is the concern here)
would be a sub-field of “philosophy of technology”. Again, this warrants a closer look.
1.3.2 Philosophy of technology
(Franssen, Lokhorst, & van de Poel, 2013, sec. 2.2) divide theories of technology in
terms  of  their  position  on  the  question  of  whether  technology  is  merely  “applied
science” or has some different inherent nature.
- 14 -
On the side that technology is applied science Franssen et al quote Bunge saying that
“technology is about action, but an action heavily underpinned by theory—that is what
distinguishes technology from the arts and crafts and puts it on a par with science”.
Bunge seems to be stressing the distinction between the (old) crafts like carpentry and
modern technology, with its heavy reliance on science (e.g. computers). Computers and
many other enabling technologies of our current lifestyle would be impossible without
quantum  mechanics.  This  break  between  the  old  crafts  and  the  (threatening)  new
technology is important to ethicists who worry about new technologies, not least the
later Heidegger (2009).
On the other side we find both Skolimowski and Herbert Simon (see section 2.2) who
see continuity between the old crafts and modern technology. Skolimowski says that
“science concerns itself with what is, whereas technology concerns itself with what is to
be”. On the other hand (an earlier version of) (Simon, 1996b) says that “the scientist is
concerned with how things are but the engineer with how things ought to be” (Franssen
et  al.,  2013).  In  terms  of  their  characterisation  of  science  there  is  little  difference
between   Skolimowski's  “what  is” and  Simon's  “how  things  are”.  In  terms  of
technology,  Skolimowski's “what is to be” is quite different from Simon's “how things
ought to be”, at least in terms of approach:
Skolimowski's  position,  if  taken to  mean “what  it  is  to  be”  in  terms  of  physics  or
metaphysics seems far less interesting in terms of technology then if we read it as a call
for a functionalist definition of artefacts: “What would it take for something to become
X”. A car  is  a horseless carriage in terms of the functions it aims to fulfil, but not in
terms  of  the  internal  materials  and  techniques  involved.  So  by  this  (functionalist)
reading of Skolimowski he is saying that technology is about the internal functions that
give rise to the overall functions, and presumably technologists are engaged in fulfilling
these functions in whatever way feasible. Simon's definition (“how things ought to be”)
seems to be either teleological, or stressing the external functions of any contraption.
Under the later reading Simon is more interested in how a contraption functions for us
and our larger purposes than in its  internal mechanics. This is in line with Simon's
interest in the social sciences, public and business administration, public policy, etc. (see
section  2.2). So the difference between Simon and Skolimowski seems to be one of
stress on the outer vs. inner functioning of artefacts (respectively).
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In these definitions we see that the crux of the matter for technology is function rather
than truth. Truth is for scientists, function is for technologists. This is a key point in this
thesis.
As a consequence of this  difference in relation to truth there are also the following
differences: 
• Science  has  an  insatiable  appetite  for  precision.  Technology  always  has  a
practical limit to any obsession with precision – a “tolerance”.
• Science aspires to generalize, and come up with a definitive theory of everything
– one ultimate reality, one unified theory (This is reminiscent of monotheism,
see below). Technology on the other hand deals with multiple perspectives: The
perspectives of the various parts of a machine, and the thermal, mechanical, and
electric perspectives, etc. of each part and/or the whole.
A key example of the use I will make of the lower truth-requirement in technology is in
sections  4.2.2,  6.3.5.1:  If,  as  (Nisbett  & Wilson, 1977) show, introspection gives us
only  the  outline  of  what  is  accomplished  by  the  mind  without  the  how,  in  AI
programming (as a technology) we can substitute whatever technical trick we have (in
our skills as programmers) to achieve something similar in a computer. In psychology,
as a science, this of course would not do – scientists demand (ultimately) an explanation
of mental processes in terms of the brain, and physics.
1.4 Notions of truth
It is the aspiration of science to aim for the most accurate facts, and to stick to the truth
with great zeal. This commitment to strictly follow the best version of the truth leads,
amongst other things, to disdain for the humanities, or any of the “loose” sciences. In
this sense, it is the main project of Psychology  (Costall, 2006; J. B. Watson, 1913) to
move  from  the  “loose”  or  “woolly”  sciences  nearer  the  more  “proper”  sciences.
Mathematics,  sometimes  called  “the  queen  of  sciences”,  has  little  content  but   the
demand to stick 100% to a well-defined notion of truth. This thesis will show that in
technology not only are we not obliged to such a strict adherence to the truth, but we are
positively hindered by such a zealous loyalty to this notion of maximal truth. In a sense
the main methodology of this thesis is examining different types of truth-claims, and
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keeping these truth-types distinct and clear. 
1.4.1 The idea of a single truth
Many people believe that there is one truth. This idea originates in monotheism, but has
mutated into the scientific world, not least in early 19th century France.
Auguste Comte (b 1798 d 1857) was a French intellectual trying to make sense of the
world  from  a  post-revolutionary  perspective  after  the  traditional  institutions  of
monarchy and church have lost their meaning. He created a doctrine called positivism
(Bourdeau, 2014; Mill, 2013), that held that all sciences were going to eventually be
unified in a single logical structure with mathematics at the base and physics, chemistry,
biology etc. leading up to a full understanding of individual humans, and eventually
societies.  His  movement  had many  adherents,  not  least  John Stewart  Mill,  and the
designers of the Brazilian flag who put “order and progress” -  Comte’s slogan – on the
flag. Positivism, believing in inexorable human progress, did not survive the horrors of
WW I. However, it partially reincarnated in logical positivism (the Vienna circle), and
the  hope  that  the  sciences  will  coalesce  and  ultimately  leave  no  empty  space  for
ignorance between them held on to a large degree. Note, however, that  (J. B. Watson,
1913) was  before  the  war  (which  started  July  1914),  and  that  the  founding  of
behaviourism was motivated by his need to bring humans and other animals under the
same scientific field.
Regardless of such speculations about  the origin of the idea,  we can see in today’s
literature a commitment to a single truth, be it a scientific-administrative physicalist
truth (Simon, see section  2.2) or a phenomenological,  idealist  or Heideggerian truth
(Dreyfus, see section 2.3). This yearning for a single truth is expressed also by attempts
to  solve  the  mind/brain  problem once  and  for  all,  such  as  the  Blue  Brain  project
(Markram, 2006). I propose, for AI, a more short-term and practical alternative, using
multiple and competing perspectives concurrently. This is a bit like Minsky’s  (1991)
“scruffy” notion.
1.4.2 Perspectivism
For AI as a technology, the discussion in section 1.3.2 of technology vs. science brings
us to consider  perspectivism, which allows us to hold both horns in case of a dilemma,
understand several contradictory aspects, and determine what kind of truth is requisite at
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any moment. In a sense a central aim of this thesis is to show how wrong types of truth
(wrong perspectives) were sometimes used in AI research, and a way of rectifying that. 
For now, let us look at perspectivism per se:
Against  positivism,  which  halts  at  phenomena--"There  are  only  facts"--I
would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We
cannot establish any fact "in itself": perhaps it is folly to want to do such a
thing [...]
In so far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning, the world is knowable;
but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless
meanings. –"Perspectivism." 
It  is  our  needs  that  interpret  the  world;  our  drives  and  their  For  and
Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective
that  it  would  like  to  compel  all  the  other  drives  to  accept  as  a  norm.
(Nietzsche, 1889, sec. 481) 
As an example, consider an armchair in the social room in our university department.
What is it? Which of the following is “The Truth”, or “Reality”? It could be:
• a chair, an armchair
• part  of  the  equipment  of  the  social  room/the  department/the  university/the
educational  system/the  UK/the  west/humanity/an  elitist  plot  to  exclude  the
uneducated/etc.
But it can also be seen as:
• a physical thing, a solid, with a location/certain weight and size/existing in time
• pieces of wood and cloth, arranged a certain way
• a large collection of dead (mainly plant) cells
• molecules; elements; atoms; sub-atomic particles
• quarks or whatever else the physicists will come up with in the future1. 
1 An aside on the ontology of recent generations: It  seems that (for some) the whole discussion of
“what is”, or “what is real” has, for the first time in the history of philosophy, been subcontracted out
to some other discipline, namely physics. Even when we treat occasionally “atoms”, “sub atomic
particles”, “quarks” or suchlike as the building blocks of the objective universe, we mostly agree that
if physics found some new subdivision (below the current “standard model”) from which all quarks,
leptons, bosons etc. are made, we would immediately accept any new scientific consensus as our new
ontology.
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But it is also:
• a coloured object; mostly greyish-blue; part of colour scheme; part of a setting
• old; discoloured; damaged; dangerous; a health-and safety violation
• a disgrace to the department (and all other bodies up to Humanity, see above)
• a relic from a bygone era.
And we could go on endlessly, describing every part in every context and from every
perspective.
This multitude of perspectives is visible in everything about us, and we choose which
perspective to use, as appropriate, while we interpret the world. If we were to look at a
person rather than a chair, the possibilities of interpretation would be even greater. None
of  these  perspectives  is  more  true  or  real  than  any  other  –  however  each  may  be
considered more appropriate for a given context or perspective. 
Note that often people tell each other to “get real” or to discuss “the real world”. But in
what sense can we say that some perspective is more real than another? To return to our
example, for a lawyer, the chair is a health-and-safety violation, a liability, a risk. For
the biologist it is dead organic matter. For me (on some days) it is ugly, or (on other
days) homely. How can we decide this? I propose that we don't, and that we suspend
any discussion of one objective reality, and treat any demand to “get real” as suspect,
even violent attempt to impose a specific perspective (see the later part of Nietzsche’s
quote above).
1.4.3 Perspectives, realities, agendas, Occam
This particular section deals with motivations for different ways of thinking. Accepting
or  rejecting  any  of  the  statements  here  does  not  change  the  main  argument.  It  is
provided as  a  guide as  to  why many people reject  perspectivism (in practice if  not
explicitly).  Presenting the extent  of our “one-truth” prejudice  with proper  rigour  is
outside the scope of this thesis.
There  are  two main  motivations  to  collapsing  a  multi-perspective  discussion  into  a
single perspective:
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• The demand to narrow down a discussion to a single perspective is driven by an
active agenda – if there were no agenda there would be no need to focus. This is
true both of the “calendar” meaning  of the word “agenda” – “we need to get
something  done in limited time”, and of the more sinister-sounding “political”
agenda, where there is a group specifically interested in shutting down some
discussion by making it “unreal”. An example “close to home” is how Watson
shut  down  introspection  (Costall,  2006),  see  section  4.2.1 and  (the  end  of)
Nietzsche’s quote above (section 1.4.2). 
• The other motivation for collapsing a  multi-perspective discussion into a single
perspective is  individual.  Having a  single perspective simplifies a  discussion
greatly, and allows faster progress (at the cost of depth). Moreover, (looking also
from a child's mentality) completely believing in a single truth gives one a sense
of security and closure, as a child has once an adult tells them “everything is
OK”. Having such closure is consoling, and allows us to function in a world that
is inherently unpredictable and frightening. This also explains the clamour for
strong  leadership  in  times  of  insecurity,  regardless  of  the  quality  of  such
leadership  (Fromm,  2011).  On  a  collective  level,  this  fits  with  our  human
tendency to  follow miracle-workers.  In  the  insecurity  of  not  knowing which
perspective to  adopt,  we clamour for  a  wise or  strong person to  lead us,  to
absolve us  from the need to  worry about  the various  perspectives ourselves.
Examples of  such miracle-workers range from Moses  and Jesus to  the USA
scientific-military-industrial complex and its most impressive spectacles – the
detonation  of  atomic  bombs  and  space  travel.  The  more  sinister  cases  of
humanity's  hankering  after  simplicity  are  those  of  demagogue-dictators,  as
discussed by (Fromm, 2011).
As we have seen, we often want one powerful truth, so we can become its loyal slaves
and always win, by this one truth winning. Occam's razor is the most prominent tool for
reducing multiple truths into one, and not surprisingly is a rare relic from the centuries
before the scientific revolution that is still revered as if the pope still instructs us as to
what to believe.
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So  let  us,  for  now,  eschew  any  hard-and-fast  discussion  of  one  “reality”  and  just
examine perspectives. This of course brings up the question: in what perspective, in
which sense, do I make the claims of this thesis?
1.4.4 In what sense is this thesis true?
In presenting this thesis, I claim, at least in some sense, that it is true. But what kind of
truth do I claim for this thesis? I claim a pragmatic truth – as befits a thesis that is
ultimately  about  technology.  So  why  perspectivism?  Because  adopting  different
perspectives at  different times  works.  Engineers do it all  the time when they design
modules  – they  design  the  interaction  between the  complete  modules,  and also  the
internal structure of each module. They design the electronic characteristics of a system,
and then move to look at the thermal design, and then the  mechanical structure, moving
between these distinct perspectives. In a sense this thesis will promote perspectivism as
an  (analytical)  tool,  and pragmatism as  value-system (for  technology development).
Later  (especially  sections  3.3,  4.7,  chapter  6)  I  will  discuss  subjectivity  and
introspection, introducing many perspectives and claiming (some) validity for some of
them. This thesis is about a method for developing ideas; ideas for AI. But ideas as such
are not the bottom line – the bottom line (in technology) is letting what works win,
without prejudice towards any particular perspectives.
So what needs to be shown is that this thesis points to plausibly profitable avenues in
anthropic-AI research.  I  need to  show how these profitable  avenues  of research are
neglected  by  current  conceptions,  and  why  these  avenues  make  promising  starts  at
addressing interesting fields.
1.4.5 Notions of truth: summary
A central  theme,  perhaps  the  central  method running throughout  this  thesis  is  how
different notions of truth are used in different contexts in AI research, and how some of
these may need to be re-examined. The demand for less truth than necessary will lead us
to  absurdities,  but  the  demand for  more  precision  than  can  be  found constricts  our
ability to invent. As  Aristotle had it: “It is the mark of an educated man to look for
precision  in  each  class  of  things  just  so  far  as  the  nature  of  the  subject  admits”
(Aristotle, 2009).
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1.5 Science vs technology and human-like vs rational
The following two distinctions are important to be born in mind while discussing AI, in
terms of the type of motivation involved:
• Some researchers build AI models in order to scientifically understand humans,
mice, insects, neural functioning or some other scientific questions (usually long
term),  while
others  build  AI
in order to solve
problems  of
technology in
the  short  term
(the  contrast
between  science
and  technology
as  motivation
should  not  be
confused  with
the contrast between them as to the types of truth required, see section 1.3.2).
• Some researchers aim for Human-like AI, and some aim for rational or ideal AI
(see section 3.2.1).
These two distinctions should be seen not as dichotomous, but as continuous.
For examples,  referring to  Illustration 1.1, see the technological motivation of Chat-
Bots, from Eliza (Weizenbaum, 1966), to commercial chat-bots and the entrants of the
Loebner prize  (Mladenić & Bradeško, 2012). These aim for human-like performance
here-and-now  (technology),  using  any  trick  available.  Meanwhile  for  Cognitive
Simulations  (or  computational  psychology)  (Sun,  2008) the  aim  is  to  simulate  for
science working models of human cognitive faculties. In sharp contrast, search engines
(such as Google) aim at the best possible result regardless of how humans would fare at
the same task, as do other Machine Learning implementations. Logic based AI is an
attempt to explain humans scientifically using various types of logic (Bringsjord, 2008),
and has also been the basis of much of (“good old fashioned”) classic AI, including its
Illustration 1.1: Locating different AI fields in key distinctions
Technology Science
Human-Like
Rational/Ideal
This Thesis
Logic-based-AI
Machine Learning
Cognitive 
Simulation
Chat 
Bots
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large technological component (McCorduck, 2004).
Both these distinctions are a bit more complex than they seem, at least for AI: We do, at
the  end  of  the  day,  need to  translate  any human-like  ideas  into  a  formal  computer
language (see section 6.3.5) in order to make an AI system work – such is the nature of
the technology available to us at the moment. More detail on what is meant by “human-
like” and what I aim for are in section 3.2.
The distinction between technology and science isn't sharp either – a working system
demonstrates  to  science  what  can  be  achieved  by  the  underlying  mechanism,  and
conversely scientific models (such as neural models) serve as the bases (or inspirations,
see sections  3.1,  6.1.1) for AI systems. A demonstration of how seriously this link is
taken  by  contemporary  science  could  be  seen  in  a  note  on  Richard  Feynman’s
blackboard at the time of his death, reading “what I cannot create, I do not understand”2
(Feynman,  1988;  Resnick,  1993).  Another  point  to recall  in  the interaction between
science and technology is that in every generation people conceive of humans in terms
of the latest technology, e.g. Aristotle's “clay vessel with a divine spark”, notions of the
heart  as  a  furnace,  Freud's  hydraulic  models  and  today's  notions  of  the  brain  as
computer (Bolter, 1984).
So the project presented here is about human-like, technological AI. An important part
of the  methodology is keeping track of truth-claims, and what kinds of truth are being
claimed.
2  Photo of blackboard: http://archives.caltech.edu/pictures/1.10-29.jpg 
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This thesis aims to establish that “introspection is recommended for anthropic AI”. In so
doing,  a  development  paradigm  for  AI  will  be  explored  (approximately)  half  way
between classic AI and the phenomenological critique of AI as initiated by  (Dreyfus,
1979). The literature review will start with understanding the two camps – cogitivism
and classic AI on one side, and phenomenology and its critique of AI on the other.
Section  2.1 focuses  on  the  heart  of  the  disagreements  between  cognitivism  and
phenomenology.
Section  2.2 Presents classic AI through the central figure of Herbert Simon. Simon is
the pre-eminent thinker in classic AI, the only person ever to receive both the Nobel
prize and the Turing prize.
Section 2.3 Presents Dreyfus and his critique of AI. Dreyfus (1979) is “the voice of one
crying in the wilderness:  'Make clear the way for Heidegger!'…”, arguing against a
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tradition in AI that Winograd & Flores will later  (1986) call the rationalistic tradition.
Sadly, Dreyfus has no concrete, coded contribution.
Section 2.4 Presents Winograd & Flores, who aim to bridge this divide and make some
more concrete progress. They come up with ideas for a working system, but that system
starts a new field of technology called “group-ware” rather than contributing to AI as
such. One of the contributions of their analysis is adding the hermeneutics of Gadamer
to the discussion.
Section 2.5 surveys hermeneutics and Gadamer in more depth.
In a nutshell, my position (that introspection is recommended for anthropic AI) will be a
compromise  between  Simon  and  Dreyfus,  and  can  be  seen  as  a  continuation  of
Winograd & Flores's work, especially their suggestion of Gadamer. Unlike Dreyfus, this
thesis aims to be positive, to show what can be done based on a more critical approach
to AI. Unlike Simon it takes account of the subjective point of view. Like Winograd and
Flores, it will look at a broader critique of AI than Dreyfus did, and will end up looking
surprisingly like the work of Gadamer (1976, 1979). Unlike Winograd & Flores it will
stay in the field of AI.
In  introducing  the  background  of  this  thesis,  more  space  will  be  dedicated  in  this
chapter to continental concepts, as they would be more foreign to some readers than the
analytical terminology.
2.1 The Cognition-vs-Phenomenology debate
This  thesis  proposes  a  novel  avenue  in  AI  development  (introspection),  which  is
between the classic-AI cognitive tradition and Dreyfus's critique of AI. Therefore, as the
first  order-of-business  it  would  be  useful  to  contrast  the  cognitivist  position  with
Dreyfus's  starkly and clearly,  using two founding texts.  We will  find that these two
camps  talk  past  each  other:  cognitivism is  essentially  reductionist-materialist,  while
phenomenology  has  either  an  idealist  or  Heideggerian  ontology.  Cognitivism
understands the mind “from the outside”, as an engineer would, while phenomenology
is interested in “what it is like” to be/have a mind. Sociologically, phenomenology is
heavily  based on a  German-language literary tradition,  while  cognitivism is  heavily
based on the metaphor of mind as machine.
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The  book  “Cognitive  Psychology”  (Neisser,  1967) coined  the  term  “cognitive
psychology” which  gave the name “cognitive” to the later “cognitive science” (Boden,
2008, p. 16). In the first paragraphs of Neisser's book - arguably the defining part of the
defining text of the entire field – he says:
It has been said that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. As a hypothesis
about localization of function, the statement is not quite right—the brain
and not the eye is surely the most important organ involved. Nevertheless it
points  clearly  enough toward the central  problem of  cognition.  Whether
beautiful or ugly or just conveniently at hand, the world of experience is
produced by the man who experiences it.
This is not the attitude of a skeptic, only of a psychologist. There certainly is
a real world of trees and people and cars and even books, and it has a great
deal  to  do  with  our  experiences  of  these  objects.  However,  we have  no
direct,  immediate  access  to  the  world,  nor  to  any  of  its  properties.  The
ancient theory of eidola, which supposed that faint copies of objects can
enter the mind directly, must be rejected. Whatever we know about reality
has been mediated, not only by the organs of sense but by complex systems
which  interpret  and  reinterpret  sensory  information.  The  activity  of  the
cognitive systems results in—and is integrated with—the activity of muscles
and glands that  we call  "behavior."  It  is  also partially—very partially—
reflected in those private experiences of seeing,  hearing,  imagining,  and
thinking to which verbal descriptions never do full justice.
Physically, this page is an array of small mounds of ink, lying in certain
positions  on  the  more  highly  reflective  surface  of  the  paper.  It  is  this
physical page which Koffka (1935) and others would have called the "distal
stimulus,"  and  from  which  the  reader  is  hopefully  acquiring  some
information. But the sensory input is not the page itself; it is a pattern of
light  rays,  originating  in  the  sun  or  in  some  artificial  source,  that  are
reflected from the page and happen to reach the eye. Suitably focused by the
lens and other ocular apparatus, the rays fall on the sensitive retina, where
they can initiate the neural processes that  eventually  lead to  seeing and
reading and remembering. These patterns of light at the retina are the so-
called "proximal stimuli." They are not the least bit like eidola. One-sided in
their perspective, shifting radically several times each second, unique and
novel at every moment, the proximal stimuli bear little resemblance to either
the real object that gave rise to them or to the object of experience that the
perceiver will construct as a result...'
So we see  that  Neisser  accepts  the  following  perspectives (see  section  1.4.2 about
perspectives) as legitimate: 
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• A person is an animal, with their brain, sense organs etc.
• with a “complex”  “cognitive system”, inside
• in a “real world”, with
◦ “trees and people and cars and even books”, and
◦ “small mounds of ink” that generate
• “patterns of light at the retina” - a process rather than a thing.
And Neisser rejects “eidola”. “Private experiences” are only accepted as end-results, not
as having any causal efficacy, beyond being described. It seems that Neisser wants to
reduce the number of elements in his world-view as much as possible - he is trying to
make  his  world-view  simpler.  This  could  have  two  motivations:  either  to  make  a
technology based on this model more feasible or because he has inherited an aversion to
complex  explanations  from  his  predecessors,  be  they  Occam,  Watson  (see  section
3.3.3), or the other early cognitivists (Pear, 2007, pp. 111–115).
Dreyfus,  on  the  other  hand  (1979,  p.  269), will  have  none  of  this.  Quoting  from
Neisser's passage above:
There is certainly a real world of trees and people and cars and
even books… However, we have no direct, immediate access to
the world, nor to any of its properties.
Dreyfus says:
Here [...] the damage is already done. There is indeed a world to which we
have no immediate access. We do not directly perceive the world of atoms
and electromagnetic waves (if it even makes sense to speak of perceiving
them)  but  the world of  cars  and books  is  just  the world  we do directly
experience.  ...  we  saw  that  at  this  point,  Neisser  has  recourse  to  an
unjustified theory that we perceive "snapshots" or sense data. His further
account only compounds the confusion: 
Physically, this page is an array of small mounds of ink, lying in
certain  positions  on the  more  highly  reflective  surface  of  the
paper.
But  physically,  what  is  there  are atoms  in motion,  not  paper  and small
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mounds of ink. Paper and small mounds of ink are elements in the human
world. Neisser, however, is trying to look at them in a special way, as if he
were a savage, a Martian, or a computer, who didn't know what they were
for. There is no reason to suppose that these strangely isolated objects are
what  men directly  perceive (although one may perhaps approximate this
experience  in  the  very  special  detached  attitude  which  comes  over  a
cognitive  psychologist  sitting  down to  write  a  book).  What  we normally
perceive is a printed page. 
Again Neisser's middle-world, which is neither the world of physics nor the
human  [experience] world, turns out to be an artefact. No man has ever
seen such an eerie world; and no physicist has any place for it in his system.
Once we postulate it, however, it follows inevitably that the human world
will somehow have to be reconstructed out of these fragments. 
One-sided in their perspective, shifting radically several times
each second, unique and novel at every moment, the proximal
stimuli bear little resemblance to either the real object that gave
rise to them or to the object of experience that the perceiver will
construct as a result.
But this whole construction process is superfluous. It is described in terms
which make sense only if we think of man as a computer receiving isolated
facts from a world in which it has no purposes; programmed to use them,
plus a lot of other meaningless data it has accumulated or been given, to
make some sort of sense (whatever that might mean) out of what is going on
around it. 
There is no reason to suppose that a normal human being has this problem,
although some aphasics do. A normal person experiences the objects of the
world as already interrelated and full of meaning. There is no justification
for the assumption that we first experience isolated facts, or snapshots of
facts, or momentary views of snapshots of isolated facts, and then give them
significance.  The  analytical  superfluousness  of  such  a  process  is  what
contemporary philosophers such as Heidegger and Wittgenstein are trying
to point out. To put this in terms of Neisser's discussion as nearly as sense
will allow, we would have to say: "The human world is the mind's model of
the physical world." But then there is no point in saying it is "in the mind,"
and no point in inventing a third world between the physical and the human
world which is an arbitrarily impoverished version of the world in which we
live, out of which this world has to be built up again. (stress added)
So Dreyfus rejects the “ink  mounds” and extols phenomenology (human experience of
a world full of meaningful things and situations). Phenomenology (see section 3.3.1.5)
is systematic peer-reviewed introspection (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012, pp. 28–29). One
could be fully sympathetic with Dreyfus, but it is important to also understand Neisser -
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he goes to the “ink mounds” level probably because he has an eye out for the scientific-
reductionist or engineering perspective.  The ink mounds are not only some “Martian”
invention of cognitive scientists, but also an approximation of what a camera would see
as pixels. The ink mounds are also what an engineer would need in order to replicate a
page. And replication, in the 20th century, is considered a hallmark of understanding: as
mentioned in section 1.5, on the death of Richard Feynman this text was found on his
office blackboard: “What I cannot create, I do not understand” (Feynman, 1988).
Arguably Dreyfus is the more thoroughly philosophical (or more dogmatic) of the two,
trying  to  distinguish  “real”  categories,  while  Neisser  is  more  pragmatic  and
technological.
Let's  now move to a more systematic  presentation of  Simon & Dreyfus's  positions.
More on how they talk past each other is found in section 1.2.3.
2.2 Simon
Herbert Simon (b. 1916, d. 2001), was one of the most prolific thinkers of the 20th
century.  His  contributions span Public  Administration,  Business Studies,  Psychology
(where he is considered one of the instigators of the cognitive revolution (Pear, 2007, p.
113)),  Economics,  Operations  research,  Mathematics,  Statistics,  Computing,  and
Artificial  Intelligence.  Indeed,  his  “more than 900 publications” span in  addition to
computers and AI “every social science discipline other than anthropology” (Augier &
March,  2001).  “As  much  as  any  one  person,  Herbert  A.  Simon  has  shaped  the
intellectual agenda of the human and social sciences in the second half of the twentieth
century”  (Turkle, 1991). Specifically in AI, arguably over half of the achievements of
GOFAI were his own or his students'. He is the only person (so far) to win both the
Turing prize (1975) and the Nobel prize (in economics, 1978). He continued Watson's
objections to introspection (J. B. Watson, 1913, 1920), and took part in bringing much
of behaviourism’s heritage into the cognitive fold (Costall, 2006). For all his breadth, he
saw himself  as “a monomaniac.  All  my life I  have been studying one thing: human
decision making” (Feigenbaum, 1989). His impact was not accidental. His energy and
conviction showed him in the light of “a proper missionary” (Augier & March, 2001).
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2.2.1 Economics
Simon viewed as his main contribution (in the field economics) the notion of bounded
rationality (Simon, 1996a, p. 165). The idea of bounded rationality was a rebellion
against  classical  economics,  and that  theory's  faith  in  “'economic  man',  who in  the
course of being 'economic' is also 'rational'  ”  (Simon, 1955). Simon's contention was
that the circumstances in which a human agent finds himself place restrictions on the
human's rationality, and therefore the idea of an optimising, totally rational “economic
man”  is  unrealistically  optimistic;  humans  are  not  as  rational  or  well  informed  as
classical economics would have it. Human rationality is bounded by the information
available  and  the  amount  of  time  and  resources  one  can  practically  devote  to  any
decision.  Similarly  in  AI,  Simon  propounds  “satisficing”,  which  is  his  term  for  a
solution that is not optimal, but “good enough”, or “fit for purpose”. He later related
satisficing to the notion of heuristics in AI.
2.2.2 Hostility to subjectivity - rationalistic
Simon was a scientist of the rationalistic tradition through and through (as defined by
(Winograd & Flores, 1986), see section 2.4). His basic world-view was that humans are
rational, his main metaphors for life were a maze, or a chess game (Simon, 1996a, p.
113).   “For me mathematics  has  always  been a language of  thought.  I  don't  know
precisely what I mean by that... Mathematics – this sort of non-verbal thinking – is my
language of discovery” (Ibid. p. 106).
He was uncomfortable with subjectivity and often distanced himself from it - in himself
and others. In his autobiography (Simon, 1996a), he only refers to himself in the first
person once he is grown up – the vicissitudes of a child's emotions were a bit too much
for him to identify with or discuss in later life. In his autobiography, when describing
his early years he refers to himself in the third person, as “the boy”. Moreover, in his
uncomfortable relationship with all  things subjective,  he was not versed even in the
everyday  terminologies  of  subjectivity,  confounding  “introspection”  with
“introversion”: “the boy himself was incorrigibly introspective” (Ibid., p. 19). 
Simon  bought  into  Watson's  ambition  (Costall,  2006) that  psychology  should  be  a
science on a par with chemistry and physics. However he falls into hubris, and takes his
ambition to be already substantially fulfilled, making his own projects into the building
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blocks of his world-view, with faultless circular logic  (Costall, 2006; Dreyfus, 1979):
“If  chess  plays  the  role  in  cognitive research that  Drosophila does  in  genetics,  the
Towers of Hanoi is the analogue of E Coli...” (Simon, 1996a, p. 327). 
2.2.3 AI
The  issue  of  subjectivity  and  introspection  does  not  explicitly  show up in  Simon's
writings about AI. Rationalistic symbol-manipulating AI was (for him) the future: “...
enlarging  symbol manipulation to embrace much more than deductive logic. Symbols
can  be  used  for  everyday  thinking,  for  metaphorical  thinking,  even  for  'illogical'
thinking. This crucial generalisation began to emerge at about the time of world war II,
though it  took the appearance of the modern computer to perfect it” (Ibid. p.  193).
Throughout his AI career he was “... interested in simulating human problem solving,
and not simply demonstrating how computers can solve hard problems” (Simon, 1996a,
p. 209). So much so that he explicitly claims in a 1956 letter to Russell that his software
proves theorems like a human does (Ibid. p. 207, see also pp. 234, 274, 331). And yet,
there are  no signs  of subjectivity  or fallibility,  beyond his  own theory of “bounded
rationality”.
Simon “saw problems as generally decomposable into hierarchical structures” (Augier
& March, 2001; Simon, 1989). This view is visible in his AI efforts, such as the General
Problem Solver, and the Logic Theorist. His faith in decomposability, and in the validity
of general solutions for wide areas shows also in his contention (above) of being only
interested in one question, human decision making, while publishing research in many
different fields.
Simon towered over the field of AI also in terms of methodology, and in terms of how
the  field  viewed  itself:  Simon  viewed  AI  as  a  science  (Simon,  1996b),  and  as
inseparable from his other fields of study – in this sense he pre-dated Wheeler's (2005)
definition of AI as the “intellectual heart of cognitive science”. 
In terms of methodology, Simon (with his usual AI collaborator, Newell) established his
ideas of the rules of the field. As (Feigenbaum, 1989, p. 10) has it:
The  work  of  Newell  and  Simon  impressed  upon  AI  the  methodological
paradigm of  empirical  science.  The  methodology  dictates  this  'scientific
loop': 
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a. design … based on the information processing model
b. test … based on computer programs you write to represent your design
c. measure … based on actual computer runs of these programs (not 'pencil-
and-paper', not 'armchair thinking', not 'theorems')
d. redesign… based upon the discoveries made about the behaviour of the
modelled
This is the 'coin of the realm', as Newell labelled it……
More details of his work are mentioned as needed in the succeeding chapters, especially
sections 3.3.3, 4.2.2, 4.3.3.
2.3 Dreyfus
Dreyfus's book, “What computers can't do” (1979) may have been better titled “What
cannot  be  formalised”.  Beyond  being  quite  polemic  against  the  AI  community,  he
exposes their  over-optimism that he blames on wild extrapolations,  and shows their
underlying  assumptions  that  he  finds  questionable.  He  presents  very  sketchily  an
alternative based on the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty,  but this alternative
does not lead to anything that can be formalised and programmed.
The rest of this section is a summary of “What Computers Can't Do” (Dreyfus, 1979)
and his more recent published position (Dreyfus, 2007).
2.3.1 Part I
To Dreyfus, the assumptions of AI start with Plato  (Dreyfus, 1979, pp. 67–68), who
looks in Euthyphro for the “necessary and sufficient” conditions for piety. To him, this
is the first quest for “effective computation” - a blind procedure that would allow a
conclusion to be reached with no human discretion. He skims over Aristotle, and quotes
Hobbes' assertion that “reason is nothing but reckoning” (Ibid. p. 69). Leibniz saw his
algebra  as  a  means  to  calculating  the  “characteristics”  of  things,  perhaps  the  first
allusion to symbols as a basis for AI. Dreyfus moves along swiftly to Boole, Babbage,
and Turing (Ibid. p 71). 
Dreyfus  then  gives  a  history  of  AI,  and turns  to  the  wild  optimism of  early  years,
including Simon's 1956 predictions (Dreyfus, 1979, pp. 81–82):
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1.  That  within  ten  years  a  digital  computer  will  be  the  world  chess
champion, unless the rules bar it from competition.
2.  That  within  ten  years  a  digital  computer  will  discover  and prove  an
important new mathematical theorem.
3. That within ten years most theories in psychology will take the form of
computer programs, or of qualitative statements about the characteristics of
computer programs.
Dreyfus then launches into a detailed debunking of these predictions.
Next (Ibid. pp. 91-100) Dreyfus surveys AI work from 1957 to 1962 in what he terms
“cognitive simulation”,  including language translation,  problem solving and pattern
recognition.  He  shows  that  the  efforts  in  these  fields  were  characterised  by  early
success, enthusiasm, failure, and sometimes pessimism and sometimes outright denial
of the difficulties. 
His diagnosis of cognitive simulation is that this project has been on the wrong side of
four distinctions:
• Fringe consciousness vs Heuristically guided search (Ibid. p. 100)
• Ambiguity tolerance vs context-free precision (Ibid. p. 107)
• Essential/inessential discrimination vs trial-and-error search (Ibid. p. 112)
• Perspicuous grouping vs character lists (Ibid. p. 120)
The next  phase of  AI was what  Dreyfus  calls  “semantic  information processing”:
Bobrow's  “student”  (Ibid.  p.  132),  Evans's  “analogy”  (Ibid. p.  137)  and  Quinlan's
“semantic memory program” (Ibid. p. 142). His analysis of the problem with this form
of AI is that all these are attempts were very specific, and no attempt was made to solve
the underlying issues of semantics, which humans obviously have a natural solution for.
2.3.2 Part II – Assumptions Underlying Persistent Optimism
In part II Dreyfus turns to an analysis of the assumptions behind both forms of AI. He
details four assumptions that are in the heart of AI as a research programme, at least one
of which a researcher must embrace in order to pursue artificial intelligence:
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1. The biological assumption (Ibid. p. 159-162), that at some level humans operate
in a digital  manner.  Every generation thinks in terms of its latest technology
(Bolter, 1984), and so we should excuse Aristotle of thinking of the brain as a
cooling device, and we should therefore forgive those alive in the later part of
the 20th century for thinking in terms of computers. But even if the brain were
some sort of computer, there is no evidence that it would be in any way similar
to our computers. All evidence we have points to the brain not being digital (see
also (B. C. Smith, 2005)). 
2. The psychological assumption (Dreyfus, 1979, pp. 163–205), that there is some
mental level which is digital (this is at the heart of cognitive science, see (Boden,
2008)). Dreyfus doubts that there is any non-metaphorical way in which we can
discuss information-processing notions like “list processing” as anything but one
of  the  things  that  the  mind  is  capable of  doing  –  but  the  psychological
assumption  and  the  cognitive  research  paradigm  require  that  the  mind  be
constituted in these discrete, digital information-processing terms. 
3. The  epistemological assumption  (Dreyfus, 1979, pp. 189–205) is that perhaps
neither the brain nor the mind are digital, but just as the planets are not actually
calculating their trajectories around the solar system, nonetheless their trajectory
can  be  calculated.  In  a  sense  this  is  the  assumption  of  AI-as-technology  as
opposed to cognitive or brain simulators. In AI-as-technology all we need is to
simulate the behaviour, not the precise actual mechanism that produced it. The
optimism of this programme is to a large part based on the success of physics
and the subsequent technology. Dreyfus doubts that any non-arbitrary human
behaviour can be formalised. 
4. The ontological assumption (Ibid. pp.206-224) is that all facts are enumerable,
and can be presented to a computer. The idea that all facts can be made explicit
has a history going as far back as Plato, but received its most recent prominent
statement  in  the Tractatus:  “The world is  the totality  of  facts,  not  of  things”
(Wittgenstein, 2001b, para. 1.1). Minsky attacks this notion with his estimate
that “sensible behaviour” would require between 105 and 107 facts. This gives
rise  to  the  “large  database  problem”,  and  the  related  frame  problem.  These
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problems  arise,  for  Dreyfus,  not  from  human  intelligence  but  from  the
ontological  assumption,  which  is  only  one  possible  interpretation  of  human
intelligence. His alternative is a flexible intelligence that is always already in a
situation,  and therefore  has  no  frame problem nor  has  any  need  to  look up
relevant facts in a large database.
Dreyfus turns  (1979, pp. 231–234) to giving his alternative by pointing out that the
Platonic-logical  tradition  and  the  computer  industry  are  forces  so  strong  that  they
overwhelm all before them, but one must at least try to be aware that the direction they
are taking human culture is not the only possible one, and the assumptions involved
(above)  are  not  axioms  we  should  never  question.  Presenting  an  alternative  as  a
scientific theory would be falling back into this Platonic tradition, because a scientific
explanation,  these  days,  requires separating  any  object  into  atomic  parts,  and  so
subsumes it under the very framework Dreyfus is trying to reject. Dreyfus presents as an
alternative phenomenology. Phenomenology (to Dreyfus) is diametrically opposed to a
mechanical  explanation.  Its  explanations  aim  to  find  the  necessary  and  sufficient
elements that go into human behaviour. Dreyfus draws mainly on the work of Martin
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
Some points of nomenclature are due. In everyday speech the terms world and universe
are used near-interchangeably. In the parlance of phenomenology the term “universe”
means the objective perspective, planets and other things “out there”, while the word
“world” means something more akin to “the world of the child” or “the world of the
17th-century London carpenter” - it is the subjective world of a particular individual.
This is related to the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena. Likewise, a
“situation” is conceived as pertaining to a particular subject, while a “state” is physical,
external,  and objective.  So a  state  is  in the universe,  and a  situation is  in  a  world.
Similarly “coping” in a situation is the phenomenological term for “responding” to a
state, being “situated” is the subjective side of being in a specific place and time, etc.
2.3.3 Part III – Alternatives to the Traditional Assumptions
Admitting that his account is less precise, Dreyfus examines three areas:
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1. The role of the body in intelligent behaviour (Ibid. pp. 235-255) 
Descartes made an argument that machines can only be in a small number of
states, and therefore cannot respond to all the complexities of the world (without
an immaterial soul). Convenient as this would be for Dreyfus, he must admit that
the number of possible states of a modern computer is so vast that this argument
no longer holds. Dreyfus argues that what is missing from a machine is not a
soul but being “an involved, situated, material body”. AI has done well in all the
“higher” parts of the mind, like logic etc., but has failed miserably in the parts of
behaviour that we share with animals. Our perception is global (Gestalt), with
the  overall  meaning  determining  the  parts  of  speech  and  the  phonemes.
Perception involves a distinction between the foreground and background, with
most  of  the  retina-input  ignored  as  background.  Our  perception  involves  an
“outer horizon” - the limits of what we notice. A computer, by contrast, has to
either  process some data  explicitly  or  not  at  all.  Perception also involves an
“inner horizon” of perceiving objects as being whole, even when we only see the
upper side of a table and three of its legs, we perceive it as having an underside
and four legs.
Skills need to be acquired, and perception is also a skill, no less in vision or
feeling than in language understanding. Unlike computers, in humans there is a
clumsy rule-following phase later replaced by a smoother skill (see the video
examples  in  section  7.5.4),  or  a  gestalt  of  skills.  This  requires  practise,  and
practice requires being involved with a  body.  The body is  already skilled in
acquiring skills.  Skills are acquired by what  Merleau-Ponty calls “maximum
grasp”, which is a continuous monitoring of the situation while measuring how
well one is coping with the situation (Ibid. p. 250). This is situation and goal
dependent. Science may require a detailed description of  every motion, but our
skills as such do not – birds are not aeronautic engineers – they just fly. Skill
also allows us to adopt tools in a sense as part of our own body, as a skilled
carpenter adopts his hammer, or as we all do with our main language.
2. Orderly behaviour without recourse to rules (Ibid. pp. 256-271)
Our (rationalist)  philosophical  tradition believes  that  every orderly behaviour
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can  be formalised in terms of rules. In open-structure problems, there are (at
least)  three  phases:  one  needs  to  find  out  which  elements  can  possibly  be
relevant, Which actually are relevant, and which of these are essential. All these
distinctions vary with the situation.
Dreyfus's alternative view is that the situation is  not a collection of data that
needs to be sorted into relevant/irrelevant categories etc., but is always already
imbued with meaning. A punter deciding on the horses does not use a database
of all facts about horses and people, but always already knows what it would be
like to be upset by a parent's death or to be disappointed in love, and knows that
such events would effect a jockey’s performance not  because of some arms-
length analysis of an alien situation but because the punter is involved in the
same field of concerns which constitutes being human, so he always already
knows “what it would be like” for a jockey to lose his mother as opposed to
losing his watch.
The human world has a unity to it, that arises out of it being my world, with my
concerns, and with implements being there for purposes, my  purposes. The AI
universe  of  disjoint  pixel  inputs  being  modelled  into  a  “universe  model”  of
objective objects is devoid of all meanings, significance, or unity. “nowhere [in
AI] do we find the familiar world of implements organised in terms of purposes”
(Ibid. p. 267).
Dreyfus  continues  with  the  discussion  quoted  above  (section  2.1),  and
summarises that  “to avoid inventing problems and mysteries we must leave the
physical  world  to  the  physicists  and  neurophysiologists,  and  return  to  the
description of the human world which we immediately perceive” (Ibid. p. 271).
3. The situation as a function of human needs (Ibid. pp. 272-280) 
People's  needs  cannot  be  pre-specified.  One  cannot  say  there  is  a  need  for
“food”, “shelter” etc., and thereby predict human behaviour except in the most
cruel and extreme situations. People discover what they want, what they need, as
an act of creative self-discovery. One can say that a man needs love, but that
need is never fully specified as just “love”. After that man falls in love with a
specific woman, his need is for her, not for “love” or “a woman” in general. We
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explore the world and stumble upon things that we later say that we always
needed – and these are always specific and arrive in the day-to-day involvement
in the world. So no pre-specified means-ends-analysis, with a predefined set of
“ends” will come close to implementing the way human intelligence operates.
Moreover,  not  only  the  motivations  and  needs  of  a  human  are  not  pre-
determined, even the correct description of a situation, even for a committed
scientist, is not pre-fixed but is determined by the observer, subject to her pre-
conceptions,  or  “paradigm”  to  use  Kuhn's   terminology  (see  also  section
3.3.3.4). Man's nature is indeed so malleable that Dreyfus worries (Ibid., p. 280)
that  if  the  current  infatuation  with  computers  and  the  AI  way  of  thinking
continues then humans will think of themselves more and more in terms of the
pre-specified means-ends paradigm, and the danger to humanity will not be from
super-intelligent machines but from sub-intelligent humans3.
2.3.4 Dreyfus's current position
Dreyfus  (2007)4  uses  the  frame  problem  as  key  to  understanding  how  different
researchers have tried to achieve AI. He takes it  for granted that the only AI worth
having  would  be  “Heideggerian  AI”.  He  quotes  approvingly  from  Brooks,  Agre,
Wheeler, and Freeman.
Brooks is quoted approvingly for objecting to representations, and looking for a non-
GOFAI way of making robots, but his “robots respond only to fixed features of the
environment, not to context or changing significance. They are like ants”, he also points
out that Brooks's systems do not learn.
Dreyfus calls Agre a “pragmatist”. Agre (with Chapman) is explicitly Heideggerian, but
objectifies the Heideggerian readiness-at-hand, and programs none of the experience of
skilful coping. Agre was “putting his virtual agent in a virtual world where all possible
relevance is determined beforehand”, and therefore cannot account for learning, or new
relevancies.
Moreover,
3 Some would say that the wholesale adoption of American business-school methods of management in
areas other than business is already doing this (Thanks to Blay Whitby for pointing this out).
4 The self-same talk has been repeated on other occasions, and appears with later dates.
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“Agre’s Heideggerian AI did not try to program this experiential aspect of
being drawn in by a solicitation. Rather, with his deictic representations,
Agre objectified both the functions and their situational relevance for the
agent. In Pengi, when a virtual ice cube defined by its function is close to
the virtual player, a rule dictates a response, e.g. kick it. No skill is involved
and no learning takes place” (emphasis added).
Dreyfus is perhaps most positive about Wheeler's work - He “agree[s] it is time for a
positive account of Heideggerian AI and of an underlying Heideggerian neuroscience”.
However he objects to Wheeler's  reintroduction of representations,  and to Wheeler's
adoption of Classic AI’s concept that humans are involved with problem solving.
Dreyfus  suggests  that  recent  research  into  neurodynamics  in  rabbits  (by  Walter
Freeman) provides a promising start to understanding cognition correctly. However, this
effort is still quite far from producing any usable technology.
Dreyfus  maintains that “most basically we are absorbed copers”, not problem-solvers,
or cognitive agents, or planners, etc. He continues that  “at its best,  coping does not
involve representations or problem solving at all”.
For more about phenomenology see section 3.3.1.5.
2.4 Winograd & Flores   
Winograd  and  Flores  pick  up  the  project  of  critically  thinking  about  AI,  and  take
Dreyfus as one of several sources for their  discussion. They  describe an intellectual
current  central  to  western  civilisation  (and  to  Dreyfus’s  critique)  they  call  “the
rationalistic  tradition”  (Winograd & Flores,  1986,  pp.  14–26) It  is  characterised  by
approaching any and all problems in a series of steps:
1. Characterise  the  situation  in  terms  of  identifiable  objects  with  well-defined
properties.
2. Find general rules that apply to situations in term of those objects and properties.
3. Apply the rules logically to the situation of concern, drawing conclusions about
what should be done.
In most  of  the analytic  or  English-speaking tradition  of  philosophy questions  about
points 1-2 are often neglected as being antithetical to the scientific project, which is
precisely about explaining and making predictions about situations in clear-and-distinct
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terms, using general rules. Most attention in English-speaking philosophy, (especially as
“the  hand  maiden  of  science”)  goes  to  finding  better  ways  of  applying  3.  This
rationalistic approach is at the heart of science, and enjoys all the prestige that comes
from science's success. For many this is the right (or possibly the only) way to think.
Anyone objecting to this way of thought is accused of “having religion up their sleeve”
(Boden,  2008,  pp.  251,  324) or  of  mysticism,  or  of  being  incomprehensible
(McCorduck, 2004, p. 230).
The rationalistic orientation pervades, therefore, not only computer-science and AI, but
also scientific psychology, management theory, linguistics, and cognitive science (not
least  thanks  to  Simon  and  other  scholars  being  active  in  several  of  these  fields
simultaneously).  Careful thinkers within this tradition do admit to its limitations, but in
daily  work from computer-science  through cognitive  science to  psychology and the
social sciences, far too often this methodology is taken for granted, not only in what
answers are accepted, but also in what questions are even allowed.
Winograd & Flores discuss three alternatives to the rationalistic view:
2.4.1 Understanding and being
Like  Dreyfus  (section  2.3)  Winograd  &  Flores  introduce  Heidegger  (Winograd  &
Flores, 1986, pp. 27–37) as a major possible source of ideas for cognitive science and
AI. However, they expand on Dreyfus by going into Hermeneutics. Hermeneutics (the
theory  of  interpretation)  began  as  a  theory  of  the  interpretation  of  texts,  especially
religious texts, such as the bible. One of the important insights of phenomenology is
that  people,  when interpreting  art,  music  and  texts  use  similar  approaches  to  when
interpreting  anything  else,  e.g.  making  sense  of  situations  they  are  in.  In  a  sense,
studying the practices people apply to understanding art or texts can be used as a test
case for developing sensibilities for understanding how people make sense of the world
in general.
One of the key observations of hermeneutics is the hermeneutic circle. The idea is that
the  whole  is  always  understood  in  terms  of  the  parts,  and  the  parts  can  only  be
understood as part of a whole. So how can we understand anything? Different thinkers
address this problem. This is somewhat analogous to the frame problem in AI – the
problem of finding the context in which to understand some input. 
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One of Heidegger's key points is denial of the dualism of subject and object. We never
have an experience of subjectivity without it being directed towards an object, nor of an
object unobserved by a subject. What  is going on (by Heidegger) is a unity he calls
being-in-the-world, the ongoing encounter between the human (dasein in his parlance)
and his world. That is not to deny that there may be an objective universe out there –
Heidegger  is  just  saying  that  is  not  what  is  going  of  phenomenologically –
phenomenologically  we  are “being  in  the  world”  -  an ongoing  encounter between
“dasein” (approximately, a fancy term for human) and dasein's world. This encounter is
not  neutral,  disinterested,  platonic,  scientific,  but  caring – the  world  in  encountered
inside a context of dasein’s concerns.
The  subjective  and  the  objective  cannot  exist  independent  of  each  other.  They  are
theoretical  (non-existent)  polar  opposites  of  what  is  really  going on – a  process  of
encounter, which is identical to the process of interpretation (of the world and “objects”
by dasein). “The interpreted and the interpreter do not exist independently: existence is
interpretation, and interpretation is existence” (Ibid. p. 31).
Hans-Georg Gadamer  (b 1900, d 2002) continued Heidegger’s work in the field of
hermeneutics,  with  Heidegger's  approval  (Malpas,  2013). Two  of  Gadamer's  key
concepts are tradition and prejudice. He shows that all thinking is done within a context
of a tradition (if only minimally in that no one person invented language). Plato was
operating  in  an  intellectual  tradition  that  already  included  Homer,  Pythagoras  and
Socrates, just as present physicists operate in a tradition that includes Occam, Leibnitz,
Newton, Einstein, Feynman, etc.
Gadamer  re-examined  prejudice,  showing  that  prejudice  does  not  only  have  the
negative meaning it has in our daily parlance, but is also a necessary condition of any
understanding. Total “openness” (let's take that as the theoretical opposite of prejudice)
cannot understand anything, because it does not have any categories or language with
which  to  interpret  and  understand  anything.  Physicists  need their  commitment  to
mathematics to gather and measure their observations. A businessman needs the notions
of  value  and  money  in  order  to  examine  opportunities.  An  interesting  example  of
prejudice in action in this positive sense is that our current society (following centuries
of struggle against dogma, racism and slavery) has a very strong prejudice against the
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notion of prejudice itself.
A few points about Heidegger's position:
Our implicit beliefs and assumptions cannot all be made explicit. There is no neutral
position we can occupy where we examine our own thought processes without these
processes being active. The inevitability of this circularity, and hence the fact that the
project of human self-exploration is  endless – these should not discourage us,  as in
every iteration we can find out more about how we operate, only this information will
never be clear and explicit, complete and objective. Being human is not an engineering
project.
Practical  understanding  is  more  fundamental  that  detached  theoretical
understanding.  Our  mind  is  not  designed/evolved  to  deal  with  platonic  theories.
Understanding the nature of our mind, which is the same as understanding the nature of
interpretation,  should start  and end with our encounter  with everyday life,  not  with
advanced  academic  matters,  which  are  highly  contrived  (e.g.  formal  grammar,
mathematics).
We do not relate to things primarily through having representations of them. What we
have,  in  our practical  and day-to-day mind, is  familiarity  and skills  of dealing with
situations and the world – not some engineer's schema of the objects around us (this is
the main thrust of Dreyfus’s attack on AI  in (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986)).
Meaning is fundamentally social and cannot be reduced to a meaning-giving activity of
individual subjects. This point is similar to Wittgenstein's point about meaning being
given within the context of a language-game, where there are socially-agreed rules (e.g.
“anthropology” is not a colour).
Thrownness is one of Heidegger's basic concepts. It describes the human predicament,
that life itself, and everything and every moment in life always starts before one is quite
ready. We are never fully prepared for anything, nor do we fully understand anything.
Winograd & Flores  demonstrate  thrownness  with an example of  having to  chair  an
important meeting:
• You cannot avoid acting
• You cannot step back and reflect on your actions
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• The effects of your actions cannot be predicted
• You do not have a stable representation on the situation
• Every representation is an interpretation
• Language is action
This may be more clear and acute in chairing a meeting, but it is true of every waking
moment.
Perhaps the most central Heideggerian concept is “readiness to hand”. A hammer (the
classic example) is not given to us in terms of its objective properties, nor is it really
present for us when it is in its correct context and in use. A Hammer shows up to us with
all its technical detail when it breaks, or when it is completely in a wrong context, like
in our salad, or displayed in a museum. When a workman is driving a nail, the hammer
is  hardly  more  present  to  him  than  his  hand,  or  the  tendon  inside his  hand.  So
equipment, in its correct context, is transparent (Heidegger calls this “ready to hand”).
The same equipment becomes present (and an annoyance) when the hammer breaks, or
isn't where it should be, or is in a wrong context.
2.4.2 Cognition as a biological phenomenon
In nature, any system that has a boundary and tries to control the environment (outside)
for its benefit using its body (inside) can be considered a form of life. Forms of life
include bacteria, horses, people, and cities. Any attempt to look at people as a form of
life  would  be  biological,  and  would  be  based  on  physics  and  chemistry.  Zoology,
anatomy and evolution are a “macro” view of this level of description.
In AI, examples of this approach are neural nets, a-life and genetic algorithms.
In philosophy of mind,  this  approach is  exemplified by the theory of autopoesis  by
Maturana  &  Varela.  Winograd  &  Flores  (1986,  pp.  38–53) discuss  this  level  as
“Cognition as a biological phenomenon”.
2.4.3 Language as listening and commitment
An important aspect of our culture is the way that promises, commitments, etc. are used
in  society,  and  specifically  in  organisations.  These  are  of  paramount  importance  to
Winograd & Flores (pp. 54-69), and they propose software arrangements to facilitate
- 43 -
such social structures.
Oddly, after all the detailed assessment of “computers and cognition” the book takes a
sharp turn away from AI and goes on to exalt the virtues as software for managing
group-work situations. This was later implemented and called “group-ware”, the most
widespread example was “Lotus Notes”, now renamed “IBM Notes” (IBM, 2014).
2.5 Hermeneutics and Gadamer
Winograd  & Flores  introduce  Hermeneutics  and  Gadamer  only  briefly  (see  section
2.4.1), but a bit more is necessary for this thesis.
This  is  a  (necessarily)  schematic  introduction to hermeneutics  and how it  relates  to
phenomenology. Initially I will treat these as entirely separate things. In the 20 th century
these merged to a degree, and were also (at times) barely separable from existentialism
and literary criticism – especially in the personae of  Martin Heidegger (b. 1889 d.
1976) and  Jean-Paul Sartre (b.  1905 d.  1980)  (P.  Watson,  2001).  Luckily,  for  our
purposes here we needn't delve too deeply into this tangle of intellectual traditions, nor
do we even need to have a full grasp of Phenomenology or Hermeneutics – a sufficient
summary will be provided here.
2.5.1 Phenomenology, hermeneutics, and other disciplines
“Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the
first-person point of view”, and is arguably as old as Buddhism, but (at least in the west)
it “came to full flower in Husserl” (b. 1859 d. 1939) (D. W. Smith, 2013). Heidegger,
Husserl's student, revolutionised the ontology implied by phenomenology – for Husserl
and most of his students questions of being or ontology were “bracketed” or set aside,
leaving the phenomenologist with essentially an idealist ontology (D. W. Smith, 2013).
Heidegger  argues  that  we cannot  understand the human condition other  than in  the
human's involvement and interaction with the world (being-in-the-world), and makes
this  very  interaction  into  his  new  ontological  foundation.  In  recasting  this  human
condition  of  interaction  as  basic  (instead  of  the  more  traditional  idealism  or
materialism), Heidegger points out that fundamental to a human's interaction with the
world is the act of interpretation, of making sense of the situation one is “thrown” into
(Heidegger, 1962, pp. H135, H298). 
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By  contrast,  hermeneutics (the  theory  of  interpretation)  was  for  most  of  its  much
longer history not a philosophical tradition but rather the theory of how to correctly
understand religious texts (Ramberg & Gjesdal, 2014). Arguably hermeneutics is at least
as old as the Pauline epistles in the new testament, however it is with Martin Luther's
(b. 1783 d. 1546) “… 'Sola Sscriptura' that we see the dawn of a genuinely modern
hermeneutics” (Ibid.).  This protestant injunction, that the bible should be interpreted
only on its own terms (without any reference to Catholic tradition) is probably the first
explicit statement of a  policy  or  principle  by which interpretation of a text should be
carried out (Ibid.). 
Speaking  against  Cartesian  notions  of  understanding  (“clear  and  distinct”),
Giambattista Vico (b. 1668, d. 1744) “argues that thinking is always rooted in a given
cultural  context.  This  context  is  historically  developed,  and,  moreover,  intrinsically
related to ordinary language” (Ramberg & Gjesdal, 2014).
The Romantic tradition, captivated as it was with holy texts from varying traditions (P.
Watson, 2006), gave rise to the first theory of understanding in general, by Friedrich
Schleiermacher (b. 1768, d. 1834). He discussed the alien nature of foreign texts, and
called for particular attention to our prejudices, so we can understand texts under their
own alien context. He does not guarantee that such strict awareness of prejudice and
openness  will  lead  to  a  correct  understanding  of  a  text  (that  may  be  impossible).
However such openness is  necessary for understanding, and is required not only for
foreign texts but for any type of communications. Because neither is such an openness
ever complete, nor is our information about the context of the writing of the text full, no
interpretation  is  ever  final.  Schleiermacher's  work  was  seen  as  the  beginning  of  a
“critique,  in  the  Kantian  meaning  of  the  term,  of  historical  reason”  (Ramberg  &
Gjesdal, 2014).
The next major thinker in hermeneutics was  Wilhelm Dilthey (b. 1833, d. 1911). He
distinguished “living experience” which is how each of us experience ourselves, from
“understanding” which is how we more systematically understand the world outside us
and  others.  He  claimed  that  true  self-awareness  can  only  be  achieved  when  one
understands oneself in the same terms one understands others. In understanding history
and historical  texts  one  should  combine  (what  we would  now call)  empathy,  i.e.  a
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“living experience” identification with the historical characters, with “understanding”,
which  is  a  more  rigorous  “from the  outside”  observations.  The  “living  experience”
component  allows  the  historian  to  form  hypotheses  about  history,   while  the
“understanding” part allows one to critique such thoughts, and see how well they stand
to reason  (Ramberg & Gjesdal,  2014).  This  contrast  between a creative and critical
phase in  intellectual  work can be seen as  a  precursor of  the context  of  discovery /
context of justification distinction (see section 4.2.4).
2.5.2 The hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer
For Heidegger  interpretation is  not only a  matter  of understanding texts,  but of our
entire mode of being, which is continuously involved with comprehending the world
and  acting  in  it  –  hence  hermeneutics  becomes  one  and  the  same  project  as
phenomenology, and this joint project becomes the new ontology (Ramberg & Gjesdal,
2014; Winograd & Flores, 1986, p. 31). Heidegger was concerned with many issues in
phenomenology, and viewed the specifics of hermeneutics  as such as a sub-field, the
detailed exploration of which he later entrusted to a large degree to Gadamer (Malpas,
2013, Chapter 4).
Gadamer viewed hermeneutics not only as the theory of understanding ancient texts and
art  in  general  (Gadamer,  2004,  pt.  1) but  also,  and  perhaps  mainly,  as  the  act  of
continuously understanding/interpreting all situations. In this sense, interpretation is an
unceasing activity (during at least most of waking hours). 
Here  is  an  example  (my  own)  of  what  is  meant  by  interpretation  in  this  context.
Consider the following:
• בלכה רעוכמ
• Ha-kelev meh'oar
• Il cane é brutto
• The canine is brutish
• The dog is ugly
At this point you may be perplexed by this strange list, as one would be with any other
strange sequence that is presented with little warning. In a sense I just caused you to be
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“thrown” onto this unusual list, and to the urgency of making sense of the situation, but
help  is  at  hand...  The  lines  all  convey  the  same  meaning  (in  different  alphabets,
languages  and  dialects).  Note  how  much  easier  it  is  to  interpret  (for  an  English
monoglot)  these examples the further down one goes.  Note also that as an English-
speaker you may be further interpreting the situation and objecting that “brutish” does
not mean the same as “ugly”, but you also may be aware that in the Italian “brutto” does
actually mean ugly, and may further be aware of how such words change meanings over
the centuries and the geographic distances involved. All these thoughts are interpretative
– they are attempts to make sense of a situation, at this instance the situation at hand is
the  bizarre  list  above.  This interpretative  effort  is  what  is  meant  when  Heidegger,
Gadamer  and  others  say  that  interpretation  is  our  “mode  of  being”  or  suchlike
expressions.
Interpretation (in the sense that interests us here) is the ability to “follow along”, to
“make sense” of the “inputs”. In following along with (say) a song, this is easier with a
familiar tune than it is with foreign music. The crux (here) of the knowledge or skill
accumulated as we become more familiar with a situation does not consist of beliefs -
we have no position on the ugliness or beauty of a dog we have never seen. What  is
being formed is an interpretation, an understanding, a grasp – before (and not requiring)
any judgement.
Gadamer's view of interpretation is contrasted with the objectivist school that viewed
the purpose of interpretation as reaching the “true” or “objective” meaning of the text
(Winograd & Flores, 1986, p. 28). Gadamer views the process of interpretation as a
meeting, or a clash, or a merger, of two “horizons”:
1. the brute facts of the text (which word is where in the text) and 
2. the sum-total of all knowledge, attitudes and prejudices of the reader. 
Hence the name of Gadamer's magnum opus (2004), “Truth and Method” - Truth stands
for the brute facts of the text, and method is all the wisdom the reader brings to bear.
The word “prejudice” has a chequered history – in earlier hermeneutics, and also in
common modern usage, this term is seen as negative, and indeed one of our culture's
strongest  prejudices  is  a  prejudice  against  “prejudice”  itself.  However  this  is  (by
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Gadamer) a very narrow reading of the term: prejudices are unavoidable. We only read
texts that are available to us by some accident of history, and once some knowledge is
acquired, it will colour our understanding of related topics for the remainder of our life.
So in a sense everything that we bring to the process of understanding, all our history,
everything that falls under “method” - these could all be called prejudices, in that they
colour how we will see all things (Gadamer, 2004, pp. 267–304).
Heidegger has already pointed out that in the process of interpretation we encounter the
“hermeneutic circle”: We understand the whole in terms of the parts, but we also only
understand  the  parts  in  terms  of  the  whole.  Gadamer  adds  another  view  of  the
hermeneutic  circle:  The  meaning  of  a  text  is  determined  (at  least  in  part)  by  the
“method” or “prejudice” (or “mindset”) of the interpreter – and also the entire cultural
being of the individual is constituted in the various influences on herself, including the
very  text  under  study.  So  the  text  (part)  determines  the  reader,  who  in  turn  part-
determines the meaning of the text (Winograd & Flores, 1986, p. 30).
How this work relates to a Gadamerian understanding is discussed in section 8.4.2. One
should recall that Gadamer was exploring a specific aspect of Heidegger’s world-view –
namely  the  hermeneutic  aspect.  In  exploring  Gadamerian  AI  we  are  exploring  one
aspect of what Heideggerian AI would be. This is in line with (Dreyfus, 2007)’s call for
a more Heideggerian AI, but in saying that it is “a step in the right direction” one is still
threatened by the “first step fallacy” (Dreyfus, 2012)
2.6 Literature review: summary
Dreyfus blames the overwhelming success of physics for the biases of the AI research
programme,  though  he  does  not  give  this  way  of  thinking  a  consistent  name:
“Platonist”, “intellectualist”, “mechanist” and “they” (sic) figure often (Dreyfus, 1979,
pp. 191–202).
Winograd  &  Flores  (1986,  Chapter  2) name  this  “the  rationalistic  tradition”,  and
characterise it as aiming to solve problems by using three steps:
1. Characterise  the  situation  in  terms  of  identifiable  objects  with  well-defined
properties.
2. Find general rules that apply to situations in term of those objects and properties.
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3. Apply the rules logically to the situation of concern, drawing conclusion about
what should be done.” (Winograd & Flores, 1986, pp. 14–15)
This critique of science-like thinking extending beyond the bounds of its competence is
widespread in the humanities and social sciences, where it is called scientism (the term
is  derogatory)  (Bannister,  1991).  Usually  the  people  using  the  word  “scientism”  in
social  science  are  fighting  against  what  they  see  as  an  overextension of  scientific
practise  to  cover  areas  that  should  be  given  a  more  qualitative  or  a  more  nuanced
treatment.
In doing a literature review, one is supposed to lay out everything which is relevant to
the subsequent discussion. This is premised on an agreed delineation of disciplines, and
on the convenient fiction that areas of thought can be delineated. This may be practical
in some areas, especially in science – but it is not the case here. Our field (philosophy of
artificial intelligence), perhaps even more than others, is populated by people whose
ways of thinking are products of a certain history.
-
To summarize the introductory chapters: There is a dearth of fundamentally new ideas
in AI. Two under-exploited sources of ideas near the existing literature were found: The
main one is the debate about phenomenology, and another one is Papert’s admission of a
mass-pretence  about  thinking  and  logic  (quoted  in  section  1.1).  There  are  always
reasons why some areas of research  are left neglected, and these should be occasionally
reviewed.  In  our  case  the  main  barrier  to  overcome is  scientific  overreach,  in  two
senses: One is that researchers have used science-level requirements in a technological
field,  unnecessarily being too stringent.  The other is that categorical methodological
judgements that make sense in science were applied as universal truths also in AI as a
technology. First and foremost amongst these is the judgement against introspection,
formulated  most  centrally  by  J.B.Watson  (1913),  but  carried  forward  forcefully  by
Simon  (see  section  2.2)  and  spread  by  his  towering  presence  throughout  the  AI
community.  The  main  tool  for  combating  such  prejudices  will  be  distinguishing
different perspectives and different types of truth requirement, e.g. between science and
technology (see section 1.3.2).
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This  chapter  presents  my  thesis,  “Introspection  is  recommended  for  developing
Anthropic  AI”  outlining  how  some  of  the  main  elements  will  be  dealt  with  in
subsequent chapters, explaining all the main terms, and making some of the secondary
arguments. This chapter includes the full argument with a finite list of holes, which will
be  filled  by  subsequent  chapters.  These  coming  chapters  will  also  add  details  and
pragmatics.  Later  still  I  will  give  some  working  examples  and  discuss  some
consequences of this project.
There  are  four  key  terms  that  will  be  used,  that  are  worth  previewing  here  as  a
preliminary outline.
1. This  thesis  is  about  human-like AI,  as  opposed to  rational/idealised AI (see
section 3.2.1).
2. Within  human-like  AI,  My  focus  is  on  Anthropic  AI,  approximating  the
underlying mechanisms of humans-as-such, rather than the accomplishments of
western, modern, well-trained adult people (see section 3.2.4).
3. Subjective methods in AI  have been relatively neglected though they give us
some access to how we work, at a level that is practical to simulate, rather than
(say) simulating every cell in a brain (see section 3.3.1).
4.  Introspection is how we can access subjectivity (see sections 3.3.2-3.3.4).
This chapter will start with the middle terms “is recommended for developing”, and will
proceed to discussing the purpose, “anthropic AI” and the means, “introspection”.
3.1 Terms of this thesis: “is recommended for developing”
This thesis's main claim is that “introspection is recommended for anthropic AI”. Let's
look at the middle terms: “recommended for developing”.
3.1.1 “Recommended”
Recommending  something  is  not  a  guarantee  that  it  would  always  work.  It  is  an
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assurance that one has reason to believe that it would work (or be profitable) in enough
of the cases to make it worth pursuing. In other words though a recommendation is not a
guarantee, it is also not vacuous.
Here is a summary of how this recommendation will backed in detail in subsequent
chapters: After introducing the terms in this chapter, in chapter 4 I will show that using
introspection for AI development is permissible (even though it was treated so far in the
literature as illegitimate),  and in  chapter  5 I  will  show that  using introspection is  a
plausible way of gaining access to a description that in many cases suffices for the
reproduction of human skills.
As detailed  in  chapter  4,  introspection  was forbidden by Watson,  as  of  (1913) (see
sections 4.2.1). Watson forbade introspection for psychology, as he wanted to strengthen
psychology's  claim to being a  science,  and to  make research into  human behaviour
contiguous with research in animal behaviour. This was motivated both by the prestige
of the “hard” sciences, and by a Darwinian effort  to eliminate any special  status of
humans over the rest of the animal kingdom (Costall, 2004, 2006). Regardless of much
debate  about  introspection  in  the  last  100  years  (6  different  positions   on  how
introspection relates to AI will be enumerated in  chapter 4), not a single AI developer
embraces introspection wholeheartedly and uses it to build working systems.  This is
shown to be misguided since the type of truth required in technology development is
quite  different  from the  one  required  in  science.  Additionally  (even  is  we  were  to
assume  a  scientific  discourse)  the  attitude  of  AI  developers  seems  to  ignore  the
distinction  between  the  context  of  discovery  and  the  context  of  justification.  The
conclusion of chapter  4 is that introspection (even the worst type, discussed below in
section 3.3.3) is an acceptable basis from which to build AI. Even in cases in the past
where introspection was partially used as such a basis, that usage was done timidly and
apologetically, as if “in sin”.
As will be shown in detail in chapter  5, introspection is the basis of most attempts to
turn mental skills (knowledge how) into any sort of communicable form. Since some
skills are transmitted in human culture for many thousands of years, the very survival of
civilizations for more than one generation is a living testimony to the (at least frequent)
success of introspection. Introspection and communication succeed in capturing enough
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of the essence of skills so that they can be communicated from one generation to the
next.  An  argument  can  be  made  that  the  very  (evolutionary)  reason  we  have
consciousness is to allow the communication of acquired skills from one individual to
the next, including the young. This can lead to the interesting aside of asking who is
evolving, humans or civilisations, and who owns whom - do humans have cultures, or
do cultures possess humans? Conveniently, this is outside the scope of this thesis. The
conclusion of chapter 5 is that introspection is a plausible source of ideas for anthropic
AI.
One  can  recommend  various  processes  for  AI  developers.  One  could  recommend
reading poetry, meditating, taking a walk or sitting on a comfortable chair. One could
even produce evidence that some of these recommendations do improve AI research.
Here my recommendation is based on a more intrinsic link between introspection, skills,
and anthropic AI.  Having shown that introspection is both acceptable and plausible,
details  of  my  precise  recommendations  are  found  in  chapter  6 and  examples  are
provided in chapter 7.
One  must  bear  in  mind  that  at  the  moment  no  AI  researcher  is  wholeheartedly
embracing introspection and writing code. This is the crux of this thesis – introspection
is recommended for developing anthropic AI.
3.1.2 “For“
This thesis recommends introspection for developing anthropic AI. So we are looking to
make anthropic AI  based on some introspection. The exact nature of this “based on”
relationship and many examples of different types of AI and what these are based on
will be found in section 6.1. For now suffice it to say that Y, a design for an AI system,
is based on an observation X (that could be an introspective observation) iff:
A) There is a causal link from X to Y.
B) X is the dominant influence on the workings of Y, i.e. there is no significant
pollution by some other factor such as a prior theoretical commitment. In our
case of AI based on introspection, this would require acceptance of introspection
(X)  as  an  acceptable  source  of  ideas,  not  to  be  obfuscated  or  denied;
minimisation of attachment to or influence of any theoretical framework, such as
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mathematics, logic, or some theory in cognition, psychology, religion, or even
phenomenological literature.
C) Corresponding  functions  are  achieved  in  similar  ways  (data  flows,  data
structures, temporal order, etc.). 
A more detailed version of this definition and how it related specifically to introspection
is given in section 6.1.1. Examples of similarities of process and data flow are given in
sections  6.1.2 and 6.1.3. For the detailed process of how introspection turns into code
see section 6.2.
3.1.3 “Developing”
This thesis concerns development of anthropic AI, specifically the “discovery” or “idea”
phase, as opposed to the software development phase. In talking about the processes
that  go  into  developing AI,  one  would  benefit  from keeping a  clear  notion  of  five
different  minds  (or  “part-minds”)  that  may  be  involved  in  the  process,  and  have
different perspectives and concerns. Consider Illustration 3.1 on page 54:
• The Basis – This is the base idea, or the inspiration used to build the AI design.
It  need  not  be  a  complete  mind,  but  probably  has  to  be  some  kind  of
information-processing  or  “intentional”  entity.  Illustration  3.1 presents  the
examples  of  logic,  mathematics,  neural  nets,  honey  bees,  introspection,  and
externally observed behaviour.
• The AI program, the machine or robot being built.
• The  Practitioner who uses the basis  as a guide or model  and builds the AI
system. Examples (in the picture) are Trenchard More, John McCarthy, Marvin
Minsky, Oliver Selfridge, and Ray Solomonoff (Knapp, 2008)
• The Observer, who may comment on the AI or the process of its development,
but is not directly and actively engaged. Examples include Dreyfus, McCorduck,
Flores, etc.
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• The King, or administrator, or the research funding agency. This is “he who pays
the piper” or “she who exerts control”, explicitly or implicitly. A prime example
from AI would be DARPA5.
In some cases one and the same person can fulfil  more than one role,  for example
Minsky (1991) was both a practitioner and an observer. 
This thesis, mainly from the position of an  observer  (bold terms refer to  Illustration
3.1),  will argue for the practitioner using introspection, which means taking both the
5 The degree that AI specifically and computers in general were developed as a military tools is an
under-appreciated question (Edwards, 1997). The evidence in the terminology such as “commands”
for instructions, etc., is suggestive. This point was made to me by Blay Whitby.
Illustration 3.1: Roles in AI development
Basis AI
Practitioner
Observer
King
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role of practitioner and of basis. This thesis is  not   about building AI   systems that will
introspect themselves. It is about the AI practitioner using his own introspection as a
basis for  his  designs.  Schematically,  this  thesis  is  a  plea  by  an  observer to  the
practitioners to use their own subjectivity as the basis, the inspiration, for novel AI; and
also imploring the kings to fund such research. In chapter 7 I will take also the position
of the practitioner in order to provide working AI examples of what is recommended
here, and in doing so I will also introspect, so I will use my own mind also as the basis.
Perhaps it is worth reiterating what was underlined above – this thesis is not directed at
introspecting AI systems. This is not because those are a bad idea, quite the contrary. If
we want to create truly human-like systems such systems will most probably need the
facility  to  reflect  on  their  own  actions,  including  their  metal  actions,  and  hence
introspection would most probably be requisite. But at the moment we do not have  AI
systems of  a  sophistication where  such abilities  are  a  reasonable next  step.  For  the
current stage of research, the urgent task is opening up introspection for the practitioner,
i.e. recommending the practitioner to use their own subjective experience of their own
mind as a basis for AI development.
Some future ideas that would have to be completed before we ask for systems that do
introspect themselves are discussed in section 8.2.
3.2 Terms of this thesis: “anthropic”
My thesis is “Introspection is recommended for developing anthropic AI”. This section
is about  the aim, the purpose: “anthropic AI”. Anthropic AI will be defined as pursuing
the  computer  implementation  of  (an  approximation  of)  the  base,  minimal,  human
ability that  allows for our culture but is independent of it. It will be contrasted with
enculturated  AI,  specifically  the  prevalent  AI  that  assumes  as  its  target  a  western,
modern, well-trained and adult intelligence.
I will first discuss human-like vs rational/ideal AI, and then will distinguish anthropic
AI as a sub-type of human-like AI.
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3.2.1 Human vs ideal/rational
Russell and Norvig, in their canonical introduction to artificial intelligence (S. Russell
& Norvig, 2013, pp. 1–4) introduce a distinction between human-like AI and rational
AI. Most of the AI work in the past 60 years has been of the rational, idealised kind.
Rational AI aims at correct, or best-possible, solutions. Human-like AI aims at imitating
humans, with all their frailty and hopefully ingenuity. Russell and Norvig's distinction is
a  slight  oversimplification.  There  are  other  actual  existing  non-optimal  intelligences
other than the human case. In cognitive science there are bodies of work on insect and
swarm intelligences,  and other animals'  intelligence.  This an active field of research
both in industry  (Raibert,  Blankespoor, Nelson, Playter, & others, 2008) and science
(Baddeley, Graham, Husbands, & Philippides, 2012), but these are not directly relevant
in the short term to human-Like AI, and will therefore not be further discussed. They
also make a distinction between thinking and acting, which is not relevant here.
As a rule  of  thumb,  if  an AI system does not  make mistakes or  if  you can prove
meaningful theorems about it, it is rational AI. There is nothing wrong with rational AI,
which is a thriving industry. But shunning the human-like because it is not mathematical
enough, not neat enough, or because our scientific methodologies do not apply easily -
that would be neglecting an area of research for no better reason than that it is difficult. 
It is important to note that not only is human-like AI neglected in research, it is nearly
entirely ignored in teaching AI, especially in computer-science settings. In (S. Russell &
Norvig, 2013, p. 5), after discussing this distinction, the authors declare that their “text
concentrates  on  general  principles  of  rational  agents  and  on  components  for
constructing them”, and proceed to use the rest of their 1090 pages to teach rational AI
alone, possibly misleading undergraduates into the impression that that is the only sort
of AI that exists. This is understandable for the authors, as human-like AI is a fringe
area, but ignoring it completely is alarming considering that their book is used by 1306
schools in 116 countries (S. Russell & Norvig, 2016).
There is nothing wrong with rational AI. The only problem is that it is (by definition)
not about humans as they  are, but insofar as it is about humans at all it is about how
they should be. This distinction should be kept separate from the distinction between AI
motivated  by technology and AI motivated by science (section  1.5 provides  a  two-
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dimensional map of AI efforts so far).
There  is  an  interesting  parallel  to  human-like  AI  in  human-like  robot  (hardware)
construction. Nick Hockings (Hockings, Iravani, & Bowen, 2014) aims to build human-
like hands, using exact replicas of the human anatomy, down to the level of tendons. At
the level of tendons he switches abruptly from being human-like to implementing the
tendons using whatever techniques and chemistry are available to build “tendons” as
similar as possible to the natural. The idea is to emulate the natural, not re-create it, but
to do it at a level as low as currently technically possible, feasibly.
In creating humanoid robots we need to emulate the underlying mechanisms, but only
insofar as possible. There is a point where in the technological interest one must give up
and go to modern plastics and 3-d printing (in robotics) or “just program” (in AI, see
sections 3.2.5.4, 6.3.5).
3.2.2 Motivations for human-like AI
3.2.2.1 Rational AI's interaction is “clunky”
Motivations  for  developing  rational  or  idealised  AI  are  clear:  computer  technology
around  us  would  be  impossibly  difficult  to  engineer  if  it  were  not  deterministic,
mathematical, and as fast as possible. Advances in machine learning etc. are ubiquitous
and  dynamically  making  tangible  contributions  to  the  lives  of  people  (nearly)
throughout  the  planet.  Examples  (just  from  smart-phones  use)  include  speech
recognition, natural language interfaces, navigation systems that dynamically learn the
maps and one-way systems of cities, etc.
Regardless  of  all  these  advances,  even  the  most  fêted  and  expensively  developed
(rational/idealised) technologies today (such as Siri) are clunky, “robotic”, etc. The idea,
common in Japan (Robertson, 2007), of using robots as companions or care-givers and
companions to the elderly is greeted with much scepticism in the rest  of the world,
because of this clunky behaviour (see section 3.2.2.3).
Other examples of existing AI's failure to capture the human way of doing things are its
best-advertised  achievements:  IBM's  “Watson”6 cannot  hold  a  conversation,  and the
various  attempts  at  (the  broad family  of  tests  called)  the  Turing  test  are  ultimately
6 Named after the founder of IBM, no relation of the psychologist.
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exposed as short-term “bags of tricks” with little expandability (more about bags-of-
tricks in section 3.2.8).  Other attempts at human-like  AI have been purely academic-
scientific,  in the field of cognitive simulation.   In any role where genuine,  practical
understanding of the human way of doing things is required, robots and AI are so far
rightly excluded.
Let's look at a few categories of motivations for human-like AI:
3.2.2.2 The versatility of human Intelligence
In the “Ode to Man” in Antigone, Sophocles (2009) expresses his wonder at the abilities
of man:
Wonders are many, and none is more wonderful than man; the power that
crosses the white sea, driven by the stormy south-wind, making a path under
surges that threaten to engulf him….
And the light-hearted race of birds, and the tribes of savage beasts, and the
sea-brood of the deep, he snares in the meshes of his woven toils, he leads
captive, man excellent in wit. ...he tames the horse of shaggy mane...  the
tireless mountain bull.
And speech, and wind-swift thought, and all the moods that mould a state,
hath he taught himself; and how to flee the arrows of the frost, when 'tis
hard lodging under the clear sky, and the arrows of the rushing rain; yea,
he hath resource for all; ...only against death shall he call for aid in vain;
but from baffling maladies he hath devised escapes....
Human intelligence is interesting in its general-purpose nature,  its  ability to achieve
such a diverse range of accomplishments. Human intelligence can learn and act in ill-
understood and uncertain circumstances, such as “crossing the white sea”. Any system
that tries to be human-like must therefore be a learning system. Humans not only learn
all  their  lives  (to  varying  degrees)  but  also  make  mistakes,  so  aiming  at  some
mathematically correct behaviour may well miss much of what human intelligence is
about7.
Possibly the most powerful motivation for human-like AI rather than rational-idealised
AI is the fact that  humans invented rationality, so we can expect human-like AI to be
more  flexible  and  have  wider  application  (even  if  it  may  be  less  reliable  and  less
7 Much  work  in  rational/idealised  AI  is  done  statistically,  aiming  (for  example)  to  be  “probably
approximately correct” (S. Russell & Norvig, 2013, p. 725). This is idealised AI since it aims to get
the probabilities right, and the approximations optimal.
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optimal). This is of particular interest for the situation of generative AI, where AI will
hopefully  be  employed  to  develop  further  AI  (van  der  Zant,  Kouw,  & Schomaker,
2013).
Formal logic, as we know it today, is specifically a western invention, starting in ancient
Greece.  Even in the modern west, not everyone thinks logically, and even those who
aspire to the feat of thinking logically often fail (Ariely, 2009). None of us were born as
logic machines, we were (at best) brought up to be skilled in logic, we were educated
into and through logic. So there must be an underlying mechanism that  allows for the
emergence of logic. Some evidence that such a mechanism exists can be found in its
malfunction in the case of fallacies. This was explored in detail in the case of algebraic
mal-rules  (Payne & Squibb, 1990).
3.2.2.3 Getting along with people
Human-like AI would be useful in areas where human-like behaviour would be better
than rationally-optimised behaviour – where the very essence of the job is to get along
with people, where it is key that the computer be easily understood in human terms, and
where it would also be useful for the AI system to understand the human way of doing
things (why being human-like is key to understanding humans in discussed in section
3.2.3). Areas of applicability would include:
• Car driving: Driving cars by computer has made great strides in recent years, but
still has difficulty with pragmatics (Richtel & Dougherty, 2015). Pragmatics are
often culture-dependent. What is done, for example with lanes, is different in
different cultures: In Brazil, where politics has driven lanes to be narrower, the
idea  that  a  large  lorry  can  take  two  or  even  three  lanes  in  a  motorway  is
considered normal. Conversely, in Bangkok lanes will form and dissolve on hard
shoulders wherever possible.
• Delivery  robots:  As  online  shopping  becomes  the  norm,  the  desire  for  fast
delivery  increases,  and  a  demand  is  created  for  faster  delivery  (Amazon  is
developing  a  drone  for  the  extreme version  of  this  problem-  delivery  in  30
minutes  (“Amazon  Prime  Air,”  2016)).  A lightweight  robot  that  can  deliver
packages to doorways would be invaluable. That would require navigating the
addresses, negotiating spaces crowded with pedestrians, and understanding such
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human communications as handwritten notes saying “If I am not home please
leave packages at flat 6”.
A particularly interesting case is care giving robots. In rapidly ageing societies there is a
growing need for carers to keep elders company and to serve as interfaces to digital
technology,  that  in  turn can help in  physical  care  (Broekens,  Heerink,  & Rosendal,
2009). Regardless of ethical issues (Whitby, 2011) (see section 3.2.9) such technologies
may become essential especially in societies (Japan stands out) where immigration of
human caregivers is not a politically palatable solution (TheEconomist, 2013).
Humans have a tendency to anthropomorphise (treat as human) all entities, for example
note Aristotle's idea that heavy objects “want to” go downwards. Regardless of efforts
by educators to combat this tendency, humans are still predisposed to think that way.
This predisposition is seen even in science where we say things like “the system obeys
the laws of physics” or “light follows Maxwell's equations”. There is no obedience or
following going  on –  this  is  all  “in  our  eyes”,  in  our tendency to  attribute  human
characteristics to inanimate objects.
As robots become more ubiquitous, they will be operated by people with fewer skills.
Moreover, in the scenario of care for the elderly, one cannot expect any training given to
the patient  /  operator  of  a  robot  to  reliably last,  due to  amplified forgetfulness  and
confusion in old age – so patients will revert to assuming that the robot is human-like. 
In the case of elderly patients cared for by robots this will be much worse (Sharkey &
Sharkey, 2011).  Patients will  assume that robots can apply rules “reasonably” while
rational-AI systems have no idea of what “being reasonable” may mean. This can cause
patients  to  trust  robots  to  behave in  ways that  would  be expected of  a  human,  but
beyond the robot's preprogrammed ability, or worse – against a clear pre-programmed
prohibition.  Since this  expectation  by the patients  is  unavoidable (and may be life-
threatening), as technologists we need to rise to the challenge and make the robots as
human-like as possible (perhaps within some hard outer boundaries).
3.2.3 Characteristics of human-like AI
Human-like AI would allow robots to form malleable habits, as opposed to rule-based
systems (see section 7.5.4) (like driver-less cars picking up the local driving culture, see
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section  3.2.2.3). By thinking and acting in a human-like, culture-adjusted way robots
would be better understood by humans. Moreover, once this technology is advanced
enough,  a  truly  human-like  technology  would  allow  robots  to  form  their  own
(speculative) understanding of human actors in their environment, to speculate about the
human intentions, and “behave considerately” towards these humans.
One of the best ways to understand some entity is to be able to simulate it and see how
it would react in different situations. The advantage of human-like AI in understanding
humans is therefore analogous to min/max's ability to understand a rival similar to itself
– for every system, it is easier to simulate, and to understand, a system similar to itself.
Uninitiated  humans  have  no  idea  of  min/max,  nor  does  min/max  have  a  notion  of
humans – but both know quite well how to deal with another instance of themselves,
since they possess the mechanisms to understand, or simulate, their peers. They do not
posses the technology to understand a system that thinks differently.  As long as the
domain of action is a formal domain, like chess, rational/ideal AI has the edge, and wins
against humans. Once we move into the human arena, we need human-like AI. This
does not preclude integrating various technologies together (Minsky, 1991).
None of this is to say that human-understanding behaviour is in-principle impossible for
any machine that is based on logical-rational principles (see the discussion of logicism
in section  3.2.5.2, and of the “formal sandwich” in section  3.3.1.2). Obviously if we
were to ever to program a computer to behave like a human, the computer would still
run on silicon chips, which implement a formal system (see sections  3.2.5.4,  6.3.5.3,
6.3.5.4).
3.2.4 Human-like vs anthropic
Let’s  examine  the  issue  of  whether  we  should  want  to  simulate  a  fully-fledged  or
enculturated  mind,  or  whether  it  would  be  better  to  simulate  the  pre-culture,  un-
enculturated, naïve mind. If we had a good simulation of a fully-cultured mind it would
animate robots that would work in one culture. If we go deeper and aim to simulate the
un-enculturated mind, we would get the  ability to get the AI system enculturated into
any culture. Most of AI so far went for the first, enculturated option, in anthropic AI we
will aim for the later, un-enculturated option.
So  why  not  use  the  term  “human-like  AI”  as  my  target?  Because  behaving
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mathematically or logically is a possibility for humans, and would therefore be part of a
“human-like” concept,  and I  specifically  want to  exclude such sophisticated highly-
trained thought: Being western, modern, well-trained, and/or adult – These may all
be desirable qualities in terms of current culture and setting (this is a western, modern,
Ph.D. thesis) – but none of these qualities is inherent to being human, and none of us
(western, modern, well-trained adults) were born that way. We learnt (or were trained)
to be that way. One could argue that being  well-cultured is  good, but  I  argue that
simulating our “best practices” is not what is needed currently in AI:
• Where “best practices” are clear, we can use normal programming, or rational
AI. We already have that.
• Where things are not clear, we need a system that can learn the complexities.
• A system may have a better chance of learning these complexities if it learns
them in a way similar to how we learn them, i.e. doing it the way we humans do
it, which is more versatile and  broader in scope then just “western, modern, well
educated adults”.
Another important point to note is the question of who decides what precisely “western
modern well-trained adult”, or “best practices” means. A learning system with fewer
pre-judged commitments can better adapt to situations.
Distinguishing a  human from their  cultural  or  social  context  is  not  simple  or  easy.
Probably  this  is  not  even  completely  possible.  But  we  must  try,  one  of  the  main
questions in this approach is: what is it about this animal that allows it to participate in
any society or culture, let alone our modern one? It is generally accepted that this will
include intelligence, or the ability to learn skills and habits. 
To get at this level we need to get under, or behind, or around, education or training, as a
person's training is a social phenomenon of the specific society in which that person was
educated. This attempt to get beyond education is probably never completely possible,
but should remain an aspiration. How to do this is the topic of chapter 6.
I  propose  using  the  Greek  for  human,  “Anthropos”,  to  mean  the  untrained,  basic
human. This jives with the way that anthropology studies  all humans,  including the
“primitive”.
- 63 -
Anthropic AI aims at minimally human intelligence – without presupposing any of our
cultural heritage (insofar as possible).  Anthropic AI is  defined as the base, minimal
human ability that allows for our culture but is independent of it.
3.2.5 Perspectives and levels in human modelling
Next I will survey the different levels we can deal with or model the mind, both for
psychological exploration and for AI technology development. But first we must slow
down a bit. 
3.2.5.1 Are there really levels or layers in the mind/brain?
Caution is advised when discussing layers or levels in the human mind/brain. The idea
that things are neatly arranged in layers comes from several sources. In engineering it is
useful to think in modules and layers, and in software design not only do we have many
layers, we even have a hierarchy (in the types of layers), where some layers are more
important, and get to be called “platforms” - like Microsoft's “Windows”, the “Java
Virtual Machine”, “IP” (the inter-networking protocol, as in “TCP/IP”) etc. In software
the  levels  are  usually  very  well  defined,  with  the  interfaces  between  layers  called
“API”s. The idea of the mind being constructed in layers is seductive but twice-wrong:
The mind is not constructed, but is an evolved characteristic of the human animal. We
have no evidence that there is anything like layers inside the human animal.
It is far more likely that the mind is like the gold-bearing reefs of the Witwatersrand
Basin in South Africa  (Safonov & Prokof’ev, 2006): Gold settled at the bottom of a
primordial lake for millions of years, then the lake-bed (arguably initially a layer) dried,
deformed and was partially eroded away. Next most of the gold-bearing deposits were
buried deep in the ground. Later a large meteorite hit the ground, tearing and throwing
up into the air a 300-km wide part of the earth's crust. As this mass of matter  crashed  in
chaos, some of the gold-bearing formations were exposed, with no particular shape. It
so happens that half the world's gold comes from these formations. There are no layers
involved, just a lot of history.
Coming back to the human mind, the brain's anatomy (its “architecture”) is composed
of multiple organs, that evolved in different eras. But that is also misleading, in that the
older brain-organs continued to evolve, and so there is no ground to treating them as
distinct modules or layers - these organs may be anatomically somewhat distinct, but
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they function together. It is doubtful we can even delineate distinct mechanisms - there
are no clear-and-distinct “layers” or boundaries to be found, nor is there a reason to
believe  we  may  find  them  in  the  future.  The  reason  people  search  for  such
oversimplified models is   that  it  would be very convenient  for our  western-modern
mode of  thinking if  we could find such layers.  Again,  the human situation is  more
complex than the ideal/rational situation, but neglecting the human just because it is
difficult may be a good way to get the first few AI systems going, but eventually we
need to tackle the human-as-it-is, rather than the western, modern, formalized way we
think that we ought to think.
Layers are how  we like to think about machines,  problems, etc.  It  is  something we
superimpose on the world in order to make sense of it, like a grid on a map (see the term
“adhyasa” in Indian philosophy, section 8.4.5).
3.2.5.2 Multiple levels of discussion
Having defined anthropic AI as the base, minimal, human ability that  allows for our
culture  but  is  independent  of  it,  we  can  turn  to  examining  what  the  alternative
approaches to human-like AI may be. Being part of the modern west, we cannot avoid
some superimposing of distinctions at least in this meta-discussion – let’s just bear in
mind that any layers are part of the  analysis and not of the human. We can identify
several modes, or “levels” or ”layers” in which one could observe, discuss and try to
simulate  humans,  their  behaviour  or  their  intelligence.  Each  of  these  levels  takes
multiple forms, and can have AI approaches associated with it. I am not making any
claim with this list,  this is for purposes of clarification only (but see section 3.2.5.3).
1. Atomic, molecular (or lower)
In terms of scientific purity, this may be the best level to simulate anything (that
is not so small as to have sub-atomic effects). The problem is that we do not
have the data (an atomic-level scan of a human) nor the computational capacity.
So this is (currently) infeasible, regardless of the waves of optimism unleashed
by the human-genome project in the early 2000s (Bower & Bolouri, 2001).
2. Cellular (see Dreyfus's “Biological assumption”, section 2.3) 
In a similar vein, simulating every cell or every neuron is a current goal, for the
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decades  if  not  centuries  to  come  (Markram,  2012).  For  now it  is  infeasible.
Moreover, if and when we have a full-brain simulation, there is no guarantee
whatsoever that the mind inhabiting such a “brain” will be in any way normal,
and/or able or willing to communicate with us.
3. Bio-functional (cell assemblies) / Neural Networks
This level simulates fewer individual neurons or (more accurately) neuron-like
abstractions. With this kind of modelling researchers are trying to simulate either
small parts of the brain, or entire systems using a (rather strong) assumption that
whole cell assemblies behave somewhat like a neuron. Another motivation for
this research is exploring what can be done with neural-nets. These neural nets
are also used in technology, unlike the previous perspectives.
4. Cognitive-theoretic (see Dreyfus's “psychological assumption” 2.3)
Cognitive models  (such as  SOAR  (Laird & Rosenbloom, 1996))  and classic
symbolic AI propose a computational model for various faculties that underlie
individual human activity (Sun, 2008). These models (when used as a scientific
tool rather than for technology) are verified by comparing their performance to
human performance in similar tasks. In technology, It is the basis for some of
GOFAI, especially heuristic and satisficing algorithms. 
The tasks achieved by these models mostly seem quite contrived and divorced
from everyday life (Dreyfus, 1979, 2007). The cognitive models themselves tend
to be parsimonious, like a small computer program. An example of how badly
these systems fail at being human-like is that we still do not have an artificial
controller for a human-like hand with any dexterity.
I distinguish (see section 3.2.5.3) between these cognitive models that are based
on  psychological  theory (in  turn  based  on  science,  mathematics,  computer
models etc.) and models based of subjective descriptions (point 6 below).
5. Personal behaviouristic
This is the level of recreating external behaviour. A notable example is passive
walking robots (Collins & Ruina, 2005).
6. Personal-subjective (see Dreyfus's “epistemological assumption” section 2.3) 
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This level is concerned with the individual humans, as we see ourselves, not as a
natural phenomenon to be examined externally. Here we are interested in the
subjective  (see section 3.3.1), without prejudice to age, gender, race, culture or
historical time. It would include anything that pertains to homo sapiens sapiens
as  such, without  any  cultural  additions,  such  as  anything  which  would  be
specifically western, modern, well-trained or adult. It would include the facility
to  learn  any  language  and  cooperate  with  others,  to  construct  edifices  and
imagine  worlds.  This  level  excludes  anything  that  is  culture-specific,  like
literacy,  or  any  particular  system  of  logic.  Our  favourite  cultural  artefacts,
language and mathematics, are already amply explored in rational-idealised AI,
in the points below. This level is this thesis's ultimate goal – anthropic AI. But
since we do not have this yet, the current goal has to be making strides in this
direction.
7. Social-behavioural
In this level basic cultural artefacts, like language, are explored. This is where
generative grammarians (like Chomsky) argue with other schools of linguistics,
like statistical linguistics.
8. Social-normative (Logic, Bayesian)
This is the level of  normative cultural artefacts, like logic, laws, etiquette, etc.
Specific to the west are logic, mathematics and science. Much of GOFAI is in
this level, e.g. Simon's Logical Theorist (Newell & Simon, 1956). 
One  should  recall  that  this  level  has  positive  and  negative  aspects:  On  the
positive side social norms give us science and technology, without which there is
no AI (and so many other things).  Moreover,  without our western normative
traditions I could not write this – I would have no Latin alphabet, no computer,
no web or email, and no readers. The western scientific tradition also gives us
empirical  methodologies  that  we  need  in  any  modern  systematic  pursuit,
including  technology  or  AI.  On the  negative  side  our  tradition  gives  us  the
drawbacks of the rationalistic views, as described by Winograd & Flores (see
section 2.4), and as critiqued by Dreyfus (see section 2.3). As Minsky had it, AI
is stuck – and I suggest it is stuck at this and the biological levels (McHugh &
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Minsky, 2003).
Every  level  seems to  require  the  levels  before  it  in  this  list,  but  its  existence  is  a
contingent  fact  about  the  levels  before.  Not  all  functioning  organisms  have  neural
systems; not all neural systems we would want to attribute full-blown cognitive abilities
to; not every cognitive mind need generate a subjective perspective; it is reasonable to
assume that young children have phenomenal experiences even before they acquire any
specific  culture;  and  not  all  cultures  developed  logic  as  an  articulated  body  of
knowledge, a few developed mathematics, but science as we recognize it today was
only developed in the west relatively recently. 
These levels can be seen as all  relevant simultaneously,  as perspectives (see section
1.4.3). However as AI developers, we need to choose at which level to focus our efforts.
So  far  AI  technology  has  mainly  been  at  levels  8  (Logic  programming,  Bayesian
approaches, some of GOFAI), 4 (GOFAI, cognitive simulation) and 3 (Neural nets).
Some  thinkers,  unpopular  with  the  majority  (e.g.  Dreyfus),  would  argue  that  the
cognitive level (4) does not exist as such, but is only an artefact of our present scientific
fashions (level 8). This deserves some discussion.
3.2.5.3 The cognitive level is problematic
The term “mind” (or “mental”) is used in the literature in two distinct senses. The first is
the lay person's intuitive sense, as in “what is on my mind” - it is the subjective world of
one's own experience (or consciousness), it is what is accessible by introspection. This
is  often  called  the  “phenomenal  mind”.  However,  in  the  psychological  (cognitive)
literature, the term “mind” refers (often if not always) to imputed processes that go on
inside a person in order to achieve the performance that people  empirically achieve
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 232). For example, much of cognitive science would say
things like “the mind is what the brain does” (Skinner, 1987) or “the mind involves top-
down processes” or “the mind has short and long term memories”. The first notion of
the mind is subjective, while the second notion aims to be “objective”, but is actually (at
least for now) speculative, with some correlational backing. We call this second notion
the “cognitive mind”, but I beg to not make this usage a claim that these mechanisms
exist other than as a level of analysis.
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Another way that the cognitive mind is often defined as “the underlying mechanisms –
the cognitive processes and structures – that give rise to … effects” (Ericsson & Simon,
1981).  One  can  only  presume  this  includes  the  seemingly  universal  behaviour  of
reporting on the existence and content of a phenomenal mind.  Miller says (quoted in
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977)) that “It is the result of thinking, not the process of thinking,
that appears spontaneously in consciousness”. So also the word “think” seems to also
have this duality – here Miller defines thinking as the underlying process that we do not
experience, while in everyday speech (and introspection) we usually consider “think” to
refer to things we can be conscious of, as in “I think that this path to the café is shorter”.
Note the aim of psychology (as a science) is  to  make cognitive models that  reflect
accurately  what  is  going  on in  the  brain,  and therefore  predict  accurately  not  only
externally-observable behaviour but also subjective experience (Seth, 2010). I have no
argument with this aim, but I must point out that we are probably at least decades away
from any models that in any way predict human behaviour and experience outside of
constrained lab situations. So for now, the “cognitive mind” of which psychologists talk
is no more than a set of theoretical constructs, with some evidence. Therefore, treating
the cognitive mind as reflecting any sort  of system that we can usefully emulate in
usable AI is only one option, and one which has arguably already been exhausted in
terms of AI technologies. The main thrust of this thesis is promoting the use of the
subjective mind as a source of ideas for AI, via introspection.
3.2.5.4 Simultaneous multiple levels in computers
Unlike the human mind, where there are no levels to be found (see section 3.2.5.1), in a
computer there are levels, since computer were designed that way. And yet, the question
of what a computer is doing is not clear-cut. One could say it is working, if the power
supply is  on.  One could say that  nearly all  its  circuits  are  dedicated to  keeping 0's
distinct from 1's (B. C. Smith, 2005). One could view it as a 64-bit processing machine,
shuffling chunks of data that size. One could view it as running MS-Windows or Linux,
or as running some software package, say an “Oracle” database. One could also see it as
running some application like a billing system, or as “collecting debts”. Less positively,
one could see such a machine as perpetuating the injustices in society. While within a
specific  discourse  such  as  “what  operating  system is  being  run”  there  are  specific
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answers, that can be categorically true of false8, I can see no way of determining what is
the “correct” description in general, perhaps except asking what was the intention of the
person configuring the system in the particular way that it is - at a particular moment.
Even  this  definition  may  be  incorrect,  as  a  learning  AI  system  may  bear  little
resemblance to any intention by a human. My cat will always view a computer as a
source of heat to sit on. Again, there is no “correct” way to view a computer. See section
1.4.2.
So even when we say that a computer is running some non-rationalist AI system, at the
same time we can see that the computer is keeping the 0s and 1s distinct, is checking
various checksums, and is running like a very digital and logical computer. The level in
which  a  computer  would  be  running  a  non-rational  system  is  at  the  level  of  our
intentions for it.  We could call  that the “conceptual level” or D.C. Dennett’s  (1989)
“design stance”. Every algorithm can be implemented by any universal machine, and a
universal machine can be built in many ways, so I may argue against Bayesian statistics
or logic, but still run my anthropic algorithm on a system that used Bayesian statistics
(perhaps) and boolean logic (for sure) at another level. This topic relates also to pan-
computationalism (Müller, 2009). Related points are found in sections 6.3.5.3, 6.3.5.4.
3.2.6 Anthropic AI so far
I see less effort being invested in human-like AI in comparison to other technologies,
and very little effort in teaching this field (see section  3.2.1), the main effort that  is
ongoing in creating human-like behaviour is chatter-bots for commercial  (Deryugina,
2010) and Turing-test  (Mladenić & Bradeško, 2012) purposes; this is human-like, but
not anthropic. Moreover, I am aware of no technology-oriented efforts to create AI that
emulates  any  subjectively-experienced mechanisms  of  the  mind  (though  Agre  tried
emulating Heidegger’s phenomenology, see section 4.3.2). On the borderlands between
philosophy and science, machine consciousness is  a vibrant effort (Gamez, 2008). Most
efforts to create human-like technology apply tried and tested paradigms of the rational-
idealised kind,  such as  machine learning.  This  mismatch of means and ends invites
Dreyfus's (1979, p. 100) quip about trying to get to the moon by climbing a tree.
8 Though note the further layers of complexity introduced by virtual machines or various types, and
nested configurations thereof.
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An interesting point is that historically “cognitive anthropology was nipped in the bud
in the early 1970s”  (Boden, 2008, p. 32).  Margaret  Boden (b. 1936)  has a whole
chapter (8) entitled “the mystery of the missing discipline” about how anthropology is
ignored  in  cognitive  science.  This  absence  of  an  anthropological  angle  to  AI could
speculatively be attributed to some general abhorrence of the primitive, as testified by
the observation that Herbert Simon (see sections  2.2) has contributed to “every social
science discipline except anthropology” (stress added) (Augier & March, 2001).
Anthropic AI assumes a pragmatic distinction between the layer  of intelligence that
allows for human learning on the one hand, and the content of such learnings (culture)
on the other hand. I find only two AI efforts with a technological orientation that were
made that are relevant to anthropic AI in that they share this assumption:
The first is CYC (Lenat, Prakash, & Shepherd, 1985), which was an attempt to give a
computer the rules, or knowledge, underlying “common sense”. These rules were done
in the spirit of an expert system, and the goal of the project was to use this “common
sense” to overcome the brittle nature of such expert systems. However (as  (Dreyfus,
1996) typically has it) “Lenat predicted that in 10 years Cyc would cope with novelty by
recognizing analogies and would then be able to teach itself by reading the newspapers.
Time is up and he seems to have made no progress on this front”. In a sense there were
three layers  envisaged here:  the innate  expert  system engine  (pre-programmed),  the
rules to be fed in, and the culture to be accumulated after such rules started functioning. 
Another attempt to do something comparable to anthropic AI was COG (Brooks et al.,
1999). The  idea  was  to  build  on  Brooks's  older  insect-like  intelligent  system,  by
attaching a system of little more internal sophistication to “an upper-torso humanoid
robot called Cog”, and to train it over time by interaction with the environment, like
human infants develop. Again, Dreyfus puts it in his accurate but cruel style: “the 'long
term project' was short lived. Cog failed to achieve any of its goals and the original
robot is already in a museum” (Dreyfus, 2007).
There is a distinction (key to debugging) between these efforts, that can also be applied
to AI in general: COG, like neural nets, cannot explain its  behaviour in (reasonable
length) language-like communicable form. On the other hand, CYC, being an expert
system extension, can print out a trace of how a logical deduction was arrived at. This
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explicitness and clarity is important in two senses: humans, at least once they acquire
the sophistication of very few years of age, can articulate reasons for (at least some of)
their actions, and as will be argued in section  5.2 these are not “noise”. Additionally,
having  the  ability  to  explain  how  some  outcome  was  arrived  at  is  invaluable  in
debugging (see sections 3.3.1.1, 7.6.3).
3.2.7 Knowing that vs knowing how, and a hint on data structure
Let’s preliminarily look at the kinds of data structures involved is different approaches
to AI. The main data type of AI systems often reflects a view or a perspective about
what type of knowledge is most basic, and should be the native data type of the AI
software. A word is due about this and some other arguments in philosophy of mind:
when these arguments are  being conducted they are most usually about  what is  the
correct way to understand humans, scientifically. However, as technologists, and even
more so as technologists looking for ideas, we have no need for correctness, since we
are  not  doing  science  (see  sections  4.2.4,  4.2.5).  We  need  perspectives,  ideas  for
technology. So if in some scientific or philosophical argument scholars are adamantly
arguing between two or three positions – in AI-as-technology we can try each and every
one in turn (more about this laissez-faire attitude in technology in sections  1.3.2,  1.4,
1.5,  4.2.4,  4.2.5).  This  section  does  not  make  claims  that  will  be  part  of  the  main
argument at this stage, it is an introduction to sections to come (5.2.2, 7.5, 7.6.2).
As Fantl (2014) describes this well-known distinction, we can distinguish three kinds of
knowledge:
1. knowing how to do something—say, ride a bicycle. Call this “knowing how”.
2. knowing a person—say, your best friend. Call this “familiarity”.
3. knowing that  some fact  is  true—say,  that  the Red Sox won the 2004 World
Series. Call this “knowing that”.
Following Fantl in ignoring (2), which seems to be mere recognition, and bearing in
mind  our  purpose  of  producing  novel  human-like  AI,  let  us  examine  the  possible
positions on the relations between “knowing how” and “knowing that”. Note that the
psychological distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge is similar though not
identical to the knowing that/how distinction.
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In terms of AI the three positions have different implications for design. Considering
one’s stance on the basic knowledge type, we should also consider what would be the AI
system's basic data structure.
1. Intellectualism is  the  position  that  all  knowledge-how  is  based  on  (and
reducible to) knowledge-that. This is the position reflected by Simon's GPS and
many other  projects,  including prolog,  expert  systems,  and arguably the vast
majority of classic (and statistical) AI (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 146). When
people design AI systems they often discuss (explicit) knowledge about the state
of  affairs  in  the  world,  rather  than  skill.  This  position  is  most  explicit  in
symbolic-AI (like expert systems) or more subtle in the statistical knowledge of
learning systems.
Appropriately, the data structures found in classic AI are usually combinations
of the following:
◦ Statements of facts and/or of rules, as in first-order predicate calculus.
◦ Statements of probabilities, in Bayesian and other statistical systems.
An interesting point is that the “naked” expert system as such is like a prolog
interpreter, an infrastructure for inferences and a store of explicit “knowledge-
that”.  A “knowledge engineer”  translates  human knowledge into  this  format,
sometimes even trying to grasp knowledge-how. Fuzzy logic (see section  7.1)
was introduced to help with the difficulty of formalizing skills.
2. Anti-intellectualism recognises the existence and validity of both categories of
knowledge. This implies that both “knowledge-how” and “knowledge-that” are
underpinned by some third terminology, but we have scant idea what that third
terminology might be (short of simulating an entire brain) and this will surely be
very  complex.  One  could  present  intellectualism  (above)  as  saying  that  the
underlying uniting mechanism is some sort of “knowing that”,  while radical-
anti-intellectualism  (below)  can  be  presented  as  identifying  this  underlying
mechanism as being sort of “knowledge how”. This middle position does not
specify what the underlying mechanism might be.
Pragmatically,  we  have  no  such  underlying  concept  which  is  readily
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implementable in technology, at a level that even aims at convincing human-like
AI. The nearest attempts are vaguely based on brains (probably since brains are
the only place we see an underlying mechanism for both types of knowledge).
The data structures associated with this approach are brain-inspired, mainly:
◦ Neural nets
◦ Brook’s emulation of multiple cooperating mechanisms (Brooks, 1991)
1. Radical  anti-intellectualism claims  that  all  knowledge-that  is  based  on
knowledge-how,  for  example  knowing  that  2+2=4  is  seen  as  just  a  set  of
behaviours one can be skilled at, like the ability to say “two-plus-two-is-four”
and  to  produce  other  behaviours  that  “apply  this  knowledge”  in  appropriate
times  (Fantl, 2014). This position has not been explored in AI yet, and seems
compatible with phenomenology and Dreyfus’s works  (1979, 2007), especially
the emphasis on skill  as the basis for a more phenomenologically correct AI
(Dreyfus  &  Dreyfus,  1986).  As  this  thesis  aims  to  open  up  new  ways  of
conceiving of AI, one should note that this is a “road less travelled by” in AI. It
may  well  be  worthwhile  remaining  sympathetic  to  this  position.  Further
discussion will be found in sections 7.6.4, 8.4.2.
A  data type that would implement knowing-how needs to have less categorical
elements  than  first-order  predicate  logic,  so  that  skills  can  be  implemented
correctly  not  just  in  the  canonical  and  clear  situations,  but  also  in  similar
situations.  Fuzzy  logic  (see  section  7.1)  makes  a  start,  and  more  advanced
examples are provided in the rest of chapter 7.
Another reason to  be sympathetic  to knowledge-how as the basis  for AI systems is
found in noting (following Ryle as quoted by  (Fantl, 2014) and  (Carroll, 1895)) that
knowledge-that is inert – it is like statements written on paper or stored in a computer.
In order to  apply knowledge-that one needs to know  how, but moreover one need to
have a mechanism that not only knows how to implement such inert knowledge-that, but
actually does it – like a CPU not only “knows” how to run programs, but actually does
it.  So  knowledge-that  just  cannot  function  alone  in  the  world,  it  needs  an  active
mechanism with the right know-how.
Since  we  are  here  interested  in  anthropic  AI,  as  distinct  from the  AI  that  imitates
“western, modern, well-trained adults”, we can leave “knowledge that” to be developed
in the enculturated, learned phase. We needn't focus on “knowledge that” directly at all,
leaving us to focus on knowledge-how. Later (section 7.5) we will see an example of an
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AI design where repetition of sequences of actions is the basis of skill-development.
3.2.8 Metaphysical non-problems
There are some debates that spring to mind at this point, but that have no technological
impact  and therefore  it  is  best  to  remain  agnostic  about  these.  These  debates  often
overlap and are sometimes simply the computer-science vs the philosophical names for
similar if not identical issues. The main points of these debates can be summarized thus:
Some  technologists  would  object  that  chatter-bots  are  not  “real  AI”,  that  their
mechanism is just a “bag of tricks” that would not constitute “real intelligence” or “a
mind” under any construal  (Deryugina, 2010). As a programmer, it is difficult to read
the source code for “Eliza” and come to any other conclusion. I would like to refrain
from making a  judgement  that  all bags  of  tricks  are  somehow categorically  “not  a
mind”, just because “Eliza”’s bag is nearly empty. Who are we to assume that our native
intelligence is anything  more  than “a (larger) bag of tricks”? In a sense, in Anthropic
systems, like in COG, we are trying to build a system with a base intelligence, that will
collect more skills as it learns and evolves – so to speak “filling up its bag” as it goes
along. Eventually the behaviour could be sophisticated, hopefully even human-like.
Searle (1980) defines “Strong” vs “Weak” AI. His argument against  strong AI is based
on the following assumption:
Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features
of the brain.
He proceeds to use the “Chinese room” argument to show that 
Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of
intentionality.
Searle discusses several replies to his argument, one of them being the “other minds”
reply. It argues that we have no way of knowing whether a person understands Chinese,
other than by their behaviour. So if we attribute cognition to people we must attribute it
also to machines that display similar behaviour. Searle says:
This  objection  really  is  only  worth  a  short  reply.  The  problem  in  this
discussion is not about how I know that other people have cognitive states,
but rather what it is that I am attributing to them when I attribute cognitive
- 75 -
states to them...
But  for  us  as  technologists  the  last  thing  we  care  about  is  “what  it  is  that  I  am
attributing”, or what the  true meaning of cognitive states is. We care about machines
that are fit for purpose, that work well enough. This is all that we will be attributing to
our AI systems, and the way to verify the criterion of “fit for purpose” is empirically.
The philosophical or scientific question of what “true” intentionality or cognition is may
take many decades to resolve. As technologists, we needn’t wait for that. The problem
of whether a mind is “real” or not is a question of philosophy, not of technology – and
here we are interested in technology.
Once we have far more advanced anthropic AI systems, the question of how “real” an
AI mind is could be re-phrased in terms of the depth of similarity between the artificial
and the natural-human intelligences. These days are far in the future.
3.2.9 Ethics
If and when we would have human-like AI, it would give rise to a bevy of philosophical
problems. As mentioned above, the strong/weak AI argument is analogical to the “other
minds” problem, which is unsolved, by most reckonings  (Hyslop, 2014). Moreover, a
truly human-like AI would give rise to (at least) three types of ethical problems:
1. Should we treat  the AI as an entity capable of  real experience (for example
suffering),  and  therefore  an  entity  towards  which  we  would  have  moral
obligations ?
2. Would such AI be dangerous, in that it could become aggressive or try to take
over the world in some dangerous (to humans) way?
3. Would it be fair to have humans relate humanly towards a machine, and develop
an emotional bond with such machines (Whitby, 2011)?
Since human-like AI is in such a pitiful state at the moment, I view it as morally safe to
exclude any ethical worries from this thesis. This however must be revisited if human-
like AI becomes significantly more successful than it has been so far.
There  is  however  an  opposite  angle  on  human-like  AI.  The  whole  idea  of  making
artificial humans is precisely in order to replace human labour. In a sense we would like,
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if  possible,  to  bring  back  slavery,  without  any  genuine  human  suffering.  Slaves
understood our language and customs, and provided personalized service. However, the
very mention of slavery is near taboo in our society: we no longer keep slaves explicitly,
but we should broaden our view. Human-like AI would possibly alleviate a lot of the
tedium of current workplaces, some of which (especially in poorer part of the globe)
may seem to future generation as repugnant as full-blown slavery seems to us today.
So there are ethical risks, but also possible benefits in human-like AI. Because of the
pitiful state of the technology, none of these will be further discussed.
3.2.10 Anthropic AI:  summary
When I  use  the  term “anthropic  AI”  I  mean  human-like,  pre-cultural  AI,  aimed  at
technology.  Not  AI  trying  to  be  a  western,  modern,  well-trained  or  adult,  and  not
directly aimed at understanding humans per se (as in the science of psychology).
Human-like AI tries to simulate human intelligence. Once we remove the normal biases
of the western image of what human intelligence consists of, we get anthropic AI.
Anthropic AI is in a sense human-like AI taken seriously. Humans are born immature,
and learn general and specific skills. The general skills can be seen as a maturation of
the  basic  abilities,  but  the  culture-specific  skills  are,  as  defined,  specific  to  the
environment of the individual. If we want human-like intelligence, then we need this
ability to adapt. Most existing learning systems are rational/ideal, and the few systems
that aim at human-like behaviour (like COG or CYC) are very far from achieving this
purpose. 
3.3 Terms of this thesis: “introspection”
This section aims to clarify (to the degree necessary) the very concept of introspection,
and  to  prepare  the  ground  for  chapter  4,  where  I  argue  that  introspection  can  be
legitimately used in some scientific and technological contexts, chapter 5, where I argue
that introspection is a promising basis for anthropic AI, and chapter 6 where I detail the
kind of introspection recommended for anthropic AI.
Introspection is a type of self-observation. Being the observation of one person, it is
subjective,  but  being  on  observation  of  one’s  own  mental  states/processes,  it  is
inaccessible to others in principle, and is therefore doubly subjective.  Phenomenology
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(in contrast to introspection, see section 3.3.1.5) (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012, pp. 28–29),
is  an  attempt  to  study  subjectivity  by  introspection,  but  in  a  controlled  and  peer-
reviewed way. In a sense it is an attempt to create an inter-subjective literature based on
introspection, an “objective” description of the subjective human condition.
3.3.1 Studying subjectivity
Subjectivity is not a favourite topic of science, for evident reasons: Few of science's
methods (empirical repeatability, mathematics, induction, Occam's razor) work in the
subjective realm. This  area is so  fraught for scientists that several attempts have been
made  (most  prominently  by  the  Vienna  circle  and  by  Watson  (1913))  to  banish
subjectivity from any discussion, that is, to legislate for systematically ignoring what is
clearly always there,  in each of our experiences (recall  Descartes'  “Cogito”)  (Seth,
2010).
3.3.1.1 Why subjectivity?
As we saw in section  3.2.5.2 there are many levels in which we can discuss and/or
simulate  humans.  Some of  these  are  impractical  (e.g.  the  atomic  level)  Some have
already been tried  repeatedly  in  AI (cognitive  simulation,  neural  nets,  mathematics,
logic, probability theory). Strangely, the level most available to us as individuals, our
own subjective experience of ourselves,  has been neglected.  Below are some of the
reasons to choose this level (beyond just trying something different).
Since our concern is with a technology that aims specifically to behave in an anthropic
manner,  an intuitive  preference could  be to  use  terminology and mechanisms that
people can readily relate to. Humans relate well to each other's subjective narrations
about  their  internal  mental  states:  many  conversations  start  with  “How  are  you”  -
soliciting precisely this sort of narrative, and some continue with “How could I do X”,
soliciting instructions based on the respondent's internal understanding of herself (for an
extended discussion of how humans instruct each other successfully using introspection
see section 5.2). Moreover, humans who have no language in common still assume the
existence of phenomenal mental states in strangers in terms familiar to their own daily
discourse. One of the benefits of the approach of this thesis is that it is plausible that if
we were to build systems based on our own subjective daily experience, such systems
would  have  a  good  chance  of  being  easier  to  relate  to,  and  hence  more  useful
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(eventually) as, for example, caregivers for the elderly (see section 3.2.2.3).
People like anthropomorphising things, like “the tree wants the sun” (see section 3.2.2).
In order to allow people to interact more smoothly with robots, we need to have some
level in the robot that functions in a way similar to humans, so that both the robot can
parse how people are behaving, and people can parse how the robot is behaving (see
section 3.2.3).
A secondary reason to be interested in the subjective is that simulation of subjective
processes  would  be  easier  to  debug  than  lower  level  processes,  since  we  have  no
intuitive understanding of lower levels such as our own neurons or neuron-assemblies.
Going any lower than subjectivity would therefore complicate debugging.
Going to an any higher, more formal levels (where cultural assumptions begin) lead us
into methodologies that tend to be clunky, possibly infallible, and not truly human-like.
3.3.1.2 Locating subjectivity
Most AI systems are implemented in software, on a computer platform. The computer
platform is designed to implement a formal system (though being a physical object in
the world any computer is subject to the whims of real world, such as power cuts) (B. C.
Smith, 2005). On such a formal system, there is usually an operating system and many
other pieces of software all making no attempt to break this formal structure. Actually, it
would be in-principle impossible to break out of a formal system: that is why we use
pseudo-random number  generators  –  there  is  nothing  random  in  a  formal  system9.
However,  using  software,  one  can  try  to  simulate  non-formal  systems,  such  as  the
weather, to a certain resolution. Such is the type of AI that this thesis promotes: using
software  for  simulating  the  processes  that  we  experience  subjectively,  the  human
thought process, which is not formal. However, a human can learn to think formally
(e.g. in school), and so in principle human-like AI could also learn to use logic and
mathematics, thus creating a 3-layer “sandwich” – formal systems below and above, and
the mess of actual human thought (Goldie, 2012) in the middle.
Consider these three levels in humans: The lower level, the hardware, which could be
9 A truly random value can be obtained from outside the computer, either by using keyclick timings (as
is done in many Linux systems) or inputting some quantum-value from a special device, obtaining a
truly random value. In any case, the randomness is being imported from outside the formal system
(Isensee, 2001).
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called  the  implementation  level,  and is  well  understood in  computers,  and is  being
painstakingly  researched  in  humans  by  neuroscience.  This  level  in  humans  is  not
accessible  to  consciousness  (Nisbett  &  Wilson,  1977),  and  therefore  is  not  readily
available to the AI developer. The middle layer, where we have the informal “mess”, is
available  to  our  subjectivity  on  the  human  side,  and  is  called  for  in  this  thesis  as
software  on  the  computer  side.  The  upper  cultured  level  is  achieved  by  years  of
education in humans (imperfectly, since humans are fallible  (Ariely, 2009)). We could
try to train introspection-based AI systems to do formal tasks, but that may be a fool’s
errand – we can use existing formal systems for that. 
The argument  against  much of AI is  that  it  tries to  short-circuit  this  sandwich,  and
pretend  that  humans  are  rational  through  and  through,  this  is  most  pronounced  in
logicism  (Bringsjord,  2008),  but  is  visible  also  in  Simon’s  work,  e.g.  the  General
Problem Solver (Newell & Simon, 1961b). Some strands of cognitive science try to see
the “mind as machine” (as per the title of (Boden, 2008)) ignoring the messy middle, at
their peril. Other parts of the cognitive science community, such a Papert as quoted in
section 1.1, recognise this messy middle, and very few if any have tried to simulate this
technologically (see COG as the nearest attempt in section 3.2.6).
3.3.1.3 What is subjectivity
So what is subjectivity? It is the fact of how things look  for us (Seth, 2010). For us
collectively, and/or for each of us as an individual. In the present, and/or in general. The
subjective world, a bit like the objective universe, seems endlessly complex, but worse,
it seems that we can never agree on anything in the subjective realm, so no division of
labour is possible, no proper gathering of data, no science, and possibly no systematic
study at  all.  The subjective realm is  not made of “moderate-sized specimens of dry
goods”  with  which  out  mind  is  so  adept  (Austin  &  Warnock,  1964,  p.  8).  These
difficulties are why it is often called “ineffable”, and left to the poets.
The idea that studying subjectivity is difficult or impossible is the received view in most
of  the  English speaking academic world.  Strangely,  where science  fails  many other
professions succeed: Lawyers convict or clear criminals with arguments that discuss
intent,  feelings,  etc.  journalists  discuss  the  emotional  states  of  politicians,
businesspeople  and  other  news-makers,  and novelists  have  little  problem  with
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discussing the subjective. Scientists will protest that their “findings” are non-repeatable,
non-quantifiable, consist of “folk psychology”  (Ravenscroft, 2010) etc., but that does
not  stop  these  professions  from  being  consistently  successful  on  their  own  terms.
Moreover,  there  have  been  at  least  two  major  attempts  to  explore  subjectivity
systematically outside the English speaking world. One was in Indian philosophy (The
classical  introduction  being  Zimmer,  1951), which  is  outside  the  scope  of  this
discussion (but surely should be explored in the context of AI elsewhere, see section
8.4.5),  and  the  other  is  phenomenology (Gallagher  &  Zahavi,  2012) (see section
3.3.1.5).
Note again that in many academic discussions of subjectivity the accepted nomenclature
(which I will follow here) for the environment is either “physical universe” or “human
world”, to denote the objective and the subjective perspectives respectively.
3.3.1.4 Subjectivity can be studied
An important part of subjectivity is perspectival-ness, (apparently) another is the qualia,
or the what-it-is-like-to-be a subject in a situation (Nagel, 1974). I take no stand on the
anatomy-of-subjectivity – that is a philosophical discussion with little or no impact on
technology  (Mandik, 2001). This section shows that subjectivity  can be explored, in
technologically meaningful ways. 
Some rudimentary starts  on exploring subjectivity in cognitive science have already
been made in cognitive science. Subjectivity seems endlessly complex, so one should be
careful never to “tick the box” labelled “subjectivity” and consider any one example
definitive. The following are all good starts:
• Any perceiving agent, even a camera, has its own geometric point-of-view, and
need not take a god-like objective perspective. So (for example) humans need
not calculate (objective) motion equations in order to know how to catch a ball,
but can implement some preferences regarding the angle of sight from their own
point of view as a player, and catch a ball with minimal difficulty  (McLeod,
Reed, & Dienes, 2003).
• Every system that tries to make sense of a situation (rational or not) has a limited
amount of information, computational resources, and time available to it - this is
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Simon's  “Bounded  rationality” for  which  he  got  the  Nobel  prize
(Nobelprize.org, 1978; Simon, 1996a). We are “only human” (see section 2.2.1).
• All  learning  AI  systems  can  be  seen  as  subjective,  in  that  every  running
specimen of a machine-learning algorithm is a product of its own training set, in
a sense a product of its own life-experience. The field of machine learning is
acutely aware of this in how it manages training sets.
As we see,  subjectivity  is  not one thing,  but  a  target  for  a  (possibly never  ending)
search. It is a search to be pursued (at least) for as long as the search is fruitful.
Another avenue to explore the subjective would be introspection. We all have a direct
(Hyslop, 2014) and relatively unhindered access to our subjectivity  in introspection.
Each and every one of us is a specimen of human subjectivity. Another way to study
subjectivity  is  to  read  reports  given by others  (perhaps  from the  phenomenological
tradition), but these are also based ultimately on someone's introspection.
3.3.1.5 Phenomenology, hetero-phenomenology
As we saw in section 2.5.1, “Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness
as experienced from the first-person point of view”, and is arguably as old as Buddhism,
but  (at  least  in  the  west)  it  “came to  full  flower in  Husserl”  (D.  W.  Smith,  2013).
Heidegger, Husserl's student, revolutionised the ontology implied by phenomenology –
for Husserl and most of his students questions of being or ontology were “bracketed” or
set  aside,  leaving  the  phenomenologist  with  essentially  an  idealist  ontology  (D.  W.
Smith, 2013). Heidegger (see detailed introduction in sections  2.4.1 and  2.5) argued
that we cannot understand the human condition other than in the human's concerned
involvement with the world, and this human interaction is Heidegger's new notion of an
ontological  foundation.  In  making  this  human  condition  the  foundation,  Heidegger
points out that fundamental to a human's interaction with the world is interpretation -
making sense of the situation one is always already inside.
Phenomenology is the systematic and peer reviewed study of introspection  (Gallagher
&  Zahavi,  2012,  pp.  28–29),  but  it  is  also  a  literary  tradition,  including  Husserl,
Heidegger,  and  others.  Some  would  argue  that  it  is  more  akin  to  a  sect,  where
Heidegger’s musings are accepted as gospel, than to a truly peer-reviewed and debated
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discipline  (Romano,  2009).  Conveniently,  I  do  not  need  to  have  a  position  on  this
matter, as I am not promoting a phenomenologically-correct methodology for AI (like
Dreyfus), but individual introspection by AI practitioners. Phenomenology is important
to this thesis because it is one of the main alternatives in the literature to cognitivism
and it is similar to my argument in that it stresses the subjective. In an important sense
this  whole  thesis  aims  to  pave  a  road about  half-way between phenomenology and
classic AI -  agreeing with the phenomenologists that rationalism is limited, and we
need subjectivity, but breaking with phenomenology and moving to the side of classic
AI in demanding that software be written, regardless of how much violence that may
cause to our models of subjectivity. Elegantly constructed models, as phenomenology
has (which are not programmable) are useless for us as technologists (Dreyfus, 2007).
Hetero-phenomenology is a systematic attempt to explore the subjective “in the second
person” using interview techniques, hence “hetero” - “other”  (D. Dennett, 2003). An
interesting  sub-case  of  hetero-phenomenology  is  Hurlburt’s  (2011) effort  to  explore
“pristine experience” using scientifically valid practices, and maximum care (Hurlburt,
Heavey, & Kelsey, 2013). For example, in some experiments subjects were asked to
carry a buzzer, and report on their experience when the buzzer goes off, immediately, so
as to minimise pollution of the introspective input from later thinking. The focus of this
work is understanding our actual experience, an illusive subject-matter, with as much
honesty and rigour as possible.
3.3.2 Defining introspection
Most of the rest of this section (3.3) will examine some definitions and delineations of
introspection,  and discuss how they stack up.
This thesis deals only with introspection within the context of it being a plausible basis
for AI development, and so has little need to involve itself with the many debates about
the nature of introspection itself.
Let's start with a definition and a characterisation of introspection:
Overgaard (2008) defines introspection as:
an observation and, sometimes, a description of the contents of one’s own
consciousness. 
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I will assume in the rest of my discussion (with the bulk of the literature) that indeed
consciousness is what is enumerated in the observation process known as introspection,
so when you introspect you are looking at consciousness. This means that I also assume
there is no other consciousness (non introspectible) and no other introspection (which is
not observing consciousness).
Schwitzgebel (2012) surveyed  many  definitions  of  introspection  and  gives  6
characterizations  of  introspection.  Most  definitions  of  introspection  include  the
following criteria (abbreviated):
1. About mental events, states, processes, etc.,
2. About the first-person,
3. Simultaneous or in  temporal proximity to the mental event, state, or process
(not a medium or long-term memory).
By most definitions introspection also:
4. Is direct, not involving (at least any complicated) inferences,
5. Is detecting pre-existing mental events, precesses (etc.), 
6. Requires an effort, not constant or automatic.
For building AI, the targets of introspection (at least initially) would be processes that
influence any operations on information, that can feasibly be replicated in a computer –
as opposed to the vague ebb and flow of subtler emotions, levels of alertness, and other
observable mental states and processes. These later elements may be of use in AI in the
future, but that future is further away and does not concern us here. Introspecting the
fact that one feels cold, or believes some peculiar fact would have no immediate utility
for  AI  design.  The  “products  of  introspection”  would  be  some  reports  on  how
information is processed, that would be useful for AI development (see section 6.2). An
example of introspection is given in section 3.3.4.
A word is due about the “effort” (point 6 above) required (by most philosophers) in
introspection, or even the idea of introspection being an action, represented by a verb. In
one sense, introspection is one of the most passive actions possible,  since the world of
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our own consciousness is available to us without much effort, just for the noticing. So
“noticing” is required, as per point 6 above. But in a sense we need to make a further
effort when introspecting, to be authentic, to tell things as they are and not as we may
expect them to be (by our own criteria or by society's). See section  6.3.3. Also if the
introspection is being expressed using words, there is the effort in speaking coherently,
e.g. not mixing languages. 
3.3.3 A boundary between introspection and science collapses
Strangely, even though introspection is presented by mainstream cognitive science as
utterly wrong (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; J. B. Watson, 1913,
1920), there are some similarities between “thinking aloud” (TA), promoted by both
J.B.  Watson  and  Simon  and introspection  (Ericsson & Simon,  1993;  J.  B.  Watson,
1920). This discussion is important (1) since TA is a central technique in psychology, (2)
since it presents an interesting boundary case for introspection, and (3) since one of the
main characters here, Simon, is also a central pillar of the AI community (see section
2.2). Note that Simon nowhere disagrees with Watson’s TA technique, he sees himself
as only further elaborating it.
The difference between TA and introspection seems to be that in (acceptable) TA the
person reporting his thoughts is naïve, not a psychologist, and the content of the report
is about some subject matter other than psychological mechanisms. 
Further below I will show that mainstream psychology’s aversion to introspection, and
neo-introspectionists’  concern  for  correct introspection  both  share  a  scientifically-
motivated aversion to unexamined inferences mixed into the data  of any systematic
study.  However,  further  examination  of  this  preference  shows  that  it  is  naïve  and
unwarranted: all observation is interpretative, and “clean” data does not exist.
3.3.3.1 “Thinking aloud” (TA) can be seen as introspective
This section is not trying to establish that TA is introspective as a matter of fact, but just
to show that a case can be made that it is introspective, or that it is arguable that TA is
introspective. Later I will show how TA was distinguished from introspection.
This section is about TA as a technique. This technique was established by J.B. Watson
(1920),  and  was  discussed  and  expanded  on  most  famously  by  Ericsson  & Simon
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(1993). My concern is with the currently acceptable practice more than with Watson as a
historical character.
Watson  was  the  leader  of  the  behaviourist  revolution  and  it  was  he  who  largely
abolished introspection as a legitimate technique in psychology  (J. B. Watson, 1913)
(see sections  2.2,  4.2.1).  Considering  that  Watson  was  vehement  in  denying
introspection any legitimate role,  it  would be very odd to find something similar to
introspection mentioned positively in his writings, especially from the same years he
was running his anti-introspectionist campaign (Costall, 2006).
However,  Watson  (1920) introduces an idea of “thinking aloud” (TA),  in contrast to
introspection,   without clear definitions or references10. He states that for starting an
experiment using TA “usually a request is sufficient”  (J. B. Watson, 1920, p. 89). He
adds that the subject has to enter into this experiment in “the proper spirit” without
detailing what that may mean (Ibid. p. 92), and states that a “scientific man is quite
willing to enter into the experiment with zest”, again without leaving us any hint as to
what is meant by this “scientific” subspecies of mankind (Ibid. p 91). He does, however,
give a few examples of such thinking aloud.
The longest example Watson quotes is of a colleague who came to stay in an apartment
in which Watson “had rooms”. He challenged the guest to figure out the use of some
contraption belonging to the landlords, while thinking aloud. Here is the full protocol as
recorded by Watson (round brackets are Watson's notes in the original  text):
“The thing looks a little like an invalid’s table, but it is not heavy, the pan is
curved, it has side pieces and is attached with a ball and socket joint. It
would never hold a tray full of dishes (cul de sac).  The thing (return to
starting point) looks like some of the failures of an inventor. I wonder if the
landlord is an inventor. No, you told me he was a porter in one of the big
banks down town. The fellow is as big as a house and looks more like a
prize-fighter  than a mechanician;  those paws of  his  would never  do the
work demanded of an inventor” (blank wall again). This was as far as we
got on the first day. On the second morning we got no nearer the solution.
On the second night we talked over the way the porter and his wife lived,
and  the  subject  wondered  how a  man  earning  not  more  than  $150 per
month  could  live  as  our  landlord  did.  I  told  him  that  the  wife  was  a
hairdresser and earned about eight dollars per day herself. Then I asked
him if he did not see the sign ‘Hair-Dresser’ on the door as we entered. The
next morning after coming from his bath he said, “I saw that infernal thing
10 This style of writing was normal at the time.
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again” (original starting point). “It must be something to use in washing or
weighing the baby-but they have no baby (cul de sac again). The thing is
curved at one end so that it would just fit a person’s neck. Ah ! I have it! The
curve does fit the neck. The woman you say is a hair-dresser and the pan
goes against the neck and the hair is  spread out over it.” This was the
correct  conclusion.  Upon reaching  it  there  was  a  smile,  a  sigh  and an
immediate turn to something else (the equivalent  of  obtaining food after
search) (J. B. Watson, 1920, p. 92).
Note that this “thinking aloud” is not a case of the “extended mind” (Clark & Chalmers,
1998) – not a case of thinking using external props (like doing arithmetic, saying out
loud or jotting down “carry 1”). Rather, it is a case of “letting one's thoughts escape
through one's mouth” in the everyday process of trying to figure something out.
Alarmingly (for our attempt to understand introspection) this technique could be seen as
being close to a case of introspection. Note however that the definitions we are now
using are all  recent,  and Watson wrote 100 years  ago, so any problem with current
definitions does not reflect badly on Watson historically, but these problems are still
problems  for  us.  The argument  that  TA is  a  type of  introspection  would  stress  that
mental  contents are  being  verbally  reported  in  TA.  Recall  the  definitions  of
introspection quoted above (top of section 3.3.2).
I believe there is a prima-facie case that TA is some variation of introspection, according
to the definitions. But it is presented by Watson as an alternative to introspection –  he
says: “...a good deal more can be learned ... by making subjects think aloud ... than by
trusting to the unscientific method of introspection”  (J. B. Watson, 1920, p. 91). Note
that Simon, who continues Watson's work on TA (Ericsson & Simon, 1993), agrees that
there is a possible confusion here: “The use of thinking-aloud protocols as data was
sometimes misunderstood as an attempt to  revive introspection”  (Simon,  1996a,  pp.
231–232), so this is no idle worry.
3.3.3.2 Two distinctions between TA and introspection
Watson's legacy in terms of the boundaries of introspection is problematic, as we have
seen above. Further elaboration of TA was one of Herbert Simon's research agendas.
Simon  says  that:  “...no  clear  guidelines  are  provided  [by  Watson] to  distinguish
illegitimate 'introspection' from many forms of verbal output that are routinely treated
as data...” (Ericsson & Simon, 1993, p. 3).
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Let's try to examine what the two poles of Watson's (& Simon's) contrasting of TA with
introspection are: What they prohibit is the psychologist introspecting in his armchair,
coming up with pronouncements about how his own mind works, and generalizing them
as a general scientific fact. The psychologist is assumed to be already invested in some
course of research in psychology, and therefore bound to be biased. On the other hand,
the naïve  person,  whether  a  “subject”  in  an experiment  or  a  scientist  who is  not a
psychologist, is assumed to be neutral. If such a neutral person gives neutral reports, just
observations, then his “verbal behaviour” is legitimate unbiased data.
Let me propose two distinctions:
1. The contents of TA are the contents of the thinking process – in the paradigmatic
example of figuring out the contraption (J. B. Watson, 1920, p. 92) the text reads
“The thing looks a little like an invalid's table, but it is not heavy...”. In “classical
introspection” the contents of the report can be about the  mechanisms that are
used to do the thinking, rather than the content of the thoughts.
2. In  the  forbidden  “classical  introspection”  it  is  the  psychologist,  a  trained
individual with a research agenda, who is making the report, while in TA it is a
naïve participant in an experimental setting.
It seems that these distinctions are supported by Watson and  Simon:
For the  first distinction, about the contents of the verbalisations, Ericsson & Simon
(1993, p. 58) analyse (J. B. Watson, 1920) as follows:
It should be noted that the kind of questioning illustrated by [Watson 1920's
story  about  the  golfer,  pp.  100-101] does  not  refer  to  to  the  subject's
memory of a specific instance, but to how he thinks he performs activities in
general when  he  is  asked about  them.  Watson made a  clear  distinction
between analytic  classical  introspection,  verbal  questioning of  a  subject,
and thinking aloud. His views on the veridicality of the later kind of verbal
report were quite different from his views on the first two” (emphasis added).
So Simon objects to the generalisations that the golfer makes, to the fact that the golfer
tries to give non-naïve, analytical comments about his conduct in general. TA would
allow him only to verbalise about the task at  hand, in the present moment, with no
elaborations or speculations.
Later  Ericsson  & Simon  (1993,  p.  247) mention  approvingly  previous  research  by
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Ohlsson who
… coded TA protocols to distinguish between heeded thoughts, on the one
hand, and introspections, retrospective reports, and communications to the
experimenter, on the other hand…. Reports were classified as introspections
if the grammatical subject was the speaker (e.g. 'I,', 'my head'); if the verb
was epistemic (e.g. 'remember,' 'feel,' 'know') and if the verbalization did not
contain specific information about the current problem.
 So any comments or speculation on the “meta” level, and discussion of how-the-mind-
does-it, are banned.
Another  insight  into  Simon's  position  is  provided  by  his  quoting  approvingly  from
Duncker, saying
While the introspector makes himself as thinking the object of his attention,
the  subject  who  is  thinking  aloud  remains  immediately  directed  to  the
problem, so to speak allowing his activity to become verbal. When someone,
while thinking, says to himself 'One ought to see if it isn't-,' or, 'It would be
nice  if  one  could  show that-,'  one  would  hardly  call  this  introspection”
(Ericsson & Simon, 1993, p. 60)
So the distinguishing criterion seems to be being “immediately directed to the problem”
- again a distinction of content.
Turning to the second distinction: is the person doing the verbalisation a professional
with an agenda or a neutral, naïve person? Here most of the evidence comes straight
from Watson. He says:
...a good deal more can be learned about the psychology of thinking by
making subjects think aloud about definite problems, than by trusting to the
unscientific method of introspection (J. B. Watson, 1920, p. 91)
His phrase “method of introspection” is clearly a reference to “the introspectionists” -
the psychologists that have not yet been converted to his behaviourism. Later he says
that 
The behaviourist… is engaged in studying the process of observing as it
appears in others, where the activity is not complicated by the demands of
introspection.  …  the  behaviourist  is  a  natural  scientist  and  makes  his
observations upon his fellow man rather than upon himself” (J. B. Watson,
1920, p. 94).
These are actually two arguments - the role of data-source needs to be separated for two
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reasons: the need to notice the data (the role of the scientist) distracts from the task at
hand, and separation of the agenda-laden scientists from the experimental subject is just
good scientific practice, minimising theoretical bias (see also section 6.3.3).
3.3.3.3 Inferences and confusion
But if we set the word “introspection” aside for a moment, we can see a commonality
between Schwitzgebel’s  (2012) criterion No. 4, that introspection be direct, and TA's
requirements  as  discussed  above,  that  the  TA report  be  by  a  naïve  person with  no
agenda, and be about the contents of the problem at hand, not about the mechanisms of
thought. The commonality is that they both do not want any inferences to be already
embedded in the data. 
Lets  look  at  this  once  more:  For  Schwitzgebel,  a  neo-introspectionist,  two
characteristics of introspection are that it  is immediate (3) and direct (4). If it is not
direct then it becomes speculation, philosophy, psychology or one of many other things,
but in ceases to be pure introspection.  Introspection is Schwitzgebel's term for “good”
non-inferential reports.
For Watson, Simon, and other psychologists TA is the thing without inferences, the “raw
data”.  They  call  that  which  contains  inferences,  speculation,  philosophy  or
psychological theory “introspection”, and that is a bad thing.
So it would seem that all we have here is a confusion in terminology. They both want
the  non-inferential,  “pure”  reports.  It  seems  that  we  have  the  same  word,
“introspection”, being used for the same thing, except for the inference part where the
same word is being used with opposite meanings.
A  reasonable  step  now  would  be  to  call  Watson's  Introspection  Intro-W,  and
Schwitzgebel's Intro-S,  sort out the differences and make peace. However, such a peace
would  be  predicated  on  joining  the  seeming  consensus  against  inference  in
introspection. The question we must ask is “Is such a position tenable?” regrettably the
answer is no. 
3.3.3.4 Non-inferential observation is impossible
The desire to separate observation from interpretation has been ruled impossible both in
the analytic and the continental traditions. On the analytic side Bogen  (2014) quotes
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Norwood  Hanson,  Paul  Feyerabend,  and  mainly  Thomas  Kuhn  in  showing  that  in
normal scientific observation:
1. Which aspects of a scene are seen as salient and worth recording varies by the
set of assumptions the observer is already committed to.
2. Observers conceptualize what they see in terms of their favoured  conceptual
framework. An everyday example would be how different people and different
cultures carve up the palette of colours.
3. The very perception can be influenced by “top down” considerations that are not
in  the  actual  world.  This  is  demonstrated  by  Bruner  and Postman's  research
using playing cards with black hearts.
All  these  worries  come  from  a  discussion  of  external  observations  in  the  natural
sciences. They would be double and triple as worrying in the more complex case of
introspection,  where  the  process  is  entirely  subjective,  and  the  very  process  of
observation may impact the content of any observation much more than in the case of
observing an external object.
There is another problem with trying to separate observation from interpretation (and
eliminate inferences) similar but distinct from point 2 above: When a person who is
conversant in more than one language introspects (or thinks aloud) their mental contents
tend to appear in more than one language. Any attempt to communicate intelligibly with
another  person requires  translating  and organizing  one's  thoughts  into  one  coherent
language.  This  process  of  regularising  expression  is  inferential.  Arguably,  even
monoglots have to regularize their language in a similar way.
On the continental side, one of hermeneutics' main points is that all observation includes
some interpretation. One quick way to make that point from the continental side is to
recall the hermeneutic circle: we make sense of the whole only because we have a sense
of the parts, but we also make sense of the parts only as since we already have a sense
of the whole (see section 2.5). 
Like  Schwitzgebel’s  (2012) introspection  and  Watson's/Simon's  “thinking  aloud”,
hetero-phenomenology (section  3.3.1.5) is also an attempt to get at the “raw data” of
subjectivity.
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3.3.3.5 A  boundary  between  introspection  and  science
collapses: conclusion
 Though they come from different apparent traditions, both cognitivism and the new
introspectionists view themselves as being within the scientific tradition, and want the
“raw data”. They want to have “data” so they can then work on the “mechanisms” in an
open, peer-reviewable way. The idea is to reach some scientific truth. However, for AI
we don't need (or want to wait for) such objective, singular truths about intelligence.
The scientific/cognitive understanding of intelligence is a long way in the future, and
the continental candidate we have for such an “objective” or well-received “truth” is
Heidegger (see section 3.3.1.5), and we saw that Heidegger is not readily programmable
(Dreyfus, 2007). AI-as-technology cannot wait for these debates to be resolved, nor is
such a wait necessary.
As we saw above (section  3.3.3.3) the attempt to separate the “good” from the “bad”
observations of mental states has hit an impasse. Without prejudice to the efforts being
made in this direction (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012; Jack & Roepstorff, 2003, 2004), for
the current purposes (technological AI) this effort must be abandoned – at the price of
stating the following at its starkest: This thesis will be promoting introspection, of the
bad type:  Whatever it was that was forbidden, in its broadest form - I am promoting
precisely that,  i.e.  self-reflective  introspection,  about  mechanism,  by  theory-laden
individuals,  with  inferences.  Consider  even  that  some introspectors  may  be  self-
conscious and evil charlatans – this possibility has to be carried forward into the rest of
the argument. However, I will show in chapter 4 that for our purposes here even “bad”
introspection is  a  legitimate source of ideas,  and  in chapter  5 that  at  least  much of
introspection is plausible as a basis for anthropic AI. I will return to making distinctions
between better and worse forms of introspection in chapter 6.
3.3.4 What kind of introspection is recommended
This section is to a large degree a summary of chapter 6, where the arguments are given
in detail. An example text follows.
As  we have  seen,  this  thesis  does  not insist  on the  introspection  being particularly
refined, correct, or exact, since it is not at all clear if that is possible, and in the context
of technology, it is unnecessary. 
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Leaving aside  any commitment  to  “correct”  or  “uninterpreted”  introspection,  unlike
various thinkers about introspection in philosophy and psychology, in AI we need to
have a commitment to the sort of concrete and clear details that are needed in computer
programming. We must try to describe the mental states and processes pragmatically, in
terms that may be programmable. These descriptions will most certainly be partial, and
we should never pretend that the description is exhaustive, or near-exhaustive. We may
also  relinquish  any  search  for  a  quick  and  efficient  way  of  distinguishing  between
“good” and “bad” introspective reports, not so much because such gradations are not
possible, but because over-attachment to correctness and precision has rendered most
previous attempts at phenomenological AI sterile in terms of producing actual testable
systems  (Dreyfus, 2007). The sort of introspection we should aim for is  mid-depth:
roughly half way between Simon (with his positive commitment to programmability)
and  the  phenomenologists  with  their  commitment  to  observing  subjectivity  as  it
appears, rather than as it should be. Note also that in sections 4.5,  5.3 I will speculate
that all programming is introspective. In that specific case the introspection is restricted
by the limitations of the programming environment (e.g. python, i386 machine) to a
small  structured palette.  In introspecting for AI,  we look at  the mind as is  operates
freely, and only later formalize.
A “piece of introspection” useful for AI would describe some sort of interaction with the
environment that would ultimately be programmable.  Any introspective observations
that have no impact on external interaction or are not programmable would be “epi-
phenomenal” and have no technological significance. 
Consider the following example introspective report:
How do I do long division? Damn – it’s  been a while – it  was that tall
teacher that taught that, right? OK, let’s see – you take the number to be
divided and put it here near the top of the page, and then there was that
angle thing you draw….. I used to like that angle! [...non verbal recollection
of the pleasant “liking”...] Now where do we put the other number – di-vi-
sor, was it, or di-vi-dor? Here? That doesn’t look right…… what was that
teacher’s name? I really need to get this done before Jim comes in…..
It  shows how irrelevant  thoughts  (and non-verbal  reminiscence)  such as  “I  liked...”
intrude. It shows how fears and reminiscence drift in and out of consciousness, and how
shaky one’s real grasp on issues often is, behind any pretence to be logical (see section
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3.3.1.2). In all these respects this example is more realistic than (say) Simon’s claim that
he “thinks in mathematics”. I here assume that Simon also has human concerns, as does
the  example  above.  But  note  also  that  this  example  is  not  as  clean  and refined  as
Heidegger’s descriptions of interacting with a nail using a hammer. The above shows us
something about how we actually do things, as far as we are concerned, and as Papert’s
said in the interview quoted in section 1.1 (McCorduck, 2004, p. 339). 
Humans can view the same situation from multiple perspectives (see section 1.4.2). Can
we program these  perspectives?  Can  we  program their  multiplicity?  If  one  were  a
scientist sworn to tell the truth, the answer should be “no”, since humans’ subjectivity is
too complex. But as technologists, this is not a question but a challenge to be answered.
Surely the challenge of multiple perspectives, and generally the challenge of pragmatic
approximations  of subjective perspectives is  easier  than  (Dreyfus,  2007)’s pedantic
challenge of programming something as nebulous as the sum-total of subjectivity. We
can do this step by step. The Phenomenologists may protest that it is “not Heideggerian
enough” (Dreyfus, 2007), but Rome was not built in a day, and the worst enemy of the
good is a nebulous idea of the perfect. How precisely such research can be done will be
the subject of chapter 6.
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4 Introspection may legitimately be used for AI
Table of Contents
4    Introspection may legitimately be used for AI..........................................................94
4.1        Introspection as “impossible”.............................................................................96
4.2        Introspection as “forbidden”...............................................................................97
4.2.1            Watson.........................................................................................................97
4.2.2            Cognitive psychology's attitude to introspection.........................................98
4.2.3            Other objections.........................................................................................101
4.2.4            Context of discovery / justification...........................................................101
4.2.5            Truth in science vs in technology..............................................................102
4.2.6            Example & summary of “introspection is forbidden”...............................105
4.3        Introspection as “commonplace”......................................................................105
4.3.1            Sweeping testimony...................................................................................106
4.3.2            Specific apparent cases..............................................................................107
4.3.3            Mainstream cognitive science uses introspection......................................110
4.3.4            Introspection is “commonplace”: summary...............................................112
4.4        Introspection as “desirable”..............................................................................112
4.4.1            Introspection & phenomenology...............................................................113
4.4.2            The Neisser-Dreyfus debate.......................................................................113
4.4.3            Introspection vs. phenomenology..............................................................114
4.5        Introspection as “unavoidable”.........................................................................114
4.6        A hybrid position...............................................................................................115
4.7        Types of truth in introspection..........................................................................117
4.8        Introspection may legitimately be used for AI: summary................................121
This  thesis  argues  for  introspection  as  a  basis  for  developing anthropic  AI.  Having
defined some some of the terminology in this claim above (chapter 3), this chapter will
argue that introspection is a legitimate source of designs in AI. Those who believe this is
a  non-scientific  approach  have  misunderstood  the  different  relations  of  science  and
technology to truth, those who believe is has already been done are granting themselves
full credit for half a step, and those who take great steps into introspection, produce no
concrete AI systems. 
The possible attitudes to the status of Introspection-for-AI that will be surveyed are that
it is:
1. Impossible:  Comte  and  other  thinkers  considered  introspection  impossible.
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These (by now uncommon) positions will be briefly discussed (and dispensed
with) in section 4.1.
2. Forbidden:  Herbert  Simon and the mainstream of cognitive science  object to
Introspection quite dogmatically, based on Watson's  (1913) paper. I will show
that their objections do not hold under the modern analysis of the context of
discovery vs justification, especially not in a technological context (section 4.2).
3. Commonplace: Solomonoff (1968) and others admit that much of AI was done
introspectively, and therefore may consider my main point to be  trivial. I will
show that so far AI researchers only used introspection in a  shallow manner,
timidly, as if it were illegitimate (section 4.3). 
4. Desirable: Dreyfus  (1979, 2007) and others are  all  for introspection (at  least
within  the  context  of  phenomenology)  but  they  do  not  generally  do  much
programming. This is the main “dissident” group from AI (section 4.4).
5. Unavoidable:  A  preliminary  case  can  be  made  that  inventing  AI  without
introspection  would  be  impossible,  if  only  because  programming  requires
introspection  under  a  specific  role  (section  4.5).  This  (novel)  discussion  is
delayed to section 5.3.
6. A hybrid position: Introspection may already be seen as “commonplace” in the
context of discovery and “forbidden” in the context of justification. A case can
be made that I have said nothing new so far. I examine what the consequences of
this  supposedly  established  practise  would  be  if  this  description  were  true
(section 4.6).
The next section (4.7), surveys various positions regarding the types of truth available
in-principle through introspection.
The purpose of this chapter is only to show that my position (encouraging introspection
as a basis for designing AI systems) is novel, and legitimate. The next chapter will argue
why one positively should  expect introspection to be a  good basis for anthropic AI.
Following  chapters  will  show  some  details  and  examples  and  will  discuss  some
consequences.
In  traversing  and  analysing  the  various  positions  scholars  have  had  towards
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introspection-for-AI,  this  chapter  also  provides  a  more  fine-grained  and  clearly-
categorized view of the state-of-the-art than was possible in chapter 2. Though the main
thrust of the argument is against those who oppose introspection, this chapter will also
contrast this thesis’ unique position within the field by critiquing other scholars, not
least sympathetic ones such as Dreyfus, Agre, and others.
Throughout this chapter it is important to bear in mind that I am not yet arguing for the
benefit or profitability of using introspection for AI. The main thrust of this chapter is
silencing those who would shout down any mention of introspection, those who argue
that using introspection is illegitimate, unscientific, or in any other way disallowed. In
passing this chapter will also demonstrate that this rehabilitation is necessary, since no
AI researcher uses introspection as such without compunction.
4.1 Introspection as “impossible”
As Overgaard has it
Brentano argued that  a  paradox exists  [in  introspection] in  the  relation
between observations of 'inner' mental states and 'outer' objects. In order to
observe and know about, say, an experience of a red apple, one must turn
one’s attention from that outer object which was cause to the sensation. This
should logically make the relevant experience cease to exist, thus also the
attempted introspection. … Comte’s first objection was that one cannot have
an identity between the observer and the object of observation in science.
He  argued  that  the  observer  cannot  be  'split  in  two'  so  that  one  part
observes the other, and, thus, observation of one’s own inner experiences is
an impossible project” (Overgaard, 2006). 
Later thinkers such as Wundt resolve this problem by saying that introspection is based
on a “change of focus” from the outer to the inner, and that in introspective vision is to a
large degree a  memory,  a  recollection of  the mental  experience rather  than a  direct
report.
These objections are of ongoing philosophical interest (Schwitzgebel, 2012), but can be
sidestepped for  this  thesis:  We can assume with  Wundt  that  introspection  is  only a
memory; Here we are interested only in inputs for technology design and not in some
absolute  or  even  scientific  truths  (see  sections  1.3.2,  1.4.2);  The  content  of
introspections exist as a matter of fact  (Seth, 2010) regardless of any qualms we can
have regrading their temporal status, or admissibility in either philosophy, science or
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technology.  The notion that we are dealing with particularly precise information in
introspecting for technology has already been put to rest in section 3.3.3.4. The idea that
introspection is inadmissible the the topic of the next section.
4.2 Introspection as “forbidden”
Practical objections to introspection also have a pre-20 th century pedigree. For example,
Comte (again) argued that introspection “will generate unreliable and conflicting data”
(Overgaard, 2006, p. 630). However in terms of impact on current thinking, the most
widely quoted prohibition on the use of introspection is (J. B. Watson, 1913).
4.2.1 Watson
John B Watson (b.  1878,  d.  1958)  is  the  most  oft-quoted  scholar  for  objecting  to
introspection, and was the most vehement in his objections (Costall, 2006). He does not
mince  words  in  criticising  his  opponents,  to  whom  he  refers  collectively  as  “the
introspectionists”:  “To make the data obtained by the language method virtually the
whole of  behavior  … is  putting  the cart  before  the horse with  a vengeance”  (J.  B.
Watson, 1913, p. 172n), “It is hopeless for me to get his introspective report”  (J. B.
Watson,  1913,  p.  172).  Watson  was  forceful  in  his  revolutionary  talk,  threatening
psychology with a schism if his world-view were not accepted:  “… either psychology
must change its viewpoint so as to take in facts of behavior, whether or not they have
bearings upon the problems of 'consciousness'; or else behavior must stand alone as a
wholly separate and independent science” (J. B. Watson, 1913, p. 159).
Watson  saw  himself  as  pushing  for  better  scientific  practise in  psychology  (viz.
“control experiments” (J. B. Watson, 1913, p. 171)). He contrasts “the behaviourist” (an
epithet he uses for himself) with the (old-style) psychologist:
...  questions  arise  which  I  may  phrase  in  two  ways:  I  may  choose  the
psychological way and say 'does the animal see these two lights as I do, i.e.,
as  two  distinct  colors,  or  does  he  see  them  as  two  grays  differing  in
brightness, as does the totally color blind?' Phrased by the behaviorist, it
would  read as  follows:  'Is  my animal  responding upon the  basis  of  the
difference in intensity between the two stimuli,  or upon the difference in
wave-lengths?' He nowhere thinks of the animal's response in terms of his
own experiences of colors and grays” (J. B. Watson, 1913, pp. 170–1). 
Note how “color” is replaced by “wavelength” - not only more scientific, but also closer
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to physics, the most prestigious of all sciences.
To maintain the unity of psychology and the coherence of the scientific programme (in a
way that is compatible with the overall scientific program as understood at the time):
“behaviourism… was an attempt to do one thing – to apply to the experimental study of
man the same kind of  procedure and the same language …  [as] … in the study of
animals lower than man” (J. B. Watson, 1931, p. ix).  Also “the behaviourist attempts to
get a unitary scheme of animal response. He recognises no dividing line between man
and brute” (J. B. Watson, 1914, p. 1). Since animals have no consciousness that can be
readily accessed (even by the introspectionists' lights), we should not even attempt the
same with humans.
Within his programme of improving psychology's scientific credentials, his most direct
attacks are on introspection and say that the content of introspection is “obscure” (J. B.
Watson,  1931,  p.  x),  the  technique  of  introspection  is  unclear  and  imposes  self-
contradictory demands (J. B. Watson, 1913, p. 163), its terminology is incoherent even
in simple distinctions of sensations (J. B. Watson, 1913, p. 164), (and switching to ad-
hominem attacks) its practitioners are effete  (Costall, 2006, p. 646) and “insufferably
prolix” (J. B. Watson, 1920, p. 97).
Like  many  thinkers,  Watson  is  often  remembered  by  simplistic  slogans,  such  as
“introspection  is   unscientific”.  His  actual  position was both more subtle  and more
strident than that – but that makes little difference to eventual influence on AI (amongst
other disciplines). What has influence is his somewhat-flattened memory, more than the
living, breathing, complex person he was (Costall, 2006).
I will respond to these and other objections to AI based on  introspection in sections
4.2.4, 4.2.5 below.
4.2.2 Cognitive psychology's attitude to introspection
“Telling  more  than  we  can  know:  Verbal  reports  on  mental  processes”  (Nisbett  &
Wilson, 1977) is one of the most cited papers “in the recent history of consciousness
studies”  (Johansson,  Hall,  Sikström,  Tärning,  &  Lind,  2006).  Nisbett  &  Wilson
complain  that  there  is  “...  little  or  no  direct  introspective  access  to  …  cognitive
processes” (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 231). They define  cognitive processes as being
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“the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response” (Ibid.). They contrast
the cognitive, “real”11 level with the contents of introspection, which “is the  result of
thinking,  not  the  process  of  thinking,  that  appears  spontaneously  in  consciousness”
(Ibid. p 232, quoting Miller, stress in the original). The amount of evidence that the
authors marshal is formidable, contributing to the canonical status of this seminal paper.
-
As long as one agrees with their assumptions, this paper stands very well. However, the
moment one tries to examine some of the underlying assumptions it becomes less stable.
Note that the authors are writing as psychologists, for psychologists, and see themselves
as scientists, like when they conclude that (as in the following quote) this paper truly
“buries” introspection as an element of psychological discourse (Ibid. p. 233):
The  accuracy  of  subjective  reports  is  so  poor  as  to  suggest  that  any
introspective access that  may exist  is  not  sufficient  to  produce generally
correct or reliable reports.
From a scientific perspective, that is enough to damn introspection as a source of truths.
But does that damn it as a source of models for technology? Note that they demand
“generally correct” reports. Is that the correct level of truth to demand for developing
AI? This will be discussed in section 4.2.4.
They complain,  (Ibid.)  that  subjective  reports  are  often  caused by a-priori  theories,
rather than by some genuine observation. True to scientific purity, they abstain from any
discussion  of  whether  the  data  of  subjective  reports  may  be  a  mixture  of  genuine
observation  plus culturally-accepted  theories.  Their  austere  conclusion  is  that  these
reports should be ignored.
One could worry, together with Dreyfus (1979) (see sections 2.1, 2.3) that the cognitive
level is invented (see section  2.1,  3.2.5.3), and therefore Nisbett & Wilson’s  (1977)
definition of the cognitive level as the “real” level would be alarming. But we can let
that issue rest, and accept multiple perspectives: perhaps the “real” level is cognitive,
perhaps neural, perhaps phenomenal. My only comment on this is that those who hold
these different perspectives all seem to be united in believing that there is only one real
truth,  and  that  all  others  are  utterly  mistaken.  This  may  be  a  reasonable  stance  in
11 “Real” by Nisbett & Wilson’s (1977) lights, but recall the usage of “real”, section 1.4.3.
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science,  but  I  argue (section  1.3.2)  that  it  is  counterproductive  in  technology.  Later
(sections 4.2.4, 4.2.5) I will present arguments that deal conclusively with any worries
to do with the validity of introspection for our technological purposes.
There  is  a  somewhat  entertaining  point  that  will  become  relevant  in  section  4.3.3:
Having given ample evidence that introspection is of little value in terms of the “actual”
“cognitive”  processes,The  authors  move  on  to  speculate  on  the  causes  of  people's
(misguided)  confidence  in  their  introspective  interpretations  of  their  own  thought
processes. The authors discuss the “conditions that give rise to introspective certainty
… Confidence should be high when the causal candidates are (a) few in number, (b) ...
(e) … In fact we appeal to introspection to support this view.” (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977,
p. 255). Fascinatingly, they appeal to introspection as their source of evidence for this
list, so perhaps even they are not as averse to introspection as they claim to be. 
They  introduce  a  distinction  between  “intermediate  output”  that  is available  to
introspection,  and  the  actual  process,  which  is  not.   As  an  example  of  how  the
intermediate results are the contents of the introspection, they quote a person describing
how he recalled his mother's maiden name by recalling his uncle's surname (Nisbett &
Wilson, 1977, pp. 255–6).  This, again, will be relevant in section 6.3.5.1. Let’s preview
the main point from there, as it shows how the we gain crucial “cash value” from the
distinction between science and technology (section 1.3.2): If we know only the outline
of what is accomplished without the how (as the authors complain), in AI programming
we can substitute whatever technical trick we have (in our skills as programmers) to
achieve something similar in a computer. AI is not science (but technology), the trick we
use need not be the same trick that the brain (or cognitive system) uses.
The  authors  speculate  on  various  reasons  why  people  believe  in  their  own
introspections. The last reason they suggest, to sum up their paper, is that it may just be
insufferably “frightening” to think that we know nothing of our own mind. I would
retort that following Watson (mainly 1913), it had become fashionable in psychology to
be  harsh on any subjectivity  (Costall,  2006).  Only  recently  is  scientific  psychology
recovering from this bias (Seth, 2010).
See also my analysis of “thinking aloud” and how it relates to introspection, section
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3.3.3.
4.2.3 Other objections
Herbert  Simon  (in  his  AI  research,  and  also  in  papers  on  other  topics,  not  least
psychology)  continues  Watson's  objections  to  introspection,  though his  case is  a  bit
more complex (see sections 2.2, 4.3.3).
If my discussions with various members of the university of Sussex are any indication,
the  main  reason  that  people  in  cognitive  science  object  to  introspection  is  various
versions of the worry that introspection is not objective, it is impossible to know who is
right in an argument, and it is not even internally consistent in that the same person can
come  up  with  contradicting  reports.  I  now  turn  to  deal  with  these  and  the  above
(sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2) objections.
As a reminder, this chapter aims to convince the reader that using introspection as a
basis for developing AI is legitimate, i.e. it needn't be forbidden. A subsequent chapter
(5) will argue that introspection should positively be pursued for anthropic AI.
4.2.4 Context of discovery / justification
There is a distinction (in philosophy of science) between the “context of discovery”
where scientists get their ideas, and the “context of justification” where scientists should
provide evidence to support their claims (Schickore, 2014). In the context of discovery,
Newton was permitted to  take inspiration from falling  apples  when discovering the
theory of gravity, and Kekulé was right to dream (while dozing) about snakes eating
their  own  tail,  giving  him  the  idea  of  circular  molecules  (Rothenberg,  1995).  The
scientists  have  to  produce  their  evidence  for  their  equations  or  models  later  in  the
context of justification, but in the inspiration of their discovery  they are entirely free.
Why then should AI researchers not be free, when inventing new AI designs, to use
introspection? Before we claim that the new designs are good, we would have to test
them as software, so we can be assured that no harm is done to empirical integrity. I am
not arguing for letting introspection into the holy-of-holies of scientific fact (Watson
(1913) would rightly shudder),  only into foyer of scientific  ideas.  Moreover for the
purposes of AI we need even less, just let introspection provide technological ideas.
So in  principle,  all  inspirations  and sources  of  ideas  are  allowed,  in  the context  of
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discovery.  But  there  is  a  seeming  problem here,  and  a  subtlety  to  be  noticed.  The
seeming problem is that this argument trivialises introspection and supposedly says that
recommending  introspection  is  as  good  as  recommending  taking  a  long  walk  or
drinking some juice to improve creativity in AI. The crude response would be “so be it”,
in this section I am only combating the notion that introspection is  forbidden, and if I
have shown that it is as legitimate as taking a walk then my work is done. A convincing
argument that introspection is positively good for AI is supplied in chapter  5, so we
could leave it at that here.
However, note the three examples above: Newton’s falling apple,  Kekulé’s dream of a
snake eating its own tail, and taking a walk for AI. These examples, though all fine in
principle within the context  of discovery, are  quite  different.  Newton was exploring
gravity, and so a falling apple is directly relevant to the content of his research. One
could speculate that he was considering the motion of the planets when he saw the apple
drop, and therefore could put the two together and come up with his unifying theory of
gravity, valid both in the sky and on earth. This example is one where the idea came
from something  relevant  - gravity.  Kekulé’s dream of a snake eating its  tail  hinted
towards circularity. Before Kekulé the possibility of molecules’ overall structure being
circular was not considered, and hence the Benzene molecule was a conundrum. So the
dream of the snake gave him the form of the molecule. Taking a walk has little to do
with AI as such. But introspection, as we will see in chapter 5 and specifically in section
5.2 is of great relevance to AI. See section 4.6 for an answer to any reader that protests
that the above is trivial, and already understood throughout the AI community.
4.2.5 Truth in science vs in technology 
The focus of the literature condemning subjectivity and introspection (foremost J. B.
Watson  (1913,  1920))  is  in  the  science of  psychology,  i.e.  the  development  and
assessment of knowledge and models about the natural facts about human behaviour.
The case of AI as a technology is different (Franssen et al., 2013; Simon, 1981), in that
the ultimate criteria for the finished AI machine is not “is it true?” or “does it give good
predictions?” but “does it work?”, “is it useful?”, or even ultimately “does the product
sell?” (see section 1.3.2).
In science there is great concern for keeping inaccurate or wrong “facts” out of the body
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of accepted knowledge. This has several motivations:
• A mistake would produce wrong predictions.
• A contradiction may imply anything.
• In principle, It can be very difficult logically to pinpoint any problem once it has
entered “the body of knowledge”. For an extreme example see the notion of
logical holism in (Quine, 1976).
• In practice, It can take a very long time to locate and root out any mistaken
“fact” – for example,  the geocentric view in astronomy held for well  over a
millennium  (P. Watson, 2006)12. The story of overcoming this model plays an
important part in teaching science (Matthews, 1994, p. 165), and hence forms a
primary source of science's fear of errors.
In technology the worry about “wrong facts” is much less pressing. If we have a wrong,
misguided or inaccurate assumption or model, then the products using the technology
would  likely  not  work,  or  at  least  be  worse  than  the  alternatives,  and  would  be
abandoned within weeks (if not minutes), rather than years, decades or centuries. This is
based on technology having a short life-cycle, being pragmatic and being designed.
When we are faced with a natural phenomenon that we do not understand, our ability to
investigate it is limited by every conceivable complication: the system may have subtle
interactions within it, may not be isolated from the rest of the world (see for example
(Reutlinger,  Schurz,  & Hūttemann,  2014)),  and may have  yet  undiscovered  physics
operating in it. Moreover, in science the unexplained phenomenon itself may be holistic
- unyielding to our (usually modular) analysis. On the other hand, in technology, we
have  an  intended design,  often modular,  with  a  well-understood  intended chain  of
causation. In the event of a problem we can therefore at least localise which link broke
in this intended chain of causation. That does not mean that any problem in technology
is easily fixed, just that it is easier to recognise a malfunction, localise it, and isolate the
“suspect” module, assuming (again) a modular structure with a clear intended causal
scheme.
12 Don't confuse Peter Watson, a living Cambridge historian, with John B Watson, the behaviourist. A
third Watson will have some comments to make about case based reasoning, in section 7.2. Moreover
IBM have a system named “Watson”.
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In highly complex systems, like a fully-loaded modern personal computer, there could
be tens or hundreds of millions of lines of source-code involved, and no one person, nor
even a team that can be gathered in a room can understand what is going on. Moreover,
some software is so old that no living person understands how it works. This complexity
can  create  a  seeming mystery,  in  that  the  intended  chains  of  causation  (that  may
malfunction) are not even known, in practise. This does not detract from the fact that in
principle,  technology can be easily  debugged.  The difference between principle  and
practise can involve thousands of programmer-years, but it is still only a management
decision to devote the resources to truly debug a system.
A possible retort is that any real artefact outstrips its design, and is a phenomenon in its
own right, that may present strange effects in as many ways as a natural phenomenon
(an example would be Radium's impact on photographic plates (Mould, 1998)). There
are two possible answers: first one could accept the criticism and appeal to common
practise,  which  shows  that  technological  artefacts  developing  truly  unexplained
behaviour are much rarer than in the case of natural phenomena. A second reply (and a
decisive one in this case) is that in the topic under discussion here we have ideas (of
variable  quality)  eventually  to  be  expressed  as  software.  Software  is  run  using
computers,  a  well-established  technology  that  is  specifically  designed  to  behave
digitally and deterministically  (B. C. Smith, 2005). And so, as long as the hardware
platform does not seriously malfunction, the behaviour of software is deterministic and
clear, or at least clear-in-principle, as discussed above. 
Moreover, if a technology works, the typical attitude is “who cares” about any inherent
truth values. Utility is the be-all and end-all of technology. A further point regarding
technology  with  an  “interesting”  malfunction  is  that  such  a  technology  turns  the
conversation over to science. An example of both points is the placebo effect. Placebo
drugs “shouldn't” work, but they do. Insofar as a medical practitioner is acting as an
engineer fixing patients, they will use placebo treatments pragmatically. In parallel, the
placebo effect is a vibrant area of research in science. It seems to be in the essence of
the engineering professions to not be interested in the seriously difficult issues – leaving
these to science13. Another example is that animal cloning is often successful, and can
be seen as a technology. However, often the cloned animals described in the literature
13 Specific thanks are due to Joshua Weinstein for discussions leading to these ideas.
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did not have the same longevity as  naturally-bred animals.  This anomaly became a
subject of research in science (Klotzko, 2001).
So our  anxiety  to  preserve truth from being polluted by falsehood should  be much
smaller in technology than in science (see also section 1.3.2). 
4.2.6 Example & summary of “introspection is forbidden”
An example (for sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5) of how truth or lack thereof worked out well
specifically in AI is  the impact of the paper “A logical calculus of the of the ideas
immanent in nervous activity”  (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943). It inspired, over time,  the
notions of finite automata, integrated logic design (the core of computer electronics) and
made a crucial contribution to our AI notion of neural nets  (Piccinini, 2004, p. 175).
This was all done notwithstanding the fact that the paper assumed “that mental states
can be analysed  in  terms of  mental  atoms endowed with  propositional  content,  the
psychons, and that the neural correlates of mental phenomena correspond to precise
configurations of neuronal pulses: individual pulses correspond to individual psychons,
and causal relations among pulses correspond to inferential relations among psychons”
(Piccinini,  2004,  p.  205).  These assumptions  are  in  retrospect  false,  but  nonetheless
caused great advances in AI technology.
Introspection is legitimate as a basis for technology-AI designs because it  would be
used in the context of discovery, where ideas are born. Any idea so formed would have
to be tested empirically later. And even if somehow some piece of “wrongness” creeps
from introspection into the final “findings” of the technological research, it would be
weeded  out  quickly  because  the  life-cycle  of  concepts  in  technology  (especially
computer technology) is much shorter than of concepts in science. We definitely do not
need “generally correct  [and] reliable reports” for AI. Recall that is specifically what
Nisbett & Wilson (1977, p. 233) were complaining about (see section 4.2.2).
4.3 Introspection as “commonplace”
So far I have discussed a mainstream bias of cognitive science – that introspection is
“wrong”, and hence forbidden. We now turn to two less dominant groups, first, and less
distinct, are the “admitters”. These people admit to using introspection, notwithstanding
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the bias against it  (Costall, 2006; J. B. Watson, 1913). Surprisingly, some of the worst
detractors  of  introspection  also  used  introspection  (e.g.  Herbert  Simon,  see  sections
4.3.3,  2.2);  very  occasionally they  even  admitted  to  it  more-or-less  openly.  In  the
following section (4.4) I will discuss the introspection-enthusiasts, mainly Dreyfus. The
question of whether AI researchers can do anything  other than introspection will  be
discussed in sections 4.5, 5.3 and 6.1.4.
This  section  surveys  the  evidence  both  for  introspection  being  used,  and  for
introspection  simultaneously being  frowned  upon.  This  later  point  is  crucial  for
answering any objection that my thesis is vacuous, in that AI researchers already use
introspection freely and fully.
4.3.1 Sweeping testimony
The most sweeping testimony that we have for using introspection are the least specific,
and the least personal:
The  first  and  only  direct  testimony  I  found  from  a  founding  member  of  the  AI
community about the overall field of AI is from Ray Solomonoff (b. 1926, d. 2009)
who  was  the  founder  of  algorithmic  information  theory  and  one  of  the  original
participants on 1956 AI conference in Dartmouth  (McCorduck, 2004, Chapter 5). He
writes  (in a sadly neglected paper14):
Almost  all of  the  artificial-intelligence  work  on  problems  of  sufficient
complexity...  [that  are] successful  frequently  enough  to  warrant  trying
them... are usually obtained by introspection; the experimenter is modelling
part of his own mind within the machine. (stress added) (Solomonoff, 1968)
As we will  see throughout this section,  the testimonies do not specify what kind of
introspection was used. This is an indication that introspection was frowned upon in the
AI community – for these scholars are not stingy in detail in other matters. For example,
we do not see here any explanation about whether the AI work was based on direct
perception  of  mechanism,  or  was  the  mechanism  inferred?  This  distinction  was
discussed in section 3.3.3.2.
Sherry Turkle  (b. 1948), a sociologist,  relays the testimonies of some principal AI
practitioners  she  interviewed:  Roger  Schank (b.  1946,  the  father  of  Case  Based
14  To the best of my knowledge this paper was previously quoted only by myself (Freed, 2013) and in a
retrospective recounting all of Solomonoff's work (Dowe, 2013)
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Reasoning (CBR), see section 7.2) said “There's only one place to get such ideas about
intelligence, and that's from thinking about myself”. And such thinking, we are safe to
suppose, was based on self-observation – otherwise why would he be thinking of his
self rather than some other concrete example. Schank is an extreme example of using
introspection but denying it. CBR (to be discussed in detail in section 7.2) seems to be
derived from introspection, but I have found not a single mention of introspection in
Schank’s works discussing AI. In a personal interview with Turkle, he admits what he
concealed – see quote above.
Turkle relays also Donald Norman (b. 1935) saying “In the end I have just [observing]
myself, and if it feels right that's what I have to trust”.  Marvin Minsky (b. 1927 d.
2016) engaged (amongst many other projects)  in building AI for jazz improvisation
because  he  himself  was  involved  with  jazz.  Minsky  explicitly  forbade  any
“psychological data” in his lab - so they used introspection.  Minsky explains: “What
you had to do was something like what Freud did. Tom Evans and I asked ourselves, in
depth, what we did to solve problems like this and that seemed to work out pretty well”
(Turkle, 1984, pp. 265–7). 
Turkle explains that this was not seen as the dreaded “introspection” for two reasons:
“First, they say that trying to capture one's thought processes in the form of a program
forces you to confront objectively your initial idea of how you think you think. … you
can work towards closer and closer approximations of something that will both 'feel
right' and 'run' – that will produce the right results”.  Second, she suggests that the
conceptual world of computer programs somehow provides a better vocabulary than
“naïve introspection” for understanding what we see in mental self-observation (Turkle,
1984, p. 267). This idea that one first “captures one’s thought” and later experiments
with software based on the mechanism of such a thought is the closest precursor I found
for my arguments on the contexts of discovery and justification, see sections  4.2 and
4.6.
4.3.2 Specific apparent cases
This section discusses apparent cases of the use of introspection in AI research, but the
word  “apparent”  plays  two  different  roles  here:  AI  researchers  admit  to  using
introspection in specific cases – explicitly, and hence “apparently” in the “clear” sense
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of that word. However, in other cases the use of introspection can only be inferred, or
even speculated, since the prevalent compunctions prevent researchers from admitting
to  using  introspection.  These  are  “apparent”  cases  in  the  sense  of  “probable”  or
“possible” uses of introspection. The purpose of this section is twofold: to show specific
cases  where  introspection  was used  in  AI,  and  to  show  how  researchers  distance
themselves from such usages.
A bridging  case,  both  a  survey  of  other  people  using  introspection  and  a  personal
specific testimony, is the case of Phil Agre  (1997, p. 145)  who says: 
“… I began by filling my notebook with exhaustively detailed stories from
my own everyday life. By this time I had grown preoccupied with planning
research, so I  decided to gather some examples of  real-life planning. In
doing so,  I  was following an AI tradition of  introspection that has been
described  aptly,  if  unsympathetically,  by  Turkle  [quoted  above,  section
4.3.1]. Many early AI researchers were clearly attempting, at one level or
another, to reproduce their own psyches on computers, and many of them
drew on introspection to motivate their programs. Introspection as a formal
research  method  in  psychology,  of  course,  had  been  comprehensively
discredited decades earlier. But AI people have not regarded introspection
as evidence but as inspiration; because the functionality of their computer
systems provides a fully adequate criterion of the success of their research,
they believe, it does not matter what experiences might have motivated the
systems' design. And introspection is close at hand. But my own practice
was  different  from  introspection  in  one  important  respect:  whereas
introspection  attempts  to  observe  and  describe  mental  processes  under
specially  controlled  conditions,  I  was  trying  to  remember  and  recount
episodes of concrete activity that took place in my own everyday life”.
Agre’s understanding of introspection is quite restricted – he says that it is usually done
in controlled conditions – as a psychological technique that was mostly true (in the time
before (J. B. Watson, 1913)), but there is nothing in the definitions of introspection as
such  to  require  this  (see  section  3.3.2).  Agre’s  description  of  introspection  as
“inspiration”  is  in  a  sense  a  precursor  of  my  analysis  in  terms  of  the  contexts  of
discovery  vs.  justification  (see  section  4.2.4),  and  in  that  sense  he  is  my  “nearest
neighbour”.  Agre  ended  up  writing  “Pengi”  -  which  was  not based  on  his  own
introspection but rather on Heidegger’s philosophy  (Dreyfus, 2007). So it seems that
Agre is partly confounding three things: 1. His self-reports on  his everyday life, 2.
Introspection  by  pre-Watson  psychologists,  and  3.  The  tenets  of  the  Heideggerian
tradition. Even with Agre (who seems to be my “nearest neighbour”) we see an effort to
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distance himself from full-blooded introspection - “my own practice was different from
introspection in one important respect...”.  This thesis  recommends introspection as a
conscious and unabashed basis for AI development (as detailed in chapter 6). Note that
Agre is interested in “planning research” - this is a fairly sophisticated attitude, while
my interest here is in uncovering and programming underlying (anthropic) mechanisms
rather than the “western, modern, well-trained and adult” or “correct” thinking that most
of AI aims at (see section 3.2).
For all his personal research and writing of “detailed stories” of his everyday life, Agre
ended up writing  his  software  based  on Heideggerian  philosophy,  even based on a
significantly  simplified  version  of  it  (Dreyfus,  2007).  It  would  not  be  much  of  a
speculation  to  say  the  following:  Agre  ended  up  preferring  the  “respectable”  and
“correct” scholarly source over the frowned upon or forbidden personal introspection.
This preference is unnecessary (in the context of discovery), and is what I refer to when
I say that researchers “shy away” from introspection, and refuse to engage with it in a
“full blooded” way - and Agre was the bravest researcher that I have found, in terms of
explicitly using introspection.
Consider Alan Turing's (b. 1912, d. 1954) work on chess in the 1940s-50s:
If I were to sum up the  weakness of the above system in a few words, I
would describe it as a caricature of my own play. It was in fact based on an
introspective  analysis of  my  thought  processes  when  playing,  with
considerable simplifications. It makes oversights which are very similar to
those which I make myself, and which may in both cases be ascribed to the
considerable moves being inappropriately chosen (emphasis added) (Turing,
1953).
Note that Turing views his using introspection as a basis for a model as a “weakness”. It
is doubtful whether he is influenced here by Watson, since he was less of a psychologist
than other AI developers, but the reservations he had about this usage is clear. Note that
he does point out that making similar mistakes would be evidence of being based on a
model of a natural mind. 
There are two cases where we have some basis to believe that introspection was used
though it  was  not  admitted  to.  The case  of  Roger Schank erasing  any mention  of
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introspection  in  his  research  publications  while  admitting  to  it  in  an  interview was
discussed above (section 4.3.1). The case of fuzzy logic is more speculative:
The field of fuzzy logic originated with  Lotfi Zadeh's  (b. 1921) paper “fuzzy sets”
(1965). This paper gives no hint as to how these ideas originally occurred to Zadeh,
other than that  he was thinking about how people think rather than computers.  The
logical possibilities are that Zadeh was considering how concepts, categories, and set
membership  work  for  either  himself,  or  other  people.  The  first  will  be  a  case  of
introspection (using his own mind as the basis of his design), while the second would be
a case of 3rd person research into how people operate (or speculation).  McNeill  and
Freiberger (1994, p. 15) provide the nearest text we have to a biography of Zadeh, or to
a historical account of the “fuzzy” idea. They say
... he had promised to work at the RAND Corporation later that month and
had not yet chosen a research topic. So he lay down on a bed, his preferred
posture for cogitation, and contemplated complex systems. And the notion of
fuzzy sets struck him
Since  on  that  bed  in  July  1964  (as  far  as  we  know)  he  was  not  engaged  in  any
interaction with psychological research about humans in general, it would probably not
be a great misrepresentation to assume that he was introspecting when he invented the
idea of fuzzy sets, and  consequentially fuzzy logic (see also sections 7.1, 6.1.4 pt 4). 
Note  that  regardless  of  whether  we  accept  the  speculation  that  Zadeh  was  indeed
introspecting, this new and unusual notion, based on “how humans think” (subjectively)
was immediately couched in respectable mathematical terms, be they “set theory” or
“logic”. The pressure of researchers to be “scientific” seems to disallow a full-blooded
acceptance of introspection even in the context of discovery.  This is a philosophical
error,  but  should  not  reflect  badly  on  any  of  the  above  scholars,  as  they  are  not
philosophers. It is however the role of philosophy to point out that such shyness in using
introspection  in  the  context  of  discovery  is  unwarranted  and  probably  hinders
exploration of novel ideas (see section 1.3.1). 
4.3.3 Mainstream cognitive science uses introspection
Herbert Simon (see section 2.2) continued Watson's (1913) objections to introspection,
and  took  part  in  bringing  much  of  behaviourism’s  heritage  into  the  cognitive  fold
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(Costall, 2006). However, While developing the Logical Theorist, in RAND at 1955, he
testifies: “I was doing a lot of introspecting on my own problem-solving processes, so I
tired to solve some problems from the Principia… I pondered as I walked about how
one solves  geometry  problems… suddenly  I  had a clear  conviction...”  (McCorduck,
2004, pp. 161–162).
Simon, as we saw in section  3.3.3, explicitly pushed for a continuation of Watson's
(1920) “thinking aloud” (TA)  and wrote extensively about the use of “thinking aloud
protocols” (Simon, 1996a), culminating in his book “Protocol Analysis”  (Ericsson &
Simon,  1993).   I  have  shown  (in  section  3.3.3)  that  the  distinction  between  TA
(encouraged by the Watson-Simon orthodoxy) and introspection (forbidden by the same
orthodoxy) is :
1. The  contents of  TA is  the  contents of  the  thinking  process.  In  “classical
introspection” the contents of the report are about the  mechanisms that were
used to do the thinking, rather than the content.
2. In  the  forbidden  “classical  introspection”  it  is  the  psychologist,  a  trained
individual with a research agenda, who is making the report, while in TA it is a
naïve participant in an experiment.
Simon used some TA protocols to develop his AI. In developing the General Problem
Solver (GPS), he had to bend the rules a bit:
But the most massive set of examples of the experimental strategy of 'just
looking' is to to found in human problem solving. Density of data was the
name of the game,  and protocol  analysis  the way of playing it.  Both Al
Newell  and I  agree  that  the  core  of  GPS was  extracted  directly  from a
particular protocol that we can identify. …  The GPS theory was extracted
by direct induction from the thinking-aloud protocol of a [single] laboratory
subject, without benefit of an experimental and a control condition (Simon,
1996a, pp. 384–385)
In using a single protocol from a single subject, he is giving up some of his scientific
rectitude. Also, in using a specific protocol he seems to be breaking one of the two
distinctions that separate the forbidden introspection from TA - he is indeed using a
naïve experimental subject, but he is using a subject not for the content of his thinking,
but  for  garnering  information  about  mechanism.  This  is  arguably  introspection-by-
proxy.
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(Nisbett  &  Wilson,  1977) (though  not  directly  engaged  in  AI)  argue  against
introspection, and this is  one of the most oft-quoted papers in cognitive science (see
section 4.2.2). Still, they cannot avoid introspection completely, and admit to it readily.
After rounding up much data to show that introspection is wrong, they turn to speculate
on  the  causes  of  the  subjective  certainty  that  people  have  regarding  their  own
introspections.  They present  their  theory that  “Confidence  should  be high when the
causal candidates are (a) few in number, (b)…. In fact, we appeal to  introspection to
support this view” (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 255, emphasis added).
4.3.4 Introspection is “commonplace”: summary
So regardless of the engrained, sometimes visceral objection to introspection within the
AI community (section 4.2), introspection is somehow permissible (at least sometimes),
“frequently  enough”  successful  (section  4.3.1),  and  has  been  used  before  in  a
widespread manner. This statement is not to fuse different thinkers’ positions into one
alleged chimera-like position, but to point out the accepted overall conduct of the AI
research community as such.
Introspection was often tainted (see section 6.3.3) by prejudice in favour of mathematics
in that the researchers described their method of solving the problem (for example of
chess) not in a neutral, human-like way, but in an idealised manner; as if we humans
give equal attention to all areas of the chess board (Turing), and never make mistakes
(within the limits of the search-depth - Simon) - as if we were all rational (perhaps even
infallible) in all our thoughts.
Moreover,  it  seems  that  though  many  cognitive  scientists  and  AI  researchers  do
introspect,  and many even admit to it,  they are still  shy,  timid,  and even apologetic
about doing so. I argue in this chapter that introspection is permissible (so they can
relax). In the next chapter (5) I argue that it is actually a good and plausible basis for
anthropic AI (and by implication maybe also for other fields in cognitive science). My
problem with all the above scholars using introspection is that they do it too timidly.
For a discussion of how introspection could be done more fruitfully see chapter 6. 
4.4 Introspection as “desirable”
To recoup: This chapter is about how previous AI scholars related to introspection. Most
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scholars objected to introspection, near-universally quoting (J. B. Watson, 1913). I have
already (in sections 4.2.4-4.2.5) shown that since we are here dealing with the context of
discovery in technology, these objections do not hold. Further I have shown (in section
4.3) that even some of the same people who denigrated introspection used it informally.
For completeness sake,  I  will  discuss here Dreyfus's  position  (Dreyfus,  1979, 2007;
Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986), who  indirectly supports introspection enthusiastically (see
section 2.3).
4.4.1 Introspection & phenomenology
Phenomenology is a branch of philosophy (written mainly in German) which attempts
peer-reviewed reporting on introspection (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012, pp. 28–29). Some
of the main names in this tradition are Husserl,  Heidegger,  Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer,
Habermas and Dreyfus. In AI, Dreyfus  (1979, 2007; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986) is a
persistent  proponent  of  this  view  in  the  field  of  AI,  but  he  has  not  made  any
technological contribution, and hence is considered by many to be outside the field of
AI. Wheeler (2005) tries to integrate phenomenology into the mainstream of cognitive
science using dynamical systems, action-oriented representations, and other concepts.
Winograd & Flores  (1986, pp. 27–37) discuss phenomenology under the heading of
“Understanding and Being”.
Just as the history of AI is intertwined with that of cognitive science (Boden, 2008), so
is Dreyfus's critique of AI intertwined with his critique of cognitivism. Note however
that Dreyfus does not distinguish human-like AI from the rational type, nor does he
distinguish technological from scientific AI (see my distinctions in sections 1.5,  3.2.1,
3.2.4).
4.4.2 The Neisser-Dreyfus debate 
Recall the debate between Dreyfus and Neisser, a founder of cognitive psychology, in
section 2.1.
On the surface, Dreyfus and Neisser are on opposing sides – the first is an idealist and
the second is a reductionist  physicalist,  the first is  interested in subjectivity and the
second in objectivity. Arguably they talk completely past each other, and have nothing
in common. But they do share this trait: they each argue that  their own perspective is
true, constitutes reality, and should be pursued to the exclusion of other positions. This
- 114 -
idea  of  “one  truth”  or  “reality”  that  should  lord  it  over  all  others  is  dogmatic  and
unnecessary (see section 1.4.2). It may be the purpose of science to arrive at a singular
truth (though neither Popper nor Kuhn nor any other philosopher-of-science I can recall
would agree), but it surely is not the purpose of technology to arrive at a singular truth
(see section 4.2.5). The purpose of technology is to make (and sell) products that people
will find useful (and will buy again). So using different perspectives (see section 1.4.2)
pragmatically is not only an option but an (technological-economic) imperative.
4.4.3 Introspection vs. phenomenology
The main problem with phenomenology as a basis for AI is that it is very difficult, if not
impossible, to write software based on the refined but somewhat vague and sometimes
flowery  language  of  the  phenomenologists  (see  Ed  Feigenbaum's  reaction  to
phenomenology in  (McCorduck,  2004, pp.  229–230)).  The phenomenologists  are  so
advanced into researching what it is like to be human, that there is no way to roll back
time 100 years or so and ask them to produce simpler models that make sense in terms
of data structures and algorithms. Nor would it be fair to impose such a restriction on
their field.  Hence I suggest introspection (rather than phenomenology) as the basis for
human-like  AI:  introspection  by  the  individual  AI  practitioners,  as  a  basis  for  new
designs in AI.
There have been several recent attempts to make phenomenology (and introspection)
more accurate, more scientific, and more respectable. A good collection of the different
approaches  is  found  in   (Jack  &  Roepstorff,  2003,  2004).  These  approaches,  like
Hurlburt’s  (2011) version of hetero-phenomenology (see section  3.3.1.5) seem to be
motivated by making introspection better in the sense of being more accurate, which is
commendable, but is in the spirit of science and/or scholarly study rather than in the
spirit  of  developing  practical  technology.  Like  Dreyfus’s  (1979,  2007)
phenomenological  “correctness”  here  trumps  technological  feasibility.  Purity  trumps
technology – and with all due respect for these efforts they take us further away from
implementable technology, so they are currently less relevant to AI.
4.5 Introspection as “unavoidable”
I will only provide here a sketch of an idea, that will be further developed in section 5.3,
once  some  more  concepts  have  been  introduced.  This  idea  is  novel,  and  I  do  not
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necessarily hold it as true (this is an open project). All I do here is present this position
as another defensible position regarding the role of introspection in AI.
The  vast  majority  of  AI,  nearly  by  definition,  takes  the  form of  software.  And  in
developing software, one has two options (or a combination of the two), either to use
already existing code or algorithms, in which case nothing is novel, or conjuring up
something new. And how does a programmer conjure up some new way of achieving a
task?  This  requires  them  to  bear  in  mind  the  problem  to  be  solved,  and  imagine
themselves in a sense to be (or be inside) a python interpreter, or an Intel processor, or
some such software environment, and ask themselves how they would achieve the task
at hand. The code would then be a log of the instructions that the programmer imagined
that they would perform in order to carry out the task. So in this sense, all original
programming requires one to  project oneself,  like a stage-actor,  into the world of a
software environment, and to write a log of all the instructions that one would perform
in such a world in order to achieve the task in hand. More detail will be given in section
5.3.2.
If  this  argument  is  successful,  this  considerably  weakens  any position  that  seeks  to
disallow or denigrate introspection in the context of AI as a software-based pursuit. If
introspection is inherent to all programming, a demand that we write software while not
introspecting would be self-contradictory.
A  possible  counterargument  could  be  that  this  position  regarding  the  need  for
introspection  for  programming  is  orthogonal  to  the  rest  of  the  discussion  about
introspection as a source of ideas for even defining the requirements for a programmer.
As with the main body of this specific argument, I remain agnostic, and include this
point as a contribution to the completeness of the discussion about the legitimacy of a
role for introspection in AI.
4.6 A hybrid position
Having discussed all these positions, another possibility arises. Maybe several of these
thinkers  (without  saying  so  explicitly)  hold  a  position  similar  to  mine:  That
introspection  is  legitimate  in  the  context-of-discovery,  and  that  in  the  context-of-
justification it isn't. That could be the reason that several names appear both in section
4.2 (introspection is forbidden) and also in section 4.3 (introspection is commonplace).
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This position is speculative,  since I have found no mention of these concepts in AI
literature.  But  as  I  quoted  in  section  4.3.1,  Turkle  offers  the explanation  that  using
introspection within AI research was was seen as legitimate for two reasons: “First, they
say that trying to capture one's thought processes in the form of a program forces you to
confront  objectively  your  initial  idea  of  how you think you think.  … you can work
towards closer and closer approximations of something that will both 'feel right' and
'run' – that will produce the right results”.  Second, she suggests that the conceptual
world  of  computer  programs  somehow  provides  a  better  vocabulary  than  “naïve
introspection” for understanding what we see in mental self-observation (Turkle, 1984,
p. 267).
One could now careen into a deeper analysis of which types of scientific method seem
to be on each thinker's mind – but that would be highly speculative. The fact remains
that  no  AI  researcher  has  given  a  justification  for  accepting  introspection-for-ideas
while still rejecting it for evidence. We simply have no textual account with which to
clarify the situation any further. So let us now assume (in the spirit of the principle of
charity) that these AI researchers foresaw my analysis in terms of contexts of discovery
and justification, and therefore I have (in this chapter so far) at most reformulated the
received wisdom. Unfortunately for my detractors, this analysis cannot stand because if
indeed they thought they could use introspection freely in the context of discovery, they
would indeed use it  freely. However, as we have seen (section  4.3), and we will see
further in section 6.1, the use of introspection so far has always been minimized, insofar
as it existed at all. Zadeh, (see sections 4.3.2, 7.1) for example, comes up with the fuzzy
edges of concepts, and then avoids any further “suspect conduct”, and retreats to the
safety of mathematics. Introspection is always used as sparingly as possible, like a chef
using  some  potent  but  frowned-upon  ingredient:  sparingly,  timidly,  with  minimal
fanfare – knowing that the dish will be stale without it, but still hiding it as much as
possible  from the  clientèle.  One  can  only  speculate  as  to  why  this  is  so.  It  is  no
coincidence that Turkle, the sociologist, got nearest to this point: AI researchers view
themselves as scientists, and want to be seen as only using good scientific methods. This
stands out in Simon's protestations that his deviation from scientific method are OK (see
section  4.3.3) and is foretold by Watson's talk of “the scientific man”  (J. B. Watson,
1920), see also  (Costall, 2006). Recall also Papert’s point that we disown our natural
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thought processes, and pretend to think logically (section 1.1).
The only example of people using introspection freely are Dreyfus and his followers
(ignoring for the moment the difference between individual introspection and systematic
phenomenology). But hardly any of these free-introspectors write any code, and the one
that does the most of that, Agre, gets condemned for not being “Heideggerian enough”
(Dreyfus, 2007) (Why Agre is not celebrated by Dreyfus as a “first step” in the right
direction probably has to do with Dreyfus's own derision of the “first-step fallacy” (Bar-
Hillel,  2003; Dreyfus, 1979, 2012)).  So we have AI researchers that introspect very
sparingly, not really capturing much of the benefit of introspection (see chapters 5, 6),
and we have serious introspectors/phenomenologists who are “too grand” to write any
actual software, resulting in a dialogue of the deaf – few people in the AI community
listen to Dreyfus (McCorduck, 2004, Chapter 9).
So the conclusion of the discussion so far is that the liberal use of introspection in the
context of discovery should be allowed, but without allowing the introspective process
to get  out  of  control,  in  the  sense  of  becoming either  an end-in-itself  or  simply so
refined  that  programming  the  models  becomes  pragmatically  impossible.  However,
some would worry that we still do not know what kind of information introspection
would yield.
4.7 Types of truth in introspection
What does introspection give us? It would have been nice if we had direct access to
guaranteed truths, or at least clear observations like we have in the objective world. This
is not the case. Let us survey what the worries and positions are. In what senses should
we expect introspective reports to be true? This survey does not lead to a satisfying
conclusion, like other discussions about introspection (see section  3.3.3.4). There is a
way forward though, as will be shown in chapter 5.
1. Introspection cannot be scientific.  In  cognitive science we are steeped in the
rationalistic  tradition  (see  section  2.4).  One  of  its  main  tenets  is  that  we
“characterise  the  situation  is  terms  of  identifiable  objects  with  well-defined
properties”  (Winograd & Flores, 1986, p. 15). We find this attitude natural in
science, technology, law, trade and many other pursuits that are public (external)
in  nature.  However,  once  we  go  into  the  realm  of  the  subjective,  there  are
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precious few “clear and distinct” (Descartes, 1952) identifiable “objects” in our
subjective experience. Even the  categories of “events”, “objects”, “processes”,
etc.  (that  Schwitzgebel  (2012) uses  in  his  definition of  introspection)  do not
necessarily  apply.  Few  “events”  or  “processes”  in  our  mind  have  a  clear
beginning, and even fewer have a clear end (When did I  stop  being afraid of
X?).  Mental  processes  are  not  “moderate-sized  specimens  of  dry-goods”
(Austin & Warnock, 1964, p. 8).
2. Is introspection a good source of information? Introspection can reflect (or not)
some objective reality. By many analytical-philosophy positions (influenced by
positivism) take reality to be one, external, and objective. Introspection does not
give us any correct observations, by definition, since it observes things that are
neither external nor public nor directly verifiable by others. However, an idealist
position such as Berkeley's would say that there is no external reality other than
our impressions of such a reality, and that external, objective reality is merely
constituted in inter-subjectivity. Even for such an idealist position, though, it is
difficult  to  show  how  a  single  person's  introspection  establishes  any  public
“truth” or “correctness”. Introspection is often wrong about objective matters
(barring solipsism, where there is no objectivity separate from subjectivity).
3. The internal  “introspective vision” could see correctly or not what is going on
for us  (bearing in mind that the use of the term “vision” is metaphoric). It is
doubtful,  therefore,  that  one  can  say that  there  is  such a  thing  as  a  “wrong
vision”. The vision is what it is – it is what was experienced by the individual,
either  introspecting,  or  reporting  on  some  events.  So  we  can  say  that
introspective reports are incorrigible  in objective terms  (Schwitzgebel, 2012).
This is not to say infallible - infallible would be about the objective universe, but
introspection is about a specific person's subjective world. And how, on what
basis, can we question someone else's subjective experience? We have no access
to  it!  Introspection is  incorrigible  about  subjective  matters.  Nothing here
guarantees against introspectors  falsifying their reports.
4. In describing any vision, having some experience or skill in the matter can be of
use.  Having a  broader  vocabulary  of  colours  and shapes  allows for  a  better
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textual report of a sunset, and there is no reason to believe that introspective
verbalisation would not benefit  from analogous acquired skills.  Also,  akin to
describing  a  sunset,  once  the  broader  “strokes”  of  the  vision  are  already
described, there is room for more detail, if one has the patience for it. So at this
level there are better and worse introspections, though it is impossible to pass
external judgement on their contents, and even more difficult to have objective
justifications for such judgements.  We can assess and appreciate the level of
detail as such. Introspection can often be improved (see chapter 6). Whether
such skill in introspection changes the experience itself or just the description is
possibly an unsolvable problem. That, again, is a big worry for science but not
for technology (see section 3.3.3.5).
5. However, even in seeing a vision, there is a good chance that one's ability to
even  see things (also internally) will be impacted by their  value-systems (see
also  discussion  in  section  3.3.3.4 about  the  difficulties  with  neutral
observations). This is an internalised (if you will “cognitive” top-down) form of
the following concern:
6. In  reporting the content  of  one's  introspective  vision,  one might  not  tell  the
entire truth, because it may be embarrassing, or show them up as transgressing
on some value system. Admitting to having frequent  sexual thoughts  (Byers,
Purdon, & Clark, 1998) or any other socially-objectionable contents may not be
advantageous,  so  reports  may  be  skewed.  Also  reports  may  be  skewed  by
theoretical commitments, e.g. a well-trained scientist may claim to be thinking
logically  and  mathematically  when  that  is  not  actually  what  is  going  on.
Introspection  can  often  be  polluted  by  other  considerations  (see  section
6.3.3).
7. But,  there  is  a  seeming  contradiction:  How  can  I  simultaneously  say  that
introspection is “incorrigible”, and then say it is may be “polluted”? In principle,
introspection is incorrigible, and anyone engaged in introspection for AI may by
all means go ahead and try designs based on their introspection and see what
contribution they may make – let a thousand flowers bloom15. However, if one
15 I  use this  expression with great  reservations.  The original  saying,  by Mao Tse-Tung,  was “let  a
hundred flowers bloom”. It was used in 1956 in his opening speech for a campaign pretending to
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were to say that all their thoughts look to them like flamingos, or alternately
claim that all their thoughts are mathematical (as Simon and many others in our
field seem to do), or claim infallibility, one may reserve the right to have  doubts
about these introspections and about the utility that AI might garner from them.
These doubts are based on the assumption that as humans we share some of our
subjective world, similar to sharing walking using two legs. Some people will be
different, but not that different. But that would just be an opinion.
Gallagher  &  Zahavi  (2012,  pp.  28–29) define  phenomenology  to  be
introspection refined by the consensus of the phenomenological community. One
could wager that introspections that are in line with established phenomenology
would fare better than outliers (flamingos) as AI algorithms. The problem we
have  had  so  far  was  not  so  much  with  obtaining  good  introspections  or
phenomenology  (Gadamer,  1979;  Heidegger,  1962),  but  with  programming
these insights, see Dreyfus's (1979) failure to code anything and his continuing
complaint that AI is “not Heideggerian  enough”  (Dreyfus, 2007). See section
4.4.3.
But,  still  some  would  worry,  isn't  introspection  messy?  There  are  entire  lines  of
argument  saying  that  introspection,  as  a  process,  necessarily  interferes  with  the
phenomena that is being observed (Schwitzgebel, 2012), that introspection may not be a
process of self-observation, but of self definition (Byrne, 2005), And that introspection,
like other observations, is theory-laden (Bogen, 2014). Again, if I were seeking to show
that  introspection  is  correct  generally  (objectively),  then  each  of  these  would  be  a
significant blow – and collectively one can see why most researchers simply dismiss
introspection, referring to Watson (1913). But here we do not claim truth, but  plausible
utility for AI. This chapter's aim (and this section's aim in a different way) is only to
show the legitimacy, not the plausibility of introspection. Plausibility is the work of
chapter 5.
canvass the opinions of the Chinese intelligentsia about how the new Chinese state should be run.
Whether initially sincere or not, the result of the “hundred flowers campaign” was that once “the
snakes were enticed out of their caves” many of these intellectuals were killed or imprisoned. I use
this expression here in its innocent connotation (Brown, 2010, pp. 313–318).
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4.8 Introspection may legitimately be used for AI: summary
Introspection  was  considered  suspect  in  philosophy  (section  4.1),  and  forbidden  in
science (section 4.2). However, in the context of discovery there should be no restriction
on what ideas can be considered, and moreover the level of worry about possible errors
interposing themselves as truths is lower in technology than in science. So we have seen
that introspection is legitimate as a source of ideas, and some developers of AI would
(half-heartedly)  agree  (section  4.3).  The  problem with  the  researchers  that  practise
introspection is that they do so half-heartedly,  and admit to it  quite rarely.  In being
ashamed of using introspection, they can hardly reap the benefits that introspection may
offer fully.
Dreyfus  and  others  considered  phenomenology  (a  close  relative  of  introspection)  a
promising field of enquiry for AI (section 4.4), but have produced no tangible examples
of working designs.  I  have provided a  speculative argument  saying that  AI  without
introspection  is  impossible  (section  4.5),  to  be  further  developed  in  section  5.3. A
further  discussion  of  a  hybrid  approach,  assuming  that  the  AI  community  already
accepts  my  point  about  the  contexts  of  discovery/justification  produced  a
recommendation for allowing the far more liberal use of introspection in the context of
discovery, while restricting any introspection to programmable models.
For anyone worrying about what kinds of truth can be produced by introspection an
argument  about  the  logical  status  of  introspection  was  given  section  4.7.  This
culminated in a dual view of introspection: In principle it is incorrigible, allowing any
introspection  the  chance  to  be  used  as  a  basis  for  AI  designs.  In  practice,  I  have
conceded that there may be better or worse introspections, and these may have some
bearing on the resultant AI. Conveniently in technology there is no harm in letting “a
thousand flowers bloom”.
My argument in this thesis is for using introspection wholeheartedly, but without losing
sight of the need to produce code (details on how this can be done are in chapter 6).
If introspection is legitimate, we still need to figure out whether we want to use it – do
we have indications that introspection would be a fecund source of good ideas? This is
the topic of Chapter 5.
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5 Introspection is likely to be profitable
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The thesis is that “introspection is recommended for anthropic AI”. After various
introductions  and overviews  in  previous  chapters,  in  the  last  chapter  I  showed that
introspection is a legitimate method for inventing AI systems. But being legitimate and
permissible  is  not  enough for being recommended:  this  chapter  will  argue why one
positively should expect introspection to be a good basis for anthropic AI. Recall that
recommendation is not a guarantee, what I need to show here is that introspection will
plausibly be a good basis for AI inventions.
This chapter will include the following arguments:
1. Consciousness is inherent to all normally-intelligent humans, and forgoing an
examination of consciousness in the quest for AI would be as odd as forgoing
the  examination  of  horse-carriages  when  trying  to  develop  the  horse-less
carriage (section 5.1).
2. If teachers use introspection to teach mental skills to their students, then the very
survival of civilisations over multiple generations is testimony to the validity of
introspection (section  5.2).
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3. A case can be made that all software programming is introspection-based  and
therefore we have already plenty of evidence that introspection is often useful
(section 5.3). 
The next chapter will go into more detail on how to develop such AI (and which pitfalls
to avoid), and chapter 7 will give some concrete working examples.
5.1 Conceptual arguments
One could present several a-priori arguments for introspection-for-AI-design, but not
everyone would be convinced by purely conceptual arguments (software engineers are
notoriously suspicious, even of their own code). Moreover, one of the most convincing
conceptual arguments I have in this context would require assuming idealism, which
many would refuse.  Instead  I will  let  the next section (5.2) do the heavy lifting of
giving a  compelling argument.  Here,  in  the conceptual  stage,  I  will  only make one
argument, and move on.
The main  model  we have  for  intelligence  is  natural  human intelligence.  This  is  by
definition the intelligence we want to emulate in  human-like AI. Specifically in this
thesis we are looking for anthropic AI, that is the un-enculturated  intelligence, prior to
any  moulding  of  a  particular  mind  to  a  particular  environment  or  society.  This  is
contrasted with the “western, modern,  well-trained and adult” mind that so much of
existing  AI  aims  at.  Artificial intelligence  is  an  attempt  to  functionally  duplicate
intelligence, like artificial leather is an attempt to functionally duplicate leather, or an
artificial  limb is  an attempt to  functionally duplicate a limb. One of the most basic
things we expect an engineer to do when developing an artificial X is to examine the
natural X as much as is needed, to glean ideas for their artefact from the  natural X.
Every human mind is subjective, and hence subjectivity is a matter of natural fact (Seth,
2010) inherent  to  the  human  mind  –  the  main  specimen  of  intelligence  we  have
available  for  examination.  But  most  AI  practitioners  would  have  us  construct
intelligence  without subjectivity. We have no natural example of such an intelligence,
and so building AI without subjectivity would be building artificial X while excluding
in-principle one of X's most salient characteristics – indeed a bit rather like climbing a
tree trying to get to the moon, as Dreyfus (1979) had it. I suspect this is the reason why
AI has become moribund in the last few decades - why the initial optimism led to such
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meagre results (Langley, 2006; McHugh & Minsky, 2003).
5.2 An argument from education16
In this section I will discuss a specific, rather common type of education – the conscious
teaching and learning of skills. This is not to detract from all other types of education or
other  aspects  of  human  existence  and  development,  such  as  emotions,  mood,
motivation, and countless others.
I will here argue that when teaching skills, the teacher needs to self-observe in order to
know how the teacher himself does X, so that he can teach how to do X. In the case
where  X  is  a  mental  skill,  then  mental  self-observation  is  required.  Mental  self-
observation  is  introspection.  The  success  human  cultures  have  in  transferring  their
mental skills from one generation to the next is testimony that introspection is neither
noise nor nonsense, but is sufficiently useful to allow the new generation to acquire the
skills  that  are  characteristic  of  that  culture.  If  the  words  used  by  teachers  who
introspected are sufficient for the young to become skilful, and people do not acquire
said  skills  spontaneously,  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  the  words  derived  from  the
introspection  efficaciously  contain  the  necessary  and  sufficient  information  for
reproducing the skill (in a healthy human). If the necessary and sufficient information
for human skill acquisition is in the introspective text, then: a. Introspection is neither
noise nor nonsense, and b. Introspection is a plausible source of information about the
skill under discussion. The rest of this section details this argument.
5.2.1 Skill questions
This argument focuses on teaching skills, rather than formal knowledge – on knowing-
how rather than knowing-that. This is partially motivated by the conclusion of section
3.2.7 that we should look more at knowledge-how than at knowledge-that. Partially it is
simply  the  best  field  in  which  to  demonstrate  that  introspection  contains  useful
information. Even if this argument has no validity outside the “teaching skills” arena,
the conclusion that at least in this arena introspection is positively useful – this finding
shifts the burden of argument to the other side who might argue that introspection is
restricted  only to that field.  Note from section  3.2.7 that the radical anti-intellectual
16 This argument was considerably sharpened by separate discussions with Joshua Weinstein and Simon
McGreggor.
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position says that there is no knowledge other that skills.
-
Having  made  the  knowledge-that/knowledge-how distinction  (in  section  3.2.7),  let's
examine how we communicate such knowledge, specifically how we answer questions
about such knowledge. The issue of how we answer questions of knowledge-that are
pretty well explored in AI (e.g. SHRLDU  (Winograd, 1971)). We also have a raging
theoretical debate on whether there are any representations involved in knowledge-that
(Dreyfus, 2007; Shanon, 2008; Wheeler, 2005). The issue of knowledge-how, and how
we answer questions about it requires more discussion.
Note that when one asks a person a seemingly straightforward question such as “Do you
know how to ride a bike?”, there are at three different conversations that may ensue:
1. Most people hear  it  as:  “Can you ride a bike”,  which would mean “Do you
believe that you could ride a bike at will”.
2. A teacher may also hear this same string of words as “Can you teach how to ride
a  bike?”,  and that  in  turn can  be  construed either  as  a  request  for  a  yes/no
answer, or as a request for teaching.
3. A scientist (perhaps a caricature of a scientific psychologist) may hear it as: “Do
you know, in detail, what strategies humans deploy to ride bicycles?”.
These are very different question, but the answer to 3 includes an answer to 2. Consider
a slightly different how-to question: “How can I get to London by train?”. Most people,
including teachers, would see that as a request for directions, and tell you which turns to
take to walk to a railway station, and suggest a train line from the selection available at
that  station,  perhaps  with  some  changes.  The  caricature-scientist's  version  of  this
question would be much longer, but will include also the teacher's version. When asking
how humans would navigate to London using trains, after answering all the scientific
questions,  ultimately the scientist  will  also need information about  station locations,
train routes,  and schedules.  So  both answers  will  include train stations,   routes  and
timetables.
In a sense, in order to maintain scientific rigour, scientists set aside  what they already
know as  they  step  into  their  scientific  role  (see  section  5.3.1 about  roles).  This  is
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because scientists see their role as asking the fundamental questions, and demanding
detailed objective answers. For technology, perhaps that is a less-than-optimal attitude:
a case of allowing the better, more detailed information to get in the way of the good,
workable technique. In technology, the every-day human way of doing something is a
good first stab at how to accomplish the task at hand. How to fill the gaps between the
coarse details of the simpler explanation will be discussed in section 6.3.5.1. Scientists
want a whole and fully objective truth, technologists just want something that will work
better than the previous technology (see section 1.3.2): Wheels are far superior to beasts
of burden in terms of carrying things around, but the idea of using beasts or burden was
a huge technological evolution for humans over carrying loads themselves. Everyday
people,  and technologists,  want  to  get  the  job  done,  not  to  get  it  done  in  the  best
possible way.
5.2.2 Teaching skills
I  have  found  three  ways  to  teach  skills  (there  may  be  more):  explicit  instruction,
imitation, and “reverse imitation”. One can learn skills by oneself (see section  5.2.6),
but here we are discussing teaching. These learning methods can be combined:
1. Instruction is  when a teacher explicitly uses language to describe how to do
something. A good example is a recipe.
2. Imitation is when the teacher provides a demonstration for the student to copy,
by observation. Copying by observation may require repeated experimentation
by the student, and possibly repeated demonstrations by the teacher. This need
not be formally orchestrated – learning by imitation (especially children from
parents) happens in the everyday course of life. When a chef puts a video clip on
the internet showing how they make some dish, this allows the viewer/student to
imitate their method in more detail than a shorthand recipe. Watching the video
even without the recipe (perhaps more times) would also allow a willing student
to learn enough about how to prepare the dish to write out a recipe themselves.
3. “Reverse imitation” is  when the teacher  (say)  stands behind a student,  holds
(say)  their  arms and shows them the correct  motion  using the student's  own
body. This is done in training beginners in crafts, music playing and sports such
as tennis. In a sense the teacher sculpts a moving functioning skilful person out
- 127 -
of the body of a novice.
The first method, “instruction” is fully explicit in that the skills are transferred using
language,  while the latter  methods are at  least  partially implicit.  However,  one may
object that the textual needs interpretation, while the embodied demonstration is the
more explicit. This  disagreement revolves around the exact definition of “explicit”, but
makes no difference to the main argument here.
Not all  skills can be  acquired by explicit-language teaching. For example control of
one's  own limbs  is  developed by trail  and error,  in  infancy  (O’Regan,  2011).  Even
explicit instructions like “add a tablespoon of oil” depend on these basic motor skills
which can not be taught. The AI implications of this point will be discussed in section
6.3.5.1.
Fascinating  as  some of  these  aspects  are,  we must  concentrate  on explicit-language
instruction, since we will eventually need to write very explicit AI software. We must
focus on how teaching begins, in the case of the explicit use of language in teaching.
Our first concern is how the instructions come into existence, in the teachers.
5.2.3 Self-observations
In the case of explicit instruction by words (the recipe of point 1 in section 5.2.2), the
teacher has to utter (or write) some text that will communicate the skill to be learned.
Where could this text come from? Maybe the teacher gets the exact text from a book –
but then the question is begged, how does the author of the book come up with the text
for teaching skill X?
1. The text could be remembered verbatim from the time when the teacher/author
herself learned the skill. This is unlikely for two reasons: first it would require
word-perfect memory over decades. Second this would lead to infinite regress,
the instructions had to come from somewhere, and unless we believe something
like a God giving all instructions to mankind at some stage (on mount Sinai?)
we have to accept that the instructions on how to perform skill X have come
from some human developing or “coming up with” them.
2. The  teacher/author  may  be  flailing  in  the  dark,  coming  up  with  various
nonsensical instructions, and testing which of them work, and use those. This
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idea is a bit like Darwinian evolution. This is unlikely in that we see very few
cases of nonsensical instructions being “tried out”.
3. The teacher/author may be trying out doing X for themselves (either actually, or
in their imagination), while self-observing to see what it is that they are doing.
There is some evidence for this in the fact that a student would often ask their
teacher (as in the examples above) something like “How would  you do X”?
“You” here is the teacher. The student asks the  teacher to observe themselves
and tell how X is done. Doing X while observing oneself would also include
imagining doing X, and imagining doing X using various options, or recalling a
procedure, “playing it our in one’s mind”, observing that and verbalizing it, etc.
As long as there is an action by the teacher being observed and verbalised, real,
remembered or imagined17, there is some version of self-observation going on.
A simple example of self-observation would be, when teaching how to ride a bike, the
teacher self-observes that in order to get on the bike and start pedalling, he needs to tilt
the bike towards his own body so that his first push down on the far pedal will not cause
the bike to fall over to the far side. The teacher will also observe what his habits are in
other areas, such as where he aims to move the bulk of his body, what angle he points
the handlebar at, etc. All these are observations of the preparation to mount the bike –
and the more of them can be made explicit the more of an advantage the teacher can
give their student. Learning to ride a bike can be done by imitation alone – but with
instructions it is learned more quickly (and less painfully).
5.2.4  Mental self-observation is introspection
Some of  the  skills  civilisations  possess  and pass  from generation  to  generation  are
mental skills – skills like using nouns to refer to things, skills like deciphering alphabets
(as you are doing now, we usually call it “reading”) or deciphering pictograms, doing
mental maths, and many more. As we have seen above, teaching a skill X requires the
teacher to self-observe and communicate how the teacher herself does skill X. If this
skill is purely mental, in that there is no external behaviour that can be observed, there
are two important consequences:
17 The “simulation theory of cognition” holds that the same mechanisms are used to perform, imagine
preforming, and recalling performing any interaction with the environment. This theory is backed
with neuroscience data (Hesslow, 2012).
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1. Any option of the learning happening by demonstration-and-imitation becomes
unlikely,  as  there  is  little  to  observe.  A possible  exception  to  this  is  the
bootstrapping of  very basic  skills  like using one's  limbs  (O’Regan,  2011) of
bootstrapping language, a special skill according to Chomsky (Cowie, 2010).
2. The  teacher  also  has  nothing  external  to  observe in  themselves  when  they
perform a mental skill (no “tilting the bike”).
To teach a mental skill, the teacher must therefore glean the information about how they
themselves do X by mental self-observation. Now recall the definitions of introspection:
Introspection refers to an observation and, sometimes, a description of the
contents of one’s own consciousness (Overgaard, 2008).
Introspection, as the term is used in contemporary philosophy of mind, is a
means  of  learning  about  one's  own  currently  ongoing,  or  perhaps  very
recently past, mental states or processes (Schwitzgebel, 2014).
Recall also Schwitzgebel’s 6 characteristics of introspection,  in section 3.3.2.
One may object that the teacher may be  imagining themselves or  recalling  doing the
task  and  not  actually doing  it.  So  they  are  not  actually  engaged  in  mental-self-
observation  (introspection)  in  real-time,  therefore  violating  Schwitzgebel's  condition
No. 3, “temporal proximity”. How to tell the difference between “imagining oneself”,
“recalling”, and actually exercising a mental skill is hard to define, even using neuro-
imaging (Hesslow, 2012). However, these difficulties make little difference to my main
point here, that the only way one can teach a mental skill to others is by looking at one's
own practice – regardless of the degree to which Schwitzgebel's condition No. 3 of
“temporal proximity” is fulfilled, and regardless of whether the skill is being exercised
“for real” rather than imagined.
5.2.5 Examples of mental skills being transmitted by introspection
1. Consider  mnemonic  tricks  for  remembering  words  in  a  foreign  language:  In
Hebrew, the word for house is “Bayit”. So people like Breuer & Shavit  (2014)
invent tricks like the sentence “What a lovely house, I think I will buy it.” (“Buy
it” sounds like “Bayit”)  to help people remember the word. How do they know
that they have a good sentence if not by playing it out “in their mind” and seeing
(introspecting!) if it “works”?
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2. Consider the game of “mental chess”. It is like normal chess, only there is no
physical chess-set and one has to memorise the board and tell the opponent one's
moves using words. This game is quite difficult,  and one may come up with
some tricks, such as clustering using various groupings, that help one remember
the  board  positions.  Again,  to  share  such  a  trick  with  another  person,  the
inventor of the trick must introspect.
3. Consider the case of remembering sequences, such as telephone numbers. We
know  that  short  term  memory  can  handle  only  7  ±  2  units  (Miller,  1956).
However  people  can  remember  significantly  longer  sequences,  using
“chunking”.  For  example,  people  could  spell  very  long  words  well  before
scientific psychology started. Whoever came up with the mnemonic device of
chunking saw that it worked in their own mind before they explained it to others.
Similarly other mnemonic tricks were invented inside people’s minds first and
then explained publicly using words. Consider the idea of being introduced to a
new  person  called  “Ben”,  and  trying  to  vividly  imagine  them  enjoying
themselves with all the other “Ben”s that one knows, in the hope that that image
will stick in one’s mind, and help in the recall of the new acquaintance’s name.
4. Consider this commonplace trick for handling anxiety: one should imagine the
worst  possible  scenario,  and  imagine  how  one  would  cope  in  such  an
eventuality. Having sketched out how one would deal with the worst eventuality,
the sense of danger and hence the anxiety subside.
A possible  objection  here  could  be  that  these  are  all  cultural  artefacts,  and we are
looking for anthropic AI, which we defined as being the substructure that allows for
culture  without  including  any  of  the  contingent  culture.  There  are  two  possible
responses, one conservative and one more daring:
1. The conservative response is that this observation is correct, but what is shown
here is that introspection carries useful information about our mental processes
overall. The question of how to distil the un-enculturated anthropic layer is left
to chapter  6, with concrete examples given in chapter  7. The short version of
how this will be overcome is that we should  aim in introspection for as low a
level as possible, and that we should use introspection iteratively so as to refine
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the models used for AI. Recall we are not doing science here, and if we do not
get something 100% correct that of not a catastrophe – technology is be far more
tolerant of errors that science is (see sections 1.3.2, 1.4).
2. The more daring response adds that mental skills, as exposed by introspection,
are  very  near the anthropic line. Consider that the examples above contain not
only very high level18 skills, like “mental chess” but also some low level skills
like dealing with anxiety – an emotion (example 4 above). Anthropic AI was
defined as aiming at  the innate  mechanisms that  enables our culture without
being part  of any contingent culture.  So looking at  basic skills,  as basic and
infantile as possible, brings us near the elusive boundary between the cultured
and the pre-cultured. We may venture to use some implications and speculations
to reach an even closer approximation (recall  section  3.3.4) – let  a thousand
flowers bloom. Recall again that we needn’t reach the “true” “precise” boundary,
since we are not looking for scientific or philosophical absolute truth, we are
looking for a technological approximation.
More discussion of this point is found in section 6.3.4.
5.2.6 Skills only part-acquired by explicit instruction
If one were to examine skill acquisition more closely, as did Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986),
one sees that there are stages in the acquisition of skills, including for example reading
(for the current purpose I will limit the discussion to English). In explicit teaching by an
instructor,  only  a  very  basic  and slow level  of  the  skill  is  picked up.  A simplified
communicable “base” skill (involving deciphering every letter individually) is explicitly
taught, with the intent of the student eventually discovering for themselves the “higher”
variant of the skill which is superior, but difficult to communicate, perhaps partially
because of a limited vocabulary, perhaps because we need some experience with the
“base” skill before we can discover the “higher” skill. Only after a lot of experience do
we have the fluency that allows us to read entire words (sometimes even while not
noticing systematically jumbled text (Rayner, White, Johnson, & Liversedge, 2006)).
Does this have any effect on our argument on AI?
18 Note  the  use  of  “high level”  and  “low level”  to  describe  different  things that  humans do.  This
tradition goes back as far as Plato, but has shaky foundations. I use it here in the accepted “intuitive”
sense, with reservations.
- 132 -
First, the main thrust of section 5.2 is that skills are taught by teachers practising self-
observation in order to generate their speech. At no time did I claim that  all skills are
taught. All that was argued is that some skills are taught, and that this teaching requires
self-observation on the part of the teacher, and mental self-obseravtion is introspection,
so introspection is key to the transfer of mental skills between generations.
Second, this issue demonstrates that some skills are acquired without instruction, and
therefore  maybe the  “true”  key  for  learning  human  skills  is  not  introspective.  This
possible  critique  misses  the  mark  in  terms  of  this  thesis  in  that  “introspection  is
recommended for developing anthropic AI”  does not claim that introspection will be
key to  all  future AI development – that would be the sort of “one truth” dogmatism
diametrically opposed to the perspectivist attitude of this thesis, see section 1.4.
5.2.7 An argument from education: summary
If person A invents some mental skill and they teach it to person B, they must be using
introspection  in  order  to  describe  what  it  is  they  are  doing internally.  They  cannot
directly describe neural or cognitive processes that are not conscious, since they not
only do not know their own “scientific” states, they also cannot communicate to the
student  which  correct  “scientific”  processes  the  student  must  adopt  (their  brain  or
“metal scape” might be different). Later when person B teaches person C, and C teaches
D etc., they all use introspection to tell each other how the skill is performed. The case
is  even  stronger  in  that  even  if  people  teach  what  they  are  taught  using  verbatim
memory,  they  must  use  introspection  to  describe   their  own  innovations  and
improvements of mental skills.
These skills (that work, somehow, in the real world, using wet neurons) are transferred
(and improved) from one generation to the next, by little other than introspective-based
narrative.
In teaching, the text “take that digit, and then add it to the other one” is a description of
what the teacher thinks (or introspects) she is doing. It can't be mere repetition because
that would not account for innovation. If introspection were noise, no student could pick
up a skill by this normal method of teaching, but we all do, ergo introspection may be
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inaccurate, may not descriptively reflect neural reality, but still reflects enough of some
reality to allow the transfer of skills and culture over many generations (reliably enough
for us to read texts from millennia ago).
So  (at  least  some forms  of)  the  contents  of  introspection  have  some  validity,  in  a
pragmatic (“it works”) sense.
5.3 Programming impossible without introspection
Although this idea has already been sketched out in section 4.5, here I will discuss it in
more detail in order to show that introspection is not only plausible and recommended
for AI, but arguably necessary for any programming.  But there is a pitfall: one might
argue that if indeed all software development is introspective, what is the novelty in this
entire thesis? I will discuss this towards the end of this section. 
5.3.1 Role-playing
When acting and communicating, humans assume a certain role (or “frame of mind”),
usually depending on the social context. The classic example is the way people take on
their “work persona” as they start their work day. This “work persona” is in the main
similar to the job description the organization would advertise to fill that role if it were
to fall vacant.  As Herbert Simon (!) noted:
Administration is not unlike play-acting. The task of the good actor is to
know  and  play  his  role,  although  different  roles  may  differ  greatly  in
content.  The  effectiveness  of  the  performance  will  depend  on  the
effectiveness of the play and the effectiveness in  which it  is  played.  The
effectiveness of the administrative process will vary with the effectiveness of
the organisation and the effectiveness with which its  members play their
parts. (Simon, 1976, p. 252, 1996b, p. xii)
Another example of people semi-automatically fulfilling a socially-constructed role is
that a bilingual person will usually speak only one language at a time.
There seems to be no such thing as the mind operating (in a way that could be relevant
for action) outside of some cultural context  (see Wittgenstein, 2001a) even if it is the
context of running amok  (Carr,  1985).  This fact of the individual’s behaviour being
constructed in (usually) socially-accepted roles is transparent to us in daily life, but has
been the subject of much research,  see for example the much acclaimed book “The
presentation of the self in everyday life” (Goffman, 1971).
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One of the roles one can adopt is the role of being cooperative with some scientific
programme, such as Watson's (and later Simon's) “thinking aloud” (see section 3.3.3.1),
requiring that a “scientific man” take on such a role as thinking aloud “in the proper
spirit” and possibly even “with zest” (J. B. Watson, 1920, p. 91). 
These roles that we adopt come with certain prejudices in interpreting our environment.
Again to take an example from bilingual people, the same utterance (the same series of
phonemes) may be interpreted completely differently in the context of one language or
another: “me” in English is the first-person-accusative pronoun, in Hebrew the same
sound (ימ)  is the personal-interrogative, meaning “who?”. Also, the same event (say the
firing of a pistol by an assassin) could be interpreted differently by the same person,
depending on whether they are acting in their capacity as a citizen of a polity, or in their
capacity as a scientist. In one case one would present the events as an assassination, and
in the other one would explain the chemistry of gunpowder and the mechanics of the
revolver.
This observation (that humans usually act within a context of a role) is not entirely alien
to the field of AI. Note that the above quote is from Herbert Simon (albeit from  his
work in public administration, not AI).
5.3.2 Programming is introspective
This is a speculative position, which I here only claim is defensible, not necessarily true.
Arguing properly for this position is outside the scope of the current project, and the
main thrust of the thesis does not depend on it.
In writing new code (not debugging or reusing existing code), in a sense a programmer
projects herself (as an actor would project himself into a character see section  5.3.1
above) into an imaginary world where she is  (say)  inside a  world consisting of the
python instruction set,  or  in a  world comprised of  an “Intel”  architecture,  and asks
herself how she could use the tools available (variables, arrays, loops, libraries, etc.) in
order to achieve a task such as calculating VAT or whatever the programming task is.
There is a lot of “first person thinking” going on, as in “how could I do this”, “this
could give me that” etc. The programmer's output, the code that is supposed to do the
task,  is  a  formalization  into  python  (or  “Intel”)  instructions by  the  programmer
introspecting inside this “world of python”. Where else could the code come from? I
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can  find  no  evidence  (or  testimony)  that  there  is  anything  like  a  tree-search  of
possibilities as GOFAI would have it. Note also the language that is used for the text
that the programmer writes in order to invoke a feature of python: it is a “command” or
“instruction”. These words, outside the context of computers are used in education in
management, telling people how to do some bigger task by giving them details of the
component-tasks in simple language (see section 5.2).  
Moreover, in debugging, a similar thing happens. In the exercise known as “a dry run”,
the programmer projects herself, like an actor, into the role of a python interpreter, and
acts (in her mind, perhaps using pencil and paper) on the code and the data as a python
interpreter would, always keeping half an eye on the intended result to see where the
actual result  deviates from the intended result.  When such a deviation is  found, the
programmer would say that she found a bug (recall the “intended chain of causation” in
section 1.3.2).
Conversely a programmer copying an algorithm from a book is not introspective.
-
In  the  beginning  of  this  section  (5.3)  a  worry  was  presented  that  if  indeed  all
programming is introspective, than what is the point of this whole thesis? I have three
retorts:
1. The distinction is subtle but clear-cut: In programming one projects oneself into
a formal system (python/Intel instructions) and tries to achieve a task (say VAT
calculation) inside that formal world. Conversely, the method promoted by this
thesis to get to human-like AI would require us to observe our thought processes
in natural form, describe them as best we can (see section 6.2), and only later
formalize them as code. The difference is whether we do the introspecting inside
or outside of the formalized world of programming.
2. Another  retort  could  be  that  if  introspection  is  indeed  so  wide-spread  and
accepted, then why is it so often denied and obfuscated? This may have to do
also with the next point.
3. There is a distinction  (Chrisley, 2003) between something being ontically novel,
as in a novel entity, vs being notionally novel – the phenomena was around for a
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while, but we never noticed. As a bare minimum, the idea of introspection for AI
is notionally novel. 
5.4 Introspection is likely to be profitable: summary
This chapter deals with why one should positively expect introspection to be a good
basis for AI development.
Section  5.1 argued conceptually that in developing a artificial X one should not shy
away from examining all aspects of X – so in developing an Artificial Intelligence one
should examine all aspect of our natural human intelligence, including the subjective-
introspective.
Section  5.2 argued that  introspection  is  neither  nonsense  nor  noise,  even using  the
worse-case delineation  (see section 3.3.4). Rather it is used to allow know-how to pass
from person to person, inducing across generations. Perhaps this very ability of humans
(to  introspect)  evolved  specifically  to  allow  the  transfer  of  know-how  from  one
generation to the next, allowing civilisations to survive by accumulated wisdom.
Section  5.3 tentatively argued that  all programming is introspective, and showed that
that  does  not  trivialise  the  overall  argument.  Being  tentative,  this  argument  is  not
necessary for the overall thesis and was included for completeness.
As we have seen there is no point in looking for “truth values” as such in introspection-
for-AI. This thesis promotes using introspection as a source of ideas for anthropic AI as
a technology, and that is justified by three moves:
1. The  requirement  for  “truth”  is  shown to  be  secondary  in  technology  to  the
requirement for utility, and the costs of a factual mistake are shown to be lower
in  technology  than  in  science,  at  least  as  far  as  software  is  concerned  (see
sections  1.3.2, 1.4).
2. The argument from the “context of discovery” allows for  any source of ideas,
thereby making introspection as  legitimate  as  any other  source of  ideas  (see
sections 4.2.4, 4.2.5). This may be seen as too weak, as by a similar token one
could  argue  for  taking  a  walk  in  the  park  before  thinking  about  AI,  but  in
principle this is enough, because of (inter alia) the next point:
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3. The argument for the validity of introspection for education (section 5.2) shows
that introspection is not only better than noise, but arguably the foundation of
many of human culture's successes. It is therefore expected to be a positively
good source of ideas for AI. 
This is also supported historically in that some of the more open practitioners of AI
admitted  to using introspection as the basis for their AI (see section 4.3), even though
they were acutely aware that introspection has a “bad reputation” in psychology. They
however never used introspection in the wholehearted manner that is recommended in
this thesis.
The argument  of  this  thesis  is  that  AI based on introspection would produce  better
anthropic  AI.  There  is  no  hard-and-fast  logical  guarantee  that  introspection  would
always produce a good design, but it produces, as a minimum, “a sketch of a sketch” as
Simon had it (McCorduck, 2004, p. 246), a basis for an idea for a design (see examples
in chapter  7). The resultant designs must later be evaluated experimentally,  possibly
improving the design by iterative introspection and coding.
Let's look at how this is done in detail.
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6 Details and how to use introspection for AI
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This  chapter  outlines  how  to  approach  developing  introspection-based  AI.  It  also
answers several questions that remain outstanding about the recommended approach,
and  how  to  go  about  doing  introspection  more  “correctly”  than  some  of  my
predecessors did (see sections  4.3,  6.1.2,  6.1.3).  In the chapter  and on I  use a new
notation: underlined text designates introspective reports.
There is a seeming tension in my argument, which is about to get worse. On the one
hand I promote a liberal approach to the possible bases of (or inspirations for) designs in
AI: “let a thousand flowers bloom” (section 4.7, point 7), while on the other hand this
chapter will prescribe “correct” ways to do such introspection. My position is that all
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types of introspection are legitimate sources of ideas for AI (chapter 4), and some types
are recommended as such sources (chapter 5). In this chapter I again recommend certain
avenues as being more plausible, more “correct” than others, and I give my arguments.
These recommendations  here  do not  detract  from the  generality  of  the  argument  in
previous chapters.
 There are a few other points that may need re-emphasising:
• Human-like AI is not better than rational AI, it is just different, and what this
thesis is about, (see section 3.2.2 for motivations)  and hence is our focus here.
• Any inspiration or basis may be used to develop any type of AI. In the extreme,
this is a form of the argument that monkeys typing randomly for eternity would
produce  the  entire  British  Museum's  library  (Borges,  2001).  Therefore,  from
looking  at  an  algorithm  we  can  never  deduce  with  cast-iron  certainty  its
provenance in terms of inspiration or basis (or the species of the designer). In the
rest of this chapter I will say things such as “neural nets are based on biology” as
shorthand for something like “it is most probable that the AI method of neural
nets was inspired by (a grossly simplified version of) real life, wet neurons”.
• It seems that so far the vast majority of AI has been based on either mathematics
(broadly  construed),  biological  inspirations,  or  on  cognitive  models  (see
(Langley,  2006)).  These approaches have been so successful that  often when
developing new AI many researchers tended to “look under the lamp” in one of
these three areas. This thesis is about broadening the search, and recommending
direction(s) to explore within the multitude of neglected possibilities.
6.1 Definitions and delineations
Here I  will  clarify  what  is  meant  by  AI  “based on introspection”,  and contrast  the
recommended methodology with other (existing) approaches to AI.
In delineating the different AI efforts so far one should look at the following aspects:
• What type of AI is being aimed at (human / insect / rational).
• What were the principal inspirations or bases for the technology.
• How successful the effort was, empirically. 
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• Especially in case of failure, does the result call into question the qualities of the
entire  approach  /  inspiration,  or  only  the  circumstances  of  the  specific
experiment?
In  section  6.1.1 I  will  set  out  some  definitions  as  to  what  precisely  is  being
recommended in this thesis. In later sections I will compare and contrast this with how
other approaches seem to work.
In contrasting my view of how to develop AI in detail with previous approaches,  this
chapter will also answer in more detail than section 4.6 any objection that there is little
novelty in this approach to introspection-for-AI. The below survey does not claim to be
complete, but to present an extensive sample of how AI systems were based on various
models.
6.1.1 Definition for “AI based on introspection”
As the idea of “an AI design based on introspection” is key to this thesis, let's define it
and look at some examples that fall outside and inside this definition.
Y is based on X
In this context, Y, a design for an AI system, is based on an observation X (that could be
an introspective observation) iff:
A) There is a causal link from X to Y.
B) X is the dominant influence on the workings of Y, i.e. there is no significant
pollution by some other factor such as a prior theoretical commitment. In our
case,  of  AI  based  on  introspection,  this  would  require  acceptance of
introspection (X) as legitimate, not to be obfuscated or denied; minimisation of
attachment to or influence of any theoretical framework, such as mathematics,
logic,  or  some  theory  in  cognition,  psychology,  religion,  or  even
phenomenological literature. See section 6.3.3.
C) Corresponding  functions  are  achieved  in  similar  ways  (data  flows,  data
structures,  temporal order,  etc.). Examples of similarities of process and data
flow are given below in sections 6.1.2 to 6.1.4.
Introspection (as a basis for AI) further requires
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D) Introspecting,  i.e.  “looking”  at  or  “listening”  to  one's  own  untrained mental
processes.  See  section  3.2.4 for  an  argument  for  “untrained”  thought  vs
“western,  modern,  well-trained  and  adult”  thought.  See  a  summary  of
Schwtzigebel’s (2012) definition of introspection above, section 3.3.2 .
E) Proficiency in conceptualising and expressing the contents of this introspective
“vision”, in text, diagrams, algorithms or suchlike. (see sections 5.2, 6.2)
F) Fidelity,  that  later  could  be  judged  (possibly  externally)  as  credibility.
Introspection is a type of  witness account. The fidelity / credibility of witness
accounts  in  general  is  discussed  in  historiography (see  section  6.3.1).  For
example,  a  design  that  never  makes  a  mistake  is  not  credible  (as  a  human
model), since humans make mistakes. Another example: a design that fits some
theory too well might well be a result of theoretical pollution, see B above.
Let’s look at all the ways this can fail, or (just another way of looking at it) how AI
development has happened so far, and how these scenarios differ from the above:
6.1.2 Non-human-like inspirations
Some algorithms have clear inspirations, which are not human, let alone introspective.
There is no specific reason to believe these would be good at producing human-like
behaviour.
6.1.2.1 Genetic algorithms (x2)
The idea of the genetic algorithm (itself) has a clear inspiration – a (somewhat naïve)
scientific  model  of  biological  inheritance  and  evolution  (usually  in  a  sexually-
reproducing population). This is based on biology (and fulfils A-C), but biology is not
introspection (and does not fulfil D-F).
A genetic  algorithm can  be  used  to  generate  an  output, any  information-entity  for
which there is an “objective function”, and as a specific case a genetic algorithm can be
made to evolve software for any purpose implied by the objective function.  Such a
successfully evolved design, since it was not made by any person, can be said to not be
based on anything. That is not to say that it was not based in some way on the objective
function (it was), but the loops and variables inherent in the code produced by a genetic
algorithm are bereft of any human design or inspiration at all. This obviously does not
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fulfil any of A-C or D-F.
6.1.2.2 Neural nets
Similar to the case of the Genetic Algorithm itself, neural nets are based on biology, so
likewise it fulfils A-C, only regarding biology, not introspection.
One could argue that  introspectively it  “feels  like” our  mind functions  in  a manner
similar to a neural net in that there are alternating phases of chaos and stability, thereby
fulfilling the criteria (D-F) for our experience as revealed by introspection, but:
• The neural-net's  data structure and data flows are not visible to us humans
internally,  therefore  are  not  introspective,  but  originate  in  scientific  external
observation (also simplification -  (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943)) of neurons  (not
output of introspection) – this violates C.
• The observation that the end result of two processes is similar is not the same as
observing  the  process  that  produces  these  end  results.  Such  an  observation
would be introspection, and is lacking here (See more about similar results in
section 6.3.5).
Again,  Neural  Nets  are  based  on  biology  (and  fulfil  A-C),  but  biology  is  not
introspection (and does not fulfil D, E-F  are debatable).
6.1.3 Human-like inspirations (non-Introspective)
See also section 3.2.5.
Behaviour:  An example of building an AI system or robot that was based solely on
externally observable  human behaviour would be hominid robots in general,  and a
more specific example would be bi-pedal walking robots. This approach is scientifically
unassailable, as it is based on hard-core observable facts (humans have two legs, knees,
etc.)  and  is  reminiscent  of  behaviourism.  The  disadvantage  is  that  the  behaviours
produced by following this inspiration are not sophisticated. Any level of sophistication
would require having some sort of mental processing (this was Chomsky's cognitivist
argument in his critique of Skinner  (Chomsky, 1959)). Mental processing breaks the
behaviouristic framework, and has to be based on something other than behaviour as
such.
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This example fulfils A-C for behaviour, not introspection, and therefore does not fulfil
D-F.
External analysis  of human behaviour:  One could create  a far more sophisticated
model, like (in natural language) a grammar, and try to base the machine's behaviour on
such a model. This is only as good as the underlying model. Our ability, thus far, to
model humans is limited. Alternately, one could have models or theories of how the
(maybe even entire) human mind works (cognitive simulation  (Sun, 2008)). A-C hold
for the abstracted models (specific or general), D-F do not hold.
Substructure: Some would simulate the brain in its entirety, either at cellular or atomic
levels. This approach is currently not feasible (see section 6.4). Again, one could have a
more abstract theory or how the mind is constituted, like logic, statistical  inference,
other mathematics, or some form of symbol processing (classic AI).  A-C hold for the
idealised  model  (or  the  entire  brain),  D-F do not  hold.  Newell  & Simon’s  (1961a)
insistence that their subjects think in “rules” can be construed as an example of this (see
section 6.3.3). A more brazen example is (Bringsjord, 2008). 
6.1.4 Types of introspection for AI 
Within the field of AI, there are several variants of introspection used (moving from the
existing to the recommended and beyond):
1. Taking a literal view of sentences of the type to be discussed, and a somewhat
idealist metaphysical stance, one could see every conscious human observation
as arguably introspective. Saying “I see red”, or “the measurement shows  me
97”  is  introspective.  Such  trivial introspection does  not  lead  to  software
designs, so there is no “based on” relationship (no A-C).
2. Much of programming is introspective: As we saw in section 5.3, arguably all
programming  is  introspective  –  It  requires  the  programmer  to  imagine
themselves as living in world of (say) python features, and asking themselves
“what would I do”, etc. 
This  introspection  while  “putting  yourself  in  the  computer's  shoes”  is
introspection  on  learnt skills,  the  skill  of  thinking  like  a  computer,  a
fundamental skill of programming. One cannot introspect in this way unless one
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knows how to think in terms of code. This specifically violates D's requirement
for untrained mental processes, and it is not consciously based on introspection
at all (A-C, D-F).
The  difference  between  my  advocacy  for  introspection  and  this  model  of
programming is subtle, yet clear-cut:  programmers first adopt the technological
role of “being a computer” and then ask “how would I solve that if I were a
program”, while I advocate asking “how do I, as I am, solve that”, and only later
turning that fully-human introspection into technical code (see section 5.3).
3. A more general case is introspecting artefacts of culture – “I think logically” “I
think using words” or even “I think in Java” (as above). The general case is “I
think using P” where P  is a construct found in a certain culture. Most often in
AI, it would be the epitome of what this thesis is not aiming for – the terms of
the introspections would be western, modern, well-trained and adult rather than
anthropic (see section 3.2).
Case-Based-Reasoning (see section 7.2) can be seen as an example of AI based
on  such  introspection,  in  that  it  operates  like  a  western  well-trained
administrator, using the best solution for any given problem. Again, this violates
D's requirement for introspecting untrained mental processes. The problem with
trained mental processes is that it gives us information about how  our culture
thinks (or how our culture thinks one should think) rather than how we actually
think.
4. I argue for introspection on natural mental processes, not enculturated ones (see
section  3.2.4). This can be done minimally, by taking a  particular element of
how we think, such as the fuzzy edges of concepts, and building  an AI concept
around it. This is good as far as it goes, but often is then used again within some
well-understood mathematical scheme, such as fuzzy logic.  The novel idea here
(fuzzy concepts)  fulfils  A-C and D-F,  but  it  is  then  embedded in  a  logical-
mathematical framework with all its non-anthropic characteristics (One cheer for
fuzzy logic! see section 7.1).
5. I further argue here (in section 6.3.6) for introspecting multiple novel elements,
for a more complete model of how our subjective mind works. These elements
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can be added gradually, interspersed with experimentation for feedback on how
each  step  of  the  development  of  the  AI  design  works,  and  allowing  further
introspection at  each stage,  looking at  how our own thought-processes differ
from the model. See examples in chapter 7.
6. Note  that  I  am  not  aiming  for  “Heideggerian  correctness”.  Unlike  Dreyfus
(1979, 2007), one can be agnostic about the correctness (or usefulness for AI) of
any particular volume of phenomenological literature. Unlike Dreyfus I argue
that AI practitioners must remain committed to pragmatism, to programmability.
So there are  two things here: One is  that  the recommended technique is  not
married to the idea of “correctness”, “precision” or “truth” in general, and the
second is that I remain agnostic specifically as to the truth or lack thereof in the
German phenomenological literature.
So subjectivity is not only necessary for any conscious human activity as suggested by
point 1 above but is needed for all programming (point 2 above) and has been used by
several if not all AI programmers before, see section 4.3. But so far AI researchers have
been subjective and did introspection in a bashful “under cover” way. (see sections 4.3,
4.6). As suggested above, it may well be time to to do it consciously and properly, rather
than coyly as if hiding from Watson's (1913) or Simon's wrath.  We surely cannot hope
to excel at developing human-like AI while pretending  not  to be human (see section
5.1),  as  in  cases  where  the  inspiration  or  basis  for  the  design  is  non-human  or  an
idealised human.
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6.2 The process of introspection for AI
Illustration 6.1: Process of introspection for AI
Human Behaviour
Human mental activity
Introspective Vision
SW Design Process
Machine Activity / Behaviour
Text (Phenomenology)
Introspective model
SW Spec / SW
Causes
Is about, refers to
Verification
Parameter Comparison (Objective)
Exteroceptive Model
Exteroceptive Model
Social Comparison (Subjective)
Articulation
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Consider  Illustration 6.1 (bold terms refer to labels in the diagram).
In approaching the process  of  introspecting for  AI one should  have  an intention to
perform the introspection in the spirit of the description to come in section  6.3 (not
polluting with theories, “looking for” processes rather than beliefs, etc.). For now lets
look at the structure of the introspection-for-AI process.
Human  mental  activity,  as  seen  subjectively  (in  the  phenomenal  mind,  not  the
cognitive  mind,  see  section  3.2.5.3)  is  a  process,  symbolised  here  as  a  spiral,  that
determines human behaviour (red arrows signify causation). Human mental activity
can be observed by an  introspective vision  (bearing in mind that the use of the term
“vision” is metaphoric), which (at least  partially, see section 5.2) mirrors the process of
the  human mental activity (hence the spiral here). In this stage, of the “vision”, the
issue of  “looking for” comes to  bear,  see section  6.3.2.  Next,  there is  a  process of
articulation,  that does  not,  in a sense,  mirror the original mental process but rather
moves away from it,  in forcing the vision into a more communicable form. Here is
where “pollution” is a danger,  see section  6.3.3. The process of articulation may be
iterative, with the vision being further and better understood with additional attempts at
articulation.  The  introspective  vision refers  to  (black  arrow)  the  human  mental
activity.  Articulation produces an  introspective model – some concrete idea of how
the human mental activity appears to work. This model can be explained or expressed
using  text,  which  would  be  a  phenomenological  report about  the  human  mental
activity. We should keep this distinct in our mind from the philosophical tradition of
phenomenology, which some may argue against, see section 3.3.1.5. Note that a text is
just a string of letters – it is not a machine or a mind or a brain that can carry out a
process (hence no spiral).  The  introspective model can also be used by a  software
(SW) design process, involving approximating (see section  6.3.5) and digitising, that
will produce a  software specification, and ultimately  software. This software, when
run, creates machine behaviour, which hopefully in some approximate sense reproduces
the original  human mental process,  or at  least  the introspective vision (hence the
spiral).
The output of this entire process can later (see section 6.5) be compared (for feedback
purposes)  to  actual  human behaviour in  two ways (see  area  under  blue  arc).  One
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alternative  is  objective  parameter  comparison –  observed  directly  (perhaps  even
mechanically)  in  human  behaviour and  the  machine  activity.  A second  feedback
method  can  involve  people  observing  both  the  human  and  machine  activity,  and
producing  their  exteroceptive  models  of  the  two  activities,  and  compare  them
subjectively. Such a process is similar to (most construals of) the Turing test. 
Note that there is no necessity for one person to be involved in the entire process. One
person  can   have  the  introspective  vision,  do  the  articulation,   and  express  his
introspective model as  text (written or spoken), and another person (or several) can
engage in the software design process, etc. 
Note also that the entire process can be an iterative process (not just the articulation),
where  refinements of  AI  designs  are  made  by further  introspection,  modelling,  etc.
Introspection can be refined in the sense of adding details, sometimes even changing the
fundamentals of the picture. For example, a trivial (non AI related) introspection could
be “I think it  will rain today”.  A deeper observation of a similar situation can yield
something like “By my experience these clouds don't mean much either way, so I can't
really say,  but I fear being caught out and getting wet,  and even more I fear being
blamed by my friends for not saying it would rain. So I say it will rain even though I
don't know”. Notice that the underlying dominant influence has shifted from thinking
(that it will rain) to being socially afraid. 
Another way that introspection can be refined is by the development of terminology.
Once one is  versed in  terminology (in  any field,  I  see no reason why introspection
should  be  an  exception)  one  can  describe  more  using  less  words.  This  ability  to
economise and increase precision in language, useful in any case of description, is of
particular importance in introspection because introspection happens in the same mind
where  the phenomena being observed are occurring,  and the  danger  of  interference
between the two processes is ever-present (and always to a degree unavoidable). Again,
Schwitzgebel (2012) gives an overview of this issue.
6.3 Comments on the process of introspection for AI
6.3.1 Introspection is a witness account
When one reports about one's introspection, one gives a testimony about what one had
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“seen”. There is every reason to expect that any known issues of reliability in testimony
would arise in the case of introspection, so it is worth summarising one of the canonical
sources on the technique of writing history, “The historian’s craft” (Bloch, 1953). Bloch
starts (pp. 79-81) with observing that believing everything that is presented as evidence
is naïve, but also mistrusting all evidence from a source willy-nilly just because some of
the evidence presented by that source is questionable – would also be equally naïve.
Often fashionable inaccuracies are accepted as truth, and one must especially be careful
with “common sense”, since firstly common sense is nothing other than the fashionable
prejudices of a certain society, and moreover common sense changes over time, usually
with  no  fanfare.  Often  convenient  rumours  are  not  denied,  because  they  suit  some
agenda (Ibid. pp. 99-100). 
The word “sincerity” has a very broad and dangerous meaning, it can incorporate many
of the above prejudices - “many witnesses deceive themselves in all good faith” (Ibid. p.
100). People are often unaware of the simplest things around them, such as the number
of windows in a familiar room. In our case, introspectors may need to practise (Ibid. p.
102) in order to see the obvious about their actual thought processes, since they are so
familiar (see also (Schwitzgebel, 2004)).
In history, the determination of the exact cause of an event is difficult in the extreme
(Bloch, 1953, pp. 103–4), but that is also the case in chemistry: we do not know which
molecule  in  the  mixture  made  the  whole  thing  explode.  We  can  only  describe  the
antecedent  conditions,  not  the  exact  cause.  Also,  no  witness's  testimony  is  equally
reliable on all matters (Ibid. p. 101), but in our case of introspection for technology, the
precise truth is of less consequence, see section 1.3.2. The practical parallel for our case
of technological introspection is the way that we can interpolate over the voids in the
introspective report, see sections 6.3.4 and 6.3.5.
Witness  accounts  vary  by  the  societal  context. But  even errors  (or  forgeries),  once
detected, can tell us much about the society that produced them (Ibid. p. 105). Ideas that
prevail  in  a  society,  like the  belief  in  German cunning in  WW I France,  led to  an
overestimation  of  their  intelligence  capabilities.  Likewise,  if  you  look  at  the  naïve
introspection of the pioneers of AI (see section 4.3.1) you will see that they attest that
they  think  mathematically.  This  confabulation  in  itself  is  a  testimony  to  the
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mathematical  prejudices  of  the scientific  community in  their  times (a  prejudice that
remains  with  us  today).  Also  in  the  case  of  the  intuitions  of  cognitive  psychology,
testimony tells us often not what the witness saw, but what his society thinks it natural
to see (Ibid. p. 107), see also (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
Summarising the accumulated wisdom of historiography as it  applies to our case of
introspection for technological human-like AI:
1. There is no mechanical logic of critical examination of testimony (Ibid. p. 110,
116). But we do not need a clear mechanical criterion for truth as such. We only
need some social (perhaps economic) criteria for  utility, and we have some –
empirical testing and market economics - see section 6.5.
2. About the temptation to throw away all of subjectivity as non-scientific (section
4.2), we can adopt Bloch's advice that 'It is always disagreeable to say “I do not
know. I  cannot  know.” It  must  not be said except  after an energetic,  even a
desperate search' (Ibid. p. 59-60). But once we despair, we have a “get out of
jail” card – since we are dealing in a technology that aims to  approximate, we
can interpolate the voids in our knowledge (see section 6.3.5).
6.3.2 Looking / listening for
In acting in different capacities, or in different roles (see section 5.3.1 about roles), we
also look for or listen for different things (Cole, 1973; Winograd & Flores, 1986, pp. 9,
50, 57, 63). An example of the different types of “looking for” could be looking at the
floor for a dropped coin, vs examining the floor for structural damage. The externally
observable actions of surveying the surface can be identical, but the intent, the mental
activity,  and  attention  are  entirely  different.  This  is  true  also  of  our  “internal
looking/listening”  in  introspection.  As  Schwitzgebel  (2012,  sec.  1.2) notes,  we  can
introspect either attitudes such as beliefs and desires,  or conscious experiences such as
emotions, images etc. The selection of what we listen for is volitional, we can choose to
listen,  together  with  the  classic-AI  people  (especially  the  knowledge  engineers)  for
beliefs  and the application of rules,  like in  the case of  the General  Problem Solver
(GPS) (Newell & Simon, 1961b). We can also focus on lower mechanisms.
Any report (not only introspective reports) beyond describing the subject-matter also
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addresses a specific audience. On a trivial level, a bilingual person will issue his reports
in one language at a time, the language of his audience. But also, any report will be
couched in terminology that  is  expected to  make sense  to  the  audience:  Stream-of-
consciousness, data-and-algorithms, beliefs-and-doubts, whatever the reporter expects
the audience to expect. Here is one of the places where Simon and Dreyfus completely
talk  past  each  other  (see  sections  2.1,  2.2):  Simon  is  an  objective  scientist  in  the
tradition of  Watson, while  Dreyfus  is  a  phenomenologist,  committed to  subjectivity.
They both listen for different things in their research, and address different communities
(see chapter 2, and section  3.3.1.5).
So when we watch our own mental processes, or listen to ourselves thinking, we are
always looking for something – there is no neutral observation. We also look to issue
some report (if only for ourselves). What should we look for? In what terms should a
report  be  made?  We  are  looking  for  AI  designs.  A design  (in  this  context)  is  a
formalisation  of  a  process of  data  processing,  so  we  are  looking  for  information
processing processes in our mind. That is what we are looking for. But there are many
pitfalls in the way: our favourite theory (e.g. that humans are rational) can interpose
itself into our observations. It is important to “bracket” our beliefs and try to see the
mental processes as they are  (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012). One of the most important
things is “keeping our eye on the ball” of human thought as we truly experience it
(insofar as possible) rather than how our culture might think our thoughts  should be.
That is  how this  approach differs from classic AI. However,  we also need to “keep
another eye” on programmability – or we will fall into the same trap as Dreyfus and his
phenomenology, producing wonderful reports of no technological application.
A possible  question arises of how can the enculturated mind look for or at  the un-
enculturated mind? There are two answers here:
1. The  first  answer  is  that  there  is  a  category  error  in  this  question,  as  if  the
“enculturated” and the “un-enculturated” minds are two different entities “inside
our head”, and there is a problem for one to access the other. The reality is that
being enculturated or not is a matter of degree, or a matter of level. In a sense all
we have is the un-enculturated level – and it goes to great lengths to “behave
itself”, i.e. to produce behaviour that is socially acceptable, enculturated. So it is
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one and the same mind, just two levels – there is no access problem.
2. The  second  answer  is  that  we  should  observe  the  un-enculturated  mind
“carefully”. We should use all our skill, refinement, patience, openness etc. (all
enculturated  properties  we  hopefully  have)  in  order  to  listen  to  the  un-
enculturated  mind  as  truthfully  as  possible,  and  use  our  (hopefully)  good
command of language and writing to produce as accurate and honest a report as
we can.
6.3.3 Pollution
So  our  listening  determines  what  kind  of  introspection  we  do  (beliefs,  processes,
sensations). It  also colours the content of what we detect in introspection. Listening
while  being committed to  some prior  theory  or  model  can  lead  to  pollution  of  our
introspection by our prior commitments. 
An  extreme example  of  what  I  call  “polluting”  introspection  with  prior  theoretical
commitments (in the context of an experiment) is beautifully recorded in  (Newell &
Simon, 1961a). This paper presents an experiment where the authors asked a student to
solve  a  formal  problem (while  “thinking  aloud”,  see  section  3.3.3.1),  given  certain
symbols and manipulation rules. They “asked the subject to talk aloud about what he
was doing-'what he was thinking about.' " (Ibid. p. 2012), and they recorded the entire
session. Only a few lines into the (quoted) session protocol the experimenters ask the
subject “Applying what rule?”, rather than a more neutral instruction such as “What are
you thinking now?”. The assumption that the subject is thinking in terms of  rules is
polluting  the  evidence,  even  when  the  explicit  instructions  were  to  report  all their
thinking.
However,  the  pollution  can  be  more  subtle,  and  self-induced.  I  would  suspect  that
anyone saying something like “For me mathematics has always been the language of
thought. I don't know precisely what I mean by that... Mathematics – this sort of non-
verbal thinking – is my language of discovery”  (Simon, 1996a, p. 106), is not being
honest with himself or with us as his audience.  Was mathematics always his “language
of thought”? Even when he was 5 years old? Again, in introspecting for anthropic AI we
need to get behind our “western, modern, well-trained and adult” thinking, and aim for
the underlying mechanisms.
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How can we defend against such pollution? First, we can make an effort to not project
our theories or other cultural artefacts onto our introspection. This can be done,  inter
alia, by noticing our theories “coming to mind” and either setting them aside calmly, as
a quiet choice, or turning our attention to how our thought processes specifically deviate
from what such a theory might expect.
Next we can critique our introspections after the fact: Would such a mechanism produce
the results we observe? As an example if “mathematics” as such were indeed someone’s
entire  “language  of  thought”,  it  would  not  produce  mistakes,  but  we  all  do  make
mistakes.  But  ultimately  we  need  no steadfast  guarantee against  such  pollution.
Different  introspections,  good and bad,  pristine and polluted,  will  simply produce a
larger variety of designs. These designs make no truth-claims, but are only candidates
for a technology. As explained in section 4.7 point 7, let a thousand flowers bloom.
For anyone who still feels that the quality should be improved, there are detailed guides
from the era before introspection fell out of favour, see (Schwitzgebel, 2004), and there
is a whole field of modern research  (Froese, 2011; Jack & Roepstorff, 2003). Again,
these may be useful, but there is no necessity in taking them too seriously. Mistakes are
acceptable – luckily for us, we are operating in the context of discovery, for technology.
For an explanation why introspection would be a good source of ideas for anthropic AI
designs,  see  chapter  5.  Pristine (non-polluted)  introspection  is  better  because  the
pollutions come from cultural artefacts, and we are aiming specifically for anthropic AI
(see section 3.2). 
Again, somewhat polluted evidence is not catastrophic, since we are exploring the space
of possible AI designs. But in aiming for novel anthropic designs, we should at least try
to avoid such unnecessary interference from over-optimistic over-mechanistic theories.
A useful distinction in avoiding the tried, tested and tired theories of yesteryear is the
distinction between knowing how and knowing that (see section  3.2.7). The very idea
that “knowing that” is a fundamental part of thinking is a western, adult notion.
6.3.4 Introspection: is it above or below the culture line?
There is another problem, or seeming contradiction: When we introspect, often we come
up with cultural products, like “I use mathematics” (to paraphrase Simon and others).
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But aiming at building anthropic AI, we should look for the mechanisms that are below
the “culture line” - for the basic human abilities and skills, that underpin culture.  See
section  3.2.5.1, where I cast doubt on the very concept of “layers” or “levels” in the
mind.
Introspection,  as  Nisbett  &  Wilson  (1977) argue,  shows  us  the  products  of  some
unconscious, innate processes, so in a sense we can see what we are thinking, but not
how. Here again I must protest that in terms of technology this is not a problem: in
seeing  “what”  we  think,  with  the  ever-better  resolution  of  practised  introspection,
aiming always to see more (see section 6.3.6), we will have enough of a picture of what
is going on to interpolate (see section 6.3.5).
So are we introspecting at the cultural or subcultural level? Insofar as possible, we aim
to introspect at that “boundary”, but again insisting too much on exactness here is a
fool's errand: it  is not the distinctions we are ultimately after,  it  is the technologies.
More discussion of this point is in section 5.2.5.
6.3.5 Interpolation and approximation
6.3.5.1 The holes in introspection
The consensus in cognitive science seems to be that introspection may tell us  what is
being thought  about,  but  not  how this  thinking is  accomplished  (Nisbett  & Wilson,
1977).
This is seen as a problem for Introspection, but that problem is in using introspection for
the science of psychology, rather than for technology. If we know only the outline of
what  is accomplished without the  how, we can substitute whatever technical trick we
have (in our skills as programmers) to achieve the same in a computer. For example, we
do not fully understand how long-term memory works in humans, and the introspection
that “I just recalled my first day in school, the weather was dreadful!” - does not help us
explain how the memories are stored in the brain. But in technology we can be far more
relaxed – if we need some long-term store of information, we can use an SQL database.
Here  we  see  the  “cash  value”  of  the  insistence  that  technology  and  science  have
different criteria for truth, see sections  1.3.2,  1.4. We need not obsess about the true
mechanism of memory with the cognitive psychologists – we can just go ahead and
write code. The gaps between the different moments in introspection (“trying to recall…
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recalled!”) are a problem for science and not for technology, for psychology and not for
AI.
My proposal of using introspection in AI design is not a proposal for a new “do-all”
technique like expert systems or “deep learning” with which often are deployed as an
entire solution. My proposal is to use introspection to design systems that use, and rest
on top of any and all previous technologies. This is very much like Minsky's “scruffy”
AI (Minsky, 1991). So we should use introspection for the overall design, and perhaps
for some of the components – but as technologists we should not shy away from using
existing techniques as part of the design.
Note (following section 5.2) that also when humans teach each other skills (like making
a cappuccino with an espresso machine) the teacher does not teach how to move one's
hand, or how to lift the milk-canister. The assumption is always that more basic skills
that can be used  pre-exist. In AI some of the more basic skills may be implemented
using an introspection-based algorithm, some can be implemented using some other AI,
and some can just be hard-coded.
6.3.5.2 Opportunistic approximation
When we need to implement some mechanism gleaned from introspection, we often do
not have enough information on what the mechanism does precisely. For example, we
may forget something or overlook the best option in some fraction of the times we try to
achieve  a  task.  We  can  use  crude  approximation,  like  “50%”,  and  later  tune  that
parameter if the result is not a good match of the observed introspection or behaviour.
Moreover,  we  can  sometimes  match  a  phenomenal  process  that  needs  to  happen
“occasionally” with some computational process that would be expensive (say in CPU
time). An example of that is given in section 7.5.3.5. These are just conveniences, and
as long as the AI works and produces credible behaviour, they are OK. Again, we are
not doing science.
6.3.5.3 Analogue cannot arise out of digital
An objection may arise that the subtlety and fluidity of our subjective mind cannot be
captured by the 0s and 1s of a computer (similar to Dreyfus's objections as summed up
in  section  2.3.2).  Though it  may  be  true  that  humans  are  essentially  analogue  and
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computers  are  essentially  digital19 and  therefore  cannot  be  the  same,  we  still  can
approximate analogue phenomena to an arbitrary precision, especially with the current
availability of virtually unlimited computation power “in the cloud”.  Just as we can
implement  floating-point  numbers  as  substitutes  to  real  numbers,  and  we  can  add
precision  by  adding  bits,  and  just  like  we  can  simulate  the  earth's  atmosphere  for
weather forecasts by simulating the physical conditions in “air cells”, so we can make
an approximation of the fluidities of human subjective experience.
6.3.5.4 Being analogue does not mean it is not digital
On  the  contrary,  one  could  speculate  that  maybe  humans'  non-ideal, informal
behaviour is nonetheless produced by an underlying ideal mechanism, perhaps in a
similar way that deterministic behaviour by a computer can be used to simulate and
predict seemingly chaotic systems, such as the weather. My response is as follows:
1. It is highly unlikely that there is such perfect order as Case Based Reasoning
(see section 7.2) or Intel processors underneath our rather non-formal experience
of ourselves dealing with the world. There seems to be nothing in the brain that
operates  digitally,  or  at  a  sufficient  frequency  to  “simulate”  our  informal
experiences (see section 2.3.2).
2. If there were even a likelihood of such an underlying order, then the onus to
show  that  such  an  order  exists  would  surely  be  of  those  who  propose  its
existence and not  on those who deny it  (by Occam's razor,  or in  analogy to
Russell’s teapot (B. Russell, 1952)).
3. Regardless of whether such an order ultimately exists underneath the seeming
informality, such a mechanism for producing chaos out of order it is not visible
to us in any form that can be used to base technology on it.
6.3.6 Multiple iterations, multiple mechanisms
In  using  introspection  as  a  basis  for  AI,  we  may  introspect  even  briefly,  not  too
thoroughly, stop and implement the model we came up with, and then come back and
refine our introspection and our model again,  and then refine the code.  There is no
necessity to produce a complete tome of phenomenology (or several) before we start
19 Brian Cantwell Smith would protest that computers are in the world, subject to the same physics, and
are only “ideally” digital. Though interesting, this point does not affect the argument here.
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coding. This is a point of difference from Dreyfus (2007).
As  we  will  see  in  section  7.1,  (one  could  argue  that)  fuzzy  logic  was  based  on
introspection, saying that the boundaries of concepts are not clear-cut but fuzzy. Zadeh
did  not  deepen this  introspection,  nor  did  he  broaden it.  Deepening it  would  mean
further  exploring  the  ways  that  concepts  behave  in  our  subjective  experience,  and
broadening  it  would  have  to  do  with  adjacent  mechanisms,  say  memory,  or  action
choice.
Zadeh used introspection for this one element, and fell back on to logic, mathematics
and the pre-established tradition of expert systems. I would argue that if we want to
create anthropic AI, we need to introspect multiple mechanisms, and  not include any
artefacts  of  a  specific  culture,  like  mathematics  or  logic.  We  most  probably  need
multiple  novel  elements,  conjoined  in  a  way  that  respects  our  introspective
observations,  not  some  “neat”  architecture  (Minsky,  1991).  These  elements  can  be
added gradually, interspersed with experimentation for feedback on how each step of
the development  of the AI design works,  and allowing further  introspection at  each
stage, looking at how our own thought-processes differ from the model.
6.3.7 Personnel 
In a sense, this thesis flies in the face of the traditional division of skills and mindsets
between  the  hard  sciences  (STEM) and  the  humanities,  and  also  is  distinctly  non-
cooperative with psychology in its quest to become an exact science. But this is not just
a theoretical point: in terms of personnel, if one wants to develop anthropic AI using
introspection, perhaps STEM education and programming skills are not the principal
skills that are needed. If indeed introspection is key, there is a need for people who are
good at that. I would wager that people with a sense of poetry, drama, literature etc. may
be useful members of a team developing AI. Such a project needs people who are more
at home with the soliloquy than with the compiler. In a sense this is a direct reply to
Snow  (1964).  We  have  done  mathematics  and  cognitive-theory  based  AI  for  long
enough. It is time to try something radically different, rather than “returning to cognitive
science” as Langley (2006) had it.
That  may  have  been  a  little  overstated.  In  any  team where  software  is  developed,
programmers  are  key.  But  the  “architects”  of  the  software  must  be  informed  by
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introspection rather than by the latest software development fad. It would of course be a
good idea to have the entire team be composed of people who are good introspectors,
knowledgeable  about  all  exiting  AI  techniques,  and  also  good  programmers.  It  is
unlikely  that  any team will  manage to  recruit  more  than  one  or  two of  these  fully
interdisciplinary  workers,  if  that.  Instead,  it  is  enough that  the  introspectors  have  a
vague  idea  of  programming,  so  that  they  produce  models  that  can  be  at  least
approximated into some software design (see section  6.3.5). The software architects,
doing the design, should at least have a healthy respect for the introspection process, but
need to have a fully professional grasp of programming, so that the programmers would
fully understand what is required software-wise. Again (as we saw in section 3.3.1.4),
“doing” subjectivity  or introspection is  not  one thing,  a box to be ticked, but is  an
ongoing and iterative process. This should not be taken lightly.
Interdisciplinary thinking is not just desirable to “compete with the Russians” as Snow
(1964) demanded.  Interdisciplinary  work  is  a  positive  requirement  for  developing
anthropic AI. These different disciplines may be found in the same person, or in a team
that works well together.
6.4 Project expectations
Consider the (currently impractical) idea of building AI by simulating every cell and
interconnection  in  an  entire  human  brain  (As  in  the  blue-brain  project  (Markram,
2006)). Since the AI would be constructed according to some scientific model of the
brain, that would initially be quite inaccurate, we should not expect the mind emerging
out  of  such  a  simulated  “brain”  to  necessarily  be  sane,  of  sound  intelligence,  or
interested in communicating with us humans. This arises from many possible causes:
many parameters will be inaccurate, the simulated brain would hardly undergo a normal
social development, etc. (Idan Segev, personal communication, 2011). In such a set-up,
we would be delighted if we get a mind capable of any learning in even very few of the
cases. 
Similarly, in an AI system that is sufficiently “low level” even if not as low as the cell
level, we should expect a relatively low success rate in engaging with the environment
in a way that would be meaningful to us. In aiming for anthropic, i.e. sub-cultural AI,
we are in the danger zone, courting those difficulties. Perhaps we will need two distinct
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phases of development – the one where the anthropic model is being developed “for its
own sake”,  brought to a functional  level “in the lab”,  and a later “implementation”
phase  where  only  the  better  specimens  of  the  original  model  are  actually  used  in
implementing practical technology. Only in this implementation phase would a normal
technical evaluation make sense.
6.5 Testing and evaluation 
In section  1.2.1 I mentioned that this thesis is in a sense the middle volume in a 3-
volume project,  with the third volume being a  proper  technological  exploration and
evaluation of algorithms. This section gives a sketch of the evaluation methodologies
that should be used, while chapter 7 gives a taste of the possible technologies.
Recall that the purpose of using introspection is both to generate a more anthropic AI
design, and to broaden the bases for AI development. As a technology, Anthropic AI
must ultimately pass muster as being fit  for purpose, workable, and marketable (see
section 1.3.2). However, in the development stage, if one is interested in how anthropic
their technology is, the following points may be of use:
The purpose of anthropic,  non acculturated AI is to create human-like systems that can
learn as flexibly as humans are flexible, without being pre-committed to a specific way
of doing things. So we are interested in how human-like an AI system is, compared to
other systems.
A conservative evaluation of any design should be empirical. As alluded to in section
6.2, any evaluation can follow an objective or a subjective (quantitative), path. Further
(and less conservatively) some qualitative feedback may be of use:
• In the objective path, both humans and introspective-based systems are put in
similar circumstances, and measurements are taken of various parameters. The
more similar the system is to the human the better it models a human, This is
similar to cognitive simulation (Sun, 2008) in method though not in intent – the
intent  of  cognitive  simulation  is  to  produce  better  scientific  models  for
psychology, while in our case the intent is to produce technology.
• The  subjective  path  for  evaluating  an  introspective  system  would  involve
producing (say) a video of the performance of various algorithms (and perhaps
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also of humans tackling a task) and asking a sample of disinterested observers to
give their impression of “how human or machine-like” each video seems. The
data collected would be processed using standard interview-data methodologies
as in the social sciences.
• Qualitative feedback could also be of interest, collecting the comments of the
observers as feedback for the developers.
The  choice  of  evaluation  methodology  would  be  influenced  by  the  aims  and
circumstances of the project. 
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7 Examples of introspection being used for AI design
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This  chapter  presents  five examples  of AI:  the first  two, fuzzy logic and CBR, are
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existing technologies which will be used for illustrating some preliminary points, while
the next final three examples are based on the proposed methodology for developing
anthropic (human-like) AI. The methodology presented in the advanced examples is in a
sense a compromise between Classic AI and Phenomenology. Like phenomenology it
follows the subjective, introspective angle. Like classic AI, observations are (perhaps
grossly) simplified in order to make them programmable, but not so much as to make
the resultant mechanisms phenomenologically non-credible.
The first example, Fuzzy Logic, will demonstrate a minimal case of using introspection
for AI. The second, Case Based Reasoning, will show a more developed example of
how this design could have evolved using introspection (thought historically it is not
clear whether introspection was involved). The third example will be “AIF0”, my first
experiment in developing introspection-based AI, followed by AIF1 (a failed effort) and
AIF2 – a successful and interesting design.
The concern being addressed is technological, not scientific, so the very question “is it
correct?” is less to the point than “does it work?” (see section 1.4.4). This calls for a few
clarifications:
1. The  introspection  data  presented  in  the  examples  is  derived  just  from  my
introspection. I present it “as is” without any attempt to argue for it, amongst
other reasons because it is not clear what sort of argument can be presented for
phenomenological / introspective data. Regardless of the accuracy or veracity of
the introspective reports below, what I am arguing for is the  methodology that
uses introspection as a basis for AI designs. Anyone can use this methodology to
design AI based on their own introspections, let a thousand flowers bloom (see
point 7 in section 4.7).
2. Building on that point, since the examples presented are only  examples, from
one person's introspection, no claim is being made that the resulting designs are
good  in and of themselves, and therefore I will not present comparative data
trying to prove that any of these example designs are better that any existing
design by some objective criteria. Any competitive evaluation would fall outside
the scope of this volume (see section 1.2.1). The claim is only that it is plausible
that  they  would  be  more  human-like,  by  using  an  anthropic  (section  3.2),
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introspection-based  design  process  (chapter  6).  The  focus  of this  thesis  is
showing a new methodology, a different way of developing anthropic AI (but see
section  3.2.6)  based  on  the  deliberate  use  of  introspection  (this  is  also  a
compromise between classic  AI and phenomenology).  I  am not  arguing here
that the example designs are fit for any specific purpose, only that they are likely
to  be  more  anthropic  (See  sections  3.3.1.1 and  5.2),  and  demonstrate  the
fecundity of the approach (see section 8.2).
3. The  focus  in  AI  design  is  technological,  and  the  criteria  of  success  for
technology are lower than for scientific truth (see section 1.3.2). However, once
a  design  exists,  regardless  of  its  source  (see  “context-of-discovery”,  section
4.2.4), a model based on such a design could be proposed as a scientific model
(theory)  in  psychology¸  similar  to  how  some  simple  neural-networks  are
proposed as theories in cognitive psychology (e.g. (Altmann & Dienes, 1999)).
People who want to resurrect subjective psychology from J. B. Watson’s (1913)
blows  may  hold  hope  for  such  theories.  This  should  be  contrasted  with
Wheeler’s (2005) approach, which sees AI as “the intellectual heart of cognitive
science” - he is interested in the science first. Here it is technology first. That
changes the level of truth we need to ascribe to our models, and allows much
more freedom.  We are  not  doing science  here,  in  any case not  directly  (see
section 8.3.1).
The first two examples, fuzzy logic and case based reasoning (CBR), are given as a
“warm up”, to illustrate some points. The historical evidence as to the degree to which
introspection  was  used  to  develop  these  designs  is  very  partial  and  at  times
contradictory. Rather than worry about these historical points, I will present them as if
there  were  a  deliberate  use of  introspection  in  both  cases,  in  order  to  use  them as
examples.
Environment
In all  the following examples other than the first (fuzzy logic) the environment is a
game-like  situation,  where  the  AI  can  take  actions  in  the  environment  (from  a
predefined set) and gets feedback in the form of a score.
Actions come from the range of available actions that can be performed by the machine.
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The outcomes of the machine's operation are given as  score inputs. The scores allow
measurement of progress towards one or more goals, and/or adherence to one or more
principles. Scores may be provided from the environment, or from a subjective source
such as a human observer.
7.1 Fuzzy logic 
Note that the first two examples are existing AI designs, that are here for illustration
purposes only. The points being illustrated are three: 1. how introspection could be used,
in a minimal way, and 2. How we can step away from the boolean, overly rational AI,
and  3.  mentioning  some  mechanisms  that  are  “nearest  neighbours”  of  the  original
designs to be presented later.
Note that the historical facts about whether Fuzzy logic (here) and CBR (in section 7.2)
were indeed derived from introspection are unclear – in both cases there is evidence
both ways. The conclusive historical facts are beside the point here - I present these
examples as if they were derived from introspection, as illustrations.
-
Fuzzy Logic is the first example because it shows, in one isolated and clear case, how
introspective AI could work, and how it did, in a minimal way. The fuzzy notion arose
from  Lotfi  Zadeh's  (1965) self-observation  that  in  human  concepts,  the  boundary
between membership and non-membership of a class (or set, or concept) is not a square-
wave or all-or-nothing affair.
The “fuzzy” notion is the idea that things need not be 100% members or non-members
of a set, or category, or concept. The example in  Illustration 7.1 shows that a specific
temperature, say 10˚C (shown here as the
vertical  line)  can  be  seen  as  being  90%
cold, and 10% warm. So the temperature
“10˚C”  is  only  a  part-member  in  the
concept or set “cold”, and likewise for the
concept  or  set  “warm”.  One  of  the
applications  of  fuzzy  concepts  is  in
formulating rules for expert systems, allowing words like “a little” “somewhat” “very”
Illustration 7.1: Fuzzy Logic (Source: Wikimedia)
1
0
cold warm hot
temperature
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etc. to be given numerical meanings, and expert-system rules to say things like “when
the boiler is somewhat warm, do X”.  This is language closer to the (human) expert's
language.  The  eventual  decision  processes  (de-fuzzyfying)  vary  between
implementations  (McNeill & Freiberger, 1994).  To clarify the terminology, fuzzy  sets
allow parsing of notions such as “somewhat warm”, while fuzzy logic is a design for
combing such notions, similar to standard logic's AND, OR, etc. 
To see how Fuzzy Logic can be seen as a minimal case of “introspection-based AI”,
let’s  trace  the  process  of  turning  an  introspection  into  an  AI  design  using  the
terminology of Section 6.2, explicitly referred to here in bold type. Zadeh (supposedly)
aimed to represent the way he actually thinks (phenomenologically) rather than the way
that a logical, mathematical or scientific mindset would urge him to think (this is the
intention to introspect). Out of his introspective vision Zadeh chose to concentrate on
(or  listen for) the boundaries  of  concepts,  or  “sets” as  he called them in his  paper
(1965).  Regardless  of  any  complexities  in  his  introspective  vision,  he  chose  to
articulate his model of his observation as allowing each object to be a member of any
concept or set to an extent. This extent is expressible as a percentage or as a real number
between 0 (non-member) and 1 (full member). 
Later (in the software design phase) Zadeh chose to approximate the boundaries of the
concepts using simple mathematical curves, such as the straight linear function seen
above in Illustration 7.1. The compromise involved with this approximation for the sake
of  programming  is clear – the diagonal lines in the diagram above are unabashedly
mathematical (this is a case of opportunistic  approximation, see section  6.3.5.2) and
therefore  not  precisely  human  or  introspective,  but  are  still  significantly  more
representative of the human situation than assuming an all-on-nothing (square wave)
membership of a category.
Again, we should not err (with Dreyfus) into an excessive belief in phenomenology or
the  phenomenological  literature:  the  idea  is  to  introspect  in  order  to  create  usable
designs in a finite (development) time. It is fine to approximate. On the other hand,
Zadeh is an excellent example of how one point of introspection is  taken, and then
embedded in a mathematical framework (set theory, logic…). Zadeh is not doing full-
blooded introspection – he is committing one little introspective sin, so to speak, and
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hurries back to the safe shores of mathematical orthodoxy. So yes, he used introspection
as basis for AI, but did so sparingly and shyly, see section 4.3.
Some may object to any discussion of fuzzy logic, in that it has been shown to be a
specific case of statistical AI, and therefore of no lasting contribution. That would be
missing the point here – here we are discussing the method of invention. The fuzzy
notion,  like  most  other  notions,  is  limited,  perhaps  already  obsolete.  It  is  here  to
demonstrate a minimal usage of introspection, and how it was done shyly.
7.2 Case based reasoning (CBR)
CBR has its roots in scripts, dynamic memory, and other cognitive theories  (Nilsson,
2010, pp. 400–402; R. C. Schank & Abelson, 1977; Roger C Schank, 1982; I. Watson,
1999) one could tell  a (perhaps reconstructed,  perhaps speculative) story about how
CBR was arrived at, in order to illustrate the point of introspection-for-AI. As we saw in
section  4.3.1 (in an interview with Turkle) Roger Schank explicitly admitted to using
introspection – however he expunged any mention of introspection from his published
AI papers. 
CBR is of interest because it exemplifies how some of AI was based on introspection
(very poorly, details of what is better introspection are in section  3.3, chapter  6), and
because  it  is  a  stepping  stone  towards  presenting  the  next,  more  interesting  (and
original) examples.
CBR (arguably  a  methodology rather  than  a  specific  algorithm  (I.  Watson,  1999)20)
attempts to solve every problem (or situation) the agent may encounter by looking into a
database  of  previously  encountered  problems  and  solutions,  and  selecting  the  best
solution available. In some cases, the solution is adapted for the current case, before it is
executed.  The slogan for  CBR is  the 4 “Re”s:  “retrieve,  reuse,  revise,  retain”.  This
design has had some success, and has many variants (I. Watson, 1999).
A reconstructed/speculative story on the origin of CBR could go like this: while playing
20 I. Watson argues that CBR is a methodology rather than an algorithm, since in its purest form it
advocated only the 4 “Re”s, retrieve, reuse, revise, retain. The details on how to do each of these
steps remained unspecified. However, if one wanted to be pedantic, any algorithm that includes even
something as simple as “add 1 to a” is underspecified, in that the exact behaviour of a in terms of
overflow  is  left  unspecified.  In  our  case  here  this  point  is  not  so  important.  I  use  the  term
“methodology” in this thesis for an approach for developing new AI designs, and the term “design”
for algorithms and families thereof. 
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the role of competent administrators (in the spirit of (Simon, 1976), see section 5.3.1),
the inventors asked themselves “what would I do?”, “How do I solve problems?”. They
came up with the answer of re-using solutions that have been accumulated in their own
memory  from previous  encounters.  The design  does  not  specify  where  the  original
database  comes  from,  or  how  new  solutions  are  generated  for  problems  never
encountered before – again like a well trained administrator, the assumption is that the
computer has  already seen all  the relevant cases,  and can make minor adaptations.
Hence, at its most primitive, CBR is little more than a directory of solutions.
Note this latest term, “solutions”, which suggests that the following assumptions are
being made:
1. That the world in which the agent is operating is made of distinct “problems”,
presented one by one;
2. These problems admit of solutions, that these solutions are clearly and obviously
distinct  from non-solutions,  which  would  be  labelled  wrong,  and  as useless
behaviour;
3. That the database already has such a solution in store for each problem to be
encountered, or a solution that can be readily adapted for any presented problem
(the “revise” stage).
So we see  that  CBR is  made  in  the  image  of  an  idealised,  rational,  administrator.
Solutions are distinct from non-solutions, there is no matter of degree of “goodness”;
where  all  the  assumptions  of  this  design  are  correct  in  the  world  in  which  the  AI
operates then the design would produce ideal behaviour – bounded rationality (Simon,
1955). There is  nothing wrong with all  that,  except it  does not meet  our agenda of
producing  anthropic  AI.  See  also  section  2.3.3 (point  3)  for  Dreyfus's  distinction
between “situation” and “problem”.
The possible objection that non-ideal, perhaps anthropic, systems may be underpinned
and implemented by ideal systems is handled in section 6.3.5.4.
The assumption that solutions are clearly and immediately separable from non-solutions
is unrealistic, and will further fade away as we progress to a more introspective designs,
such as the next example.
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7.3 AIF0
This  example  demonstrates  moving  away  from the  mathematical  towards  the  more
introspective. It is a first step into technical novelty. There are two more to come. As a
point of nomenclature, I will use “select” for picking a subset out of a bigger set (a bit
like  SQL uses  that  word)  and  will  use  “choose”  for  the  one final  decision  of  an
algorithm in a specific round. 
Let's  refine  CBR.  I  will  describe  the  process  of  introspection  (the  contents  of
introspections  are  underlined),  and  the  processes  of  software  design,  running  and
results, and will later discuss the implications of this example.
7.3.1 Introspection
One could observe that in everyday life, I often use suboptimal solutions for problems,
not  because  I  have  not  encountered  a  better  solution,  and  not  because  it  is  “good
enough” (Simon's satisficing) but just because it is not in my nature to always do the
perfectly  correct  thing  –  either  through  ignorance,  confusion  (mis-execution),  or
through playfulness or exploration (remember we are not aiming for emulating the well-
trained scientist or soldier). So in terms of introspection,  I do things that I know (or
hope, or believe) will work best, but I do not necessarily choose the best of the options I
know of. Sometimes I just guess, or do something new, even if I know a good response
to a situation. I also sometimes mis-execute my intentions.
Here is an articulation of the following innovations over CBR, a model:
1. Not one “solution” is selected, but several, and 
2. One of these is chosen with some random element.
3. The very notion of “solution” (as in a 1-0 solution-on-not sense) is gone, and is
replaced by the notion of “the best few we know”. Therefore the assumption that
we have a correct solution for every prospective problem, or even one “good
enough” solution is relaxed and replaced with “the best few we have”.
4. Unlike CBR where “the” solution (or “the best” solution) is chosen and used, in
AIF0 there are steps.  First  multiple similar cases are selected (perhaps up to
some threshold of similarity), and next these similar cases are sorted by expected
outcome, derived from the episodes’ score as found in the memory bank.  In a
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relatively rare case, a random action is performed.
5. A score, or feedback, is collected from the environment.
7.3.2 Implementation
In the process of software design we must approximate the introspective model using a
software  mechanism,  so  in  this  case  we  can  use  the  following  approximation  for
fallibility and playfulness of the human: use the best “case” solution only half of the
time, and the second best “case” in another ¼ of the cases, and so on for the next 1/8
and 1/16 of the cases. In the last 1/16 of the cases we can have the design choose an
output  at  random from the  repertoire  of  possible  responses  (this  is  an  example  of
“interpolating” a mechanism, see sections  6.3.5.1,  6.3.5.2). This mechanism facilitates
learning,  so  this  design  can  bootstrap  its  own  knowledge  bank,  without  any  prior
knowledge.
Pseudo Code:
• For every situation:
◦ recall all similar situations from the past, (similarity can be crudely defined
as equality for the time being)
◦ Of these similar solutions, select the top best (outcome) 4 cases that were
used, and sort them by score,
◦ i ← first case,
◦ while i is a valid case:
▪ Flip a coin (50% chance). 
▪ If heads, 
• choose the i'th case (goto “DONE”)
▪ else 
• i ← next case,
◦ When the “while loop” ends, choose a random action
◦ DONE:
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◦ Perform the chosen action in the “world” (which is probably a micro-world,
simulated), collect a score, store the case, and repeat from the start for next
input
All that is left of the original introspection (that was not in CBR) is 
1. that we select multiple cases, and 
2. choose from these non-deterministically, and 
3. allow for some ongoing degree of random choice.
This is a stepping-stone, and this is a technological project, so adding three features at a
time is a reasonable step.
Note also that the whole issue of “similarity” is being brushed neatly into a subroutine
(as it is in CBR). The following example will use identity as a crude form of similarity.
7.3.3 Example run, statistics
This algorithm was run in a world consisting of a game where each input, A, B, C, or D
should be matched with 1, 2, 3, or 4 as output, respectively. A successful match scored
1, an unsuccessful match scored 0.
Each “case” starts with the algorithm getting an input of either A, B, C, or D. The
algorithm produces an answer,  1, 2, 3 or 4.  Below is a trace from an example run. 
Explanation of the trace: Please follow as an example the highlighted line number 45.
Every iteration number is followed by the input ('A' – 'D'), then the 4 “best matches”
(selected options) are presented (represented by their iteration number) from which the
algorithm will later choose. These four “best matches” are represented by the “iteration
number”,  so  in  our  (highlighted)  example  the  input  “C”  is  similar  to  all  previous
instances of a “C” input, and these are sorted by score, and the best case is 18, followed
by 19, 36 and 39 (in all of which the program scored 1). Note that in the first few lines
of the trace, where there are no precedents to follow, an index of “-1” is shown. Next in
the output line is the index of the chosen option, 0-3 (for the four possibilities) or R, if a
random action was selected. Note that when there are few options available (near the
top) then the random option is common. Next the output is shown and the score.
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ITER  Inp.  Options to consider (4), selected      Score
   0, in B: ops(  -1,   -1,   -1,   -1)-> R out 4, S= 0
   1, in C: ops(  -1,   -1,   -1,   -1)-> R out 1, S= 0
   2, in B: ops(   0,   -1,   -1,   -1)-> R out 3, S= 0
   3, in A: ops(  -1,   -1,   -1,   -1)-> R out 2, S= 0
   4, in D: ops(  -1,   -1,   -1,   -1)-> R out 3, S= 0
   5, in A: ops(   3,   -1,   -1,   -1)-> R out 2, S= 0
   6, in C: ops(   1,   -1,   -1,   -1)-> R out 4, S= 0
   7, in B: ops(   0,    2,   -1,   -1)-> 1 out 3, S= 0
   8, in C: ops(   1,    6,   -1,   -1)-> 1 out 4, S= 0
   9, in D: ops(   4,   -1,   -1,   -1)-> R out 2, S= 0
  10, in A: ops(   3,    5,   -1,   -1)-> 0 out 2, S= 0
  11, in D: ops(   4,    9,   -1,   -1)-> R out 1, S= 0
  12, in A: ops(   3,    5,   10,   -1)-> R out 2, S= 0
  13, in B: ops(   0,    2,    7,   -1)-> 0 out 4, S= 0
  14, in B: ops(   0,    2,    7,   13)-> 0 out 4, S= 0
  15, in A: ops(   3,    5,   10,   12)-> 0 out 2, S= 0
  16, in B: ops(   0,    2,    7,   13)-> 1 out 3, S= 0
  17, in B: ops(   0,    2,    7,   13)-> 2 out 3, S= 0
  18, in C: ops(   1,    6,    8,   -1)-> R out 3, S= 1
  19, in C: ops(  18,    1,    6,    8)-> 0 out 3, S= 1
  20, in D: ops(   4,    9,   11,   -1)-> 2 out 1, S= 0
  ...
  35, in B: ops(   0,    2,    7,   13)-> 0 out 4, S= 0
  36, in C: ops(  18,   19,    1,    6)-> 0 out 3, S= 1
  37, in B: ops(   0,    2,    7,   13)-> 1 out 3, S= 0
  38, in A: ops(   3,    5,   10,   12)-> 1 out 2, S= 0
  39, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,    1)-> 0 out 3, S= 1
  40, in D: ops(   4,    9,   11,   20)-> 1 out 2, S= 0
  41, in A: ops(   3,    5,   10,   12)-> 0 out 2, S= 0
  42, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 1 out 3, S= 1
  43, in B: ops(   0,    2,    7,   13)-> 0 out 4, S= 0
  44, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 0 out 3, S= 1
  45, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 3 out 3, S= 1
  46, in A: ops(   3,    5,   10,   12)-> 0 out 2, S= 0
  47, in D: ops(   4,    9,   11,   20)-> 0 out 3, S= 0
  48, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 0 out 3, S= 1
  49, in D: ops(   4,    9,   11,   20)-> 2 out 1, S= 0
  50, in A: ops(   3,    5,   10,   12)-> 0 out 2, S= 0
  51, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 1 out 3, S= 1
  52, in A: ops(   3,    5,   10,   12)-> 0 out 2, S= 0
  53, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 0 out 3, S= 1
  54, in A: ops(   3,    5,   10,   12)-> 0 out 2, S= 0
  55, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> R out 4, S= 0
  56, in B: ops(   0,    2,    7,   13)-> 3 out 4, S= 0
  57, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 0 out 3, S= 1
  58, in A: ops(   3,    5,   10,   12)-> 0 out 2, S= 0
  59, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 1 out 3, S= 1
  60, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 0 out 3, S= 1
  61, in A: ops(   3,    5,   10,   12)-> 2 out 2, S= 0
  62, in A: ops(   3,    5,   10,   12)-> 0 out 2, S= 0
  63, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 2 out 3, S= 1
  64, in B: ops(   0,    2,    7,   13)-> R out 2, S= 1
  65, in A: ops(   3,    5,   10,   12)-> 2 out 2, S= 0
  66, in A: ops(   3,    5,   10,   12)-> 2 out 2, S= 0
  67, in A: ops(   3,    5,   10,   12)-> 2 out 2, S= 0
  68, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 1 out 3, S= 1
  69, in D: ops(   4,    9,   11,   20)-> 0 out 3, S= 0
  70, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 0 out 3, S= 1
  71, in D: ops(   4,    9,   11,   20)-> 0 out 3, S= 0
  72, in D: ops(   4,    9,   11,   20)-> 1 out 2, S= 0
  73, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 0 out 3, S= 1
  74, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 1 out 3, S= 1
  75, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 2 out 3, S= 1
  76, in B: ops(  64,    0,    2,    7)-> 0 out 2, S= 1
  77, in C: ops(  18,   19,   36,   39)-> 0 out 3, S= 1
  78, in B: ops(  64,   76,    0,    2)-> 1 out 2, S= 1
  79, in A: ops(   3,    5,   10,   12)-> 0 out 2, S= 0
Note that by the end of this trace (80 rounds) the machine has learnt about the mappings
for B and C, but not for A or D. This will likely happen later in the run and the entire
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mapping will be learnt. Illustration 7.2 shows an average of the scores of 10,000 runs of
a 2,000-round game.
Note that the theoretical maximum that this graph should approach can be calculated as
follows:
Once the program has run for long enough to have 4 samples of a correct response for
each possible input, it will usually choose the correct answer based on this accumulated
experience. The chances of it choosing a random choice are 0.5^4 = 0.0625 = 6.25%. If
the software chooses a random action, it still has a 25% chance of choosing the correct
answer  randomly,  so  the  ultimate  error  rate  should  be  4.68%,  and  the  success  rate
should be 95.32%, as we indeed see in the graph above.
Consider the following modifications:
Illustration 7.2: Statistics on the Learning of AIF0 on the ABCD -> 1234 problem
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• If the rules of the game (the correct mappings between ABCD and 1234) change
midway through the game, this would lead to much confusion. A slight variation,
making the “case number” part of the input that is compared by the similarity
function, would allow the algorithm to recover from a change in the rules as it
would  prefer  more  recent  “cases”  since  they  would  be  more  similar  to  the
current case.
• Adding  a  random  small  “noise”  to  the  score  does  not  change  the  results
noticeably, though it makes the “similarity” more like a real world scenario. 
Recall, the purpose of this algorithm is only as a simple example to illustrate the wider
point about the methodology. In subsequent section this will be built upon.
7.3.4 Discussion
Some of the observations in the introspection above could be reached using other, more
objective, means. As long as an introspection gives us  some new insight for a design
that  insight  is  worthy  of  consideration.  In  following  introspection  rather  than
mathematical correctness we move away from rational AI towards anthropic AI, away
from classic AI towards subjectivly-informed AI,  away from classic AI and towards
Dreyfus. 
In this specific algorithm we introduce mistakes (not choosing the best option, the 1/16
chance that the result will be random), but we gain the algorithm's ability to bootstrap
its own knowledge, i.e. to learn, starting from an empty database. Moreover, we gain the
ability to recover from a mid-way rule-change. Also, through introspection we uncover
three distinct sources of sub-optimality, and these are reflected in the software design:
• Ignorance – we simply do not know a better response to a situation. This is
reflected in the AI design in that the software can also be ignorant of the “better
solution”.
• Confusion (mis-execution) - “the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak”21 - like
tripping – there was a full  intention to do the right thing,  and the execution
failed. This is mainly reflected in the possibility that only the 2nd-to-4th options
21  Matthew 26:41
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will be chosen. It is also reflected by the “random answer”, the fifth option in
each decision.
• Playfulness - Humans  (not  well-trained  soldiers)  often  do  not  go  for  100%
accurate performance, since they find it boring. Humans like experimenting –
we could call it playfulness. Contrast a 2 year old with undergraduate students,
and with elderly people: the older a person gets, the more they tend to refrain
from experimentation and play-behaviour, and the more you can expect them to
“behave reasonably”.  This tendency to reduce exploratory moves (playfulness)
with time can be reflected in the algorithm by gradually, during the run-time of
the above design, moving the  chance of using each selected case up from 50%
to say 70%. The result would be that gradually during the game the chance of a
random choice moved from 0.5^4 (6.25%) to 0.3^4 (=0.81%). This will allow
for sufficient experimentation in the early stages, but will allow a better result
later on – at the cost of the learning ability later on. This modification of this
“decisiveness” parameter during the run is one of the variations possible with
this  design  (see  section  8.2).  Playfulness  is  reflected  mainly  in  the  random
action, and also somewhat in the possibility of choosing the 2nd-to-4th options.
7.3.4.1 Details and parameters
Not every aspect of the code reflects introspection directly, e.g. the notion of “flipping a
coin” in this particular way is just an attempt to approximate the apparent randomness in
the  introspected  process.  Note  also  that  the  parameters  “50%”  (coin  flip)  for
decisiveness  or  “4”  (number  of  attempts)  are  arbitrary,  and  may  be  tuned  to  get
different behaviours. Note also that these details are crude and mathematical, and have
no basis in introspection whatsoever. This is part of the compromise between classic AI
and phenomenology, and is in line with the precedent of fuzzy logic, where the fuzzy
edges of  the concepts are  assumed to be linear,  or  described by some other  simple
function (see section 6.3.5.1).
A question might arise here as to what degree can these arbitrary parameters be tuned
away from the initial values (50% and 4 here) before the AI method can no longer be
considered “based on introspection”. Being interested in technology I view this question
as scholastic (in the derogatory medieval sense) – as long as an activity (introspection)
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generates  worthwhile  ideas  for  designs  it  is  worth  pursuing,  but  the  purpose  is  not
“good” or  “pristine”  introspection  as  in  (Hurlburt,  2011),  but  rather  forwarding our
human-like AI technology. So we may use introspective ideas to make designs, and later
we  may,  if  it  behoves  our  purpose,  abuse  the  introspection  by  using  some
introspectively-implausible parameters. Let a thousand flowers bloom (see point  7 in
section 4.7).
7.3.4.2 Why this is more anthropic
AIF0 is more “human-like” or “anthropic”, since humans do not have a pre-existing
database of cases telling them that solution Y for situation X is correct, optimal, or “a
solution” in some pre-determined sense. Humans struggle along in situations as they can
(no “best”!) with the information they have. 
The best response available to a human may be (objectively) quite bad, and moreover,
once a “bad habit” of using a bad response has established itself in a human mind, it
may be seen (subjectively) as “the best I have”, even if an external observer can rightly
judge the habit to be bad. A brief exposure to a better response to a situation may not
cause an immediate overall switch-over to the better response, like any rational system
would. By sheer “bad luck” or “pig headedness” the better response may be neglected
(examples of this are in section 7.5.4).
Mistakes are made. This is a hallmark of non-rational, non-ideal AI.
7.3.4.3 Similarity
An important issue in many AI algorithms is  the notion of  similarity,  often hidden
inside a similarity function. The issue of how to judge the similarity of two inputs is
easy only insofar as the input is  very primitive, ideally discrete digital data. When the
inputs are images with millions of multi-band pixels, or worse, videos, or “situations”
(in the phenomenological sense) - then the issue of what is similar explodes into an
impossible imbroglio. Considering our commitment to producing actual AI designs, we
cannot just throw our hands up in despair à la Dreyfus (1979), but we have to, in each
implementation, come up with some similarity function, just as CBR does. This gets
more complex with the complexity of the examples, and always involves a wrenching
sense of not doing justice to the real notion of similarity – but the software  must be
written. The similarity function, in principle, can involve another, entirely different AI
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algorithm from the main one, such as one of the many derivatives of the neural net
concept,   “nearest  neighbour”  by  Pythagorean  distances  in  some  vector  space,  a
genetically-evolved  similarity  function,  etc. We  can  also  experiment  with  different
approaches, as any technologists is allowed to do (see section 1.4.5).
One  must  recall  that  AIF0  is  a  simple  example  of  the  concept  of  AI  based  on
introspection,  and  the  resultant  design  is  no  more  than  a  preliminary  caricature  of
anthropic thought, a beginning of our project. We aim for phenomenologically more
correct stuff, see the rest of this chapter.
7.4 AIF1
The purpose of this example is to show how introspection can be deepened, and more
introspected mechanisms can be brought into software.
Introspection: I observe that all thoughts (including those about possible actions) have a
time dimension, they do not appear as closed “cases” but as “sequences” over time.
Once I commit in my mind that currently unfolding events are similar to some sequence
of  events  in  the  past,  I  treat  the  whole sequence  form the  past  as  the  “case” I  am
following, perhaps in a similar manner to AIF0.
Attempted approximation: I tried using an instance of the precious algorithm (AIF0) to
determine the beginnings and ends of sequences, and use another instance (of AIF0) to
select sequences and produce behaviour. 
Having coded a version of this algorithm, it failed to produce behaviour better  than
noise  (no  useful  learning).  The  algorithm  that  was  supposed  to  find  meaningful
beginnings  and  ends  to  algorithms  did  not  train  meaningfully,  probably  (analysing
retrospectively) because the idea that there are clearly defined beginnings and ends was
wrong. Perhaps the success of AIF0 led me down the dangerous path of wanting my
new “pet technique” to be the building block of future AI. This temptation to want all of
intelligence to come out of a single idea is tempting, and several AI approaches have
this “imperialist” view of the scope of use for their favoured idea: logical AI and neural
nets  spring  to  mind,  as  does  the  critique  of  this  over-optimism  verging  on  hubris
(Dreyfus, 2012).
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On the positive side, this is an example of iterative introspection. Having achieved a
first  success  with  AIF0,  I  went  back  and  refined  the  introspection,  adding  a  time
dimension.
7.5 AIF2
The purposes of this example are:
• To further deepen the introspection.
• To  demonstrate  how  complex  introspections  can  be  approximated  by  code,
sometimes in an opportunistic way.
• To show how a failure (AIF1) need not imply a retreat, and that the solution
could be in even more ambitious introspection (reminiscent of Dreyfus's demand
for an even “more Heideggerian” AI (Dreyfus, 2007)).
Furthermore, this example demonstrates:
• Smooth acquisition of skills by interleaving multiple “cases”, recalling Dreyfus
& Dreyfus (1986).
• A possible  concrete  manifestation  of  Gadamerian  AI  as  recommended  by
Winograd & Flores (1986), see sections 2.4, 2.5.
7.5.1 Introspection
The introspective vision became clear gradually – first I was displeased with the idea
of discreet “sequences” - it seemed too constrained, too on-or-off. Then (while driving),
I noticed how I was following multiple sequences, simultaneously – but could not quite
put it  into words. These sequences seemed to have to do with different aspects and
eventualities of the driving, and of whatever was on my mind. However, this vision
came initially with none of the below orderliness – all I could do to hold on to the vision
was to point to the Beatles' song “Across the universe”:
Words are flowing out
Like endless rain into a paper cup
They slither wildly as they slip away
Across the universe
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Needless to say this is technologically useless. A more comprehensible articulation of
this image emerged over the following few days, making the notions of “flowing” and
“slipping” more concrete: 
• The sequences (of AIF1) also known as “lines of thought” are not as on-or-off as
in AIF1, but fade in and out  without clear beginnings and ends. 
• There  are  multiple  such  lines  “being  followed”  simultaneously,  to  varying
degrees.
• Actions are usually selected out of one of these sequences, again, aiming for the
best future outcome, but often missing.
Over time and in different contexts the terms “episode”, “sequence”, “line/thread/train
of thought” and just “line” were used, are equivalent, and represent a sequence of events
in the past, being “followed” in the present, since it is similar to current events. Note
that the sequences that are present but less dominant play the role of the “recesses of the
mind”.
7.5.2 Introspective model:
In a  mind,  at  any point,  there are  multiple  different  things  “on one's  mind”.  These
“things” (hereinafter “lines of thought” or just “lines”, sequences, etc.) are not static,
but take the form of a sequence of events from memory, that are similar (or relevant, see
below) to  current  unfolding events.  Such “lines” are  followed in the sense that  the
“current” part of the sequence advances in time as reality advances in time, like (when
singing) we do not need to consciously “advance” in the lyrics and in the music when
singing, but we just go with the flow of the memories of having heard or sung the song
before. A 15-second phrase in the remembered song will be reproduced in a time not too
unlike 15 seconds.
An action is selected out of the options presented by these lines of thought, as follows:
if in line “a” I did A, and in line “b” I did B (and these are all the “lines” “on my mind”
simultaneously), it is probably correct to assume I will do either A or B.
There is a preference to selecting an action that would be beneficial, so each line is
given priority  based on the anticipated reward occurring in  the proximate time (the
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anticipated future, or the yet to be replayed part of these remembered lines in the past)22.
Of course this is still only a model, and many details are missing to recreate the original
introspection. This is left to future work, see section 8.2. It is doubtful if we can ever
fully  model  our  introspections.  But  we  also  can’t  fully  model  real  numbers  in  a
computer – approximations are good enough for technology (see section 1.3.2).
The next step should be to find a formalization in software and data, that will create an
approximation of simultaneous “lines” or “trains of thought”,  drifting in and out  of
some group of thoughts, perhaps called “consciousness”.  
7.5.3 Software design
The  details  of  the  design  will  be  presented  in  an  order  that  moves  from  some
preliminary remarks, to the functionality visible in the introspective model, and then to
the  technicalities  inherent  in  any  design.  These   later  technicalities  are  details  of
implementation that need to be addressed,  like an integer’s number of bits  must be
determined, and whether it is signed or unsigned; In this design, there are  many such
details. 
7.5.3.1 Sequences in software
Recall that my introspections calls for “lines of thought” which “fade in  in and out
without clear beginnings and ends”. This is not the common way of doing anything in
computing. Usually we need a beginning in order to: 1. find the data, 2. not start before
the data, over running something else, 3. have a starting point for some loop or process.
We need an end for similar reasons: 1. Not to over-run some other data, 2. provide an
end point where we can say our work is done. If we can achieve similar functions in
AIF2  using  different  means,  then  we  will  have  a  reasonable  design  “without  clear
beginnings and ends”.
Traditionally in programming, one would assume that a sequence would be represented
by a formal array, a consecutive group of memory locations, or by a linked list. That
means that a sequence has a clear beginning and end, and there is some pointer or index
pointing to the “current” position. Consider printing out a string 40 characters long:
Assuming “a” is a character array representing a string, and “i” is an integer:
22 This is reminiscent of Husserl's “protension” (Beyer, 2015).
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• for i=0 to 40
◦ putchar (a[i])
Or consider printing a string which is a null-terminated sequence of bytes in memory,
pointed to by “p”, “q” being another pointer:
• q = p;
• while (*q is not null)
◦ print *q 
◦ q++
Consider further a linked list of characters:
• z = head_of_list
• while z is not null
◦ print z.data 
◦ z = z.next
In both cases there are:
1. A data point marking the beginning: “a”, “p”, “head of list”
2. An index, traversing the data, “i”, “q”, “z”
3. an indicator of the end, “40”, the null character at the end of the last string, or
the null pointer at the end of the linked list.
In AIF2, as we will see below, the beginning and end are abstracted away. There are
separate  mechanisms for “starting” or “ending” sequences.  The only mechanism we
need most of the time is just a pointer into the “current” moment in a sequence. This is a
step away from the rationalistic view that we need strict control over beginnings and
ends, and towards the subjective experience that all we have at any point is the now,
with the various memories, thoughts and tunes going through our mind.
It so happens in AIF2 that the sequences are advanced by one time unit, represented by
a “1” in the indexing of any area of the memory bank, but at the same moment the
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memory bank is growing by one unit  every iteration, so there is no danger that the
sequence data type will “overflow” its end. We are now ready for the main design.
7.5.3.2 A novel data type 
Here I introduce two closely related novel data types: a “sequence”, and a “table” of
sequences. Sequences will usually be used in groups of a few at a time, such a group
being called a “table”. The sequences are based on (and refer back to) a history database
of all the history of the program's current run. The history database is not novel.
All  the  “personal  history”  of
the  AI  system  is  saved,
including inputs, outputs, and
scores (from the outside world
or  micro-world).  This  array
starting at 0 and ending “now”
is represented as the “history
database” in Illustration 7.3.
The  “sequence”  data  type  is
designed to represent a single
train-of-thought,  or  line-of-
thought,  or  a  scenario  that
occurred  in  the  past.  Every
“sequence”  is  minimally
comprised of two  scalar
values:  one  is  an  index or
pointer  into  the  history
database. This index points to
a moment in time in the past
that  is  analogous  to  the
present moment in time. The  relevance score,  which is a (discounted) accumulating
score of the similarity of the events in the sequence and the events as they are actually
occurring in the situation facing the system. Every instance of a sequence represents a
sequence of events (scenario in the past) that is considered to be similar to the present,
Illustration 7.3: AIF2 Data Types
History Database 
(Inputs, actions, scores)
1.5
2.5
0.9
2.8
3.3
1.3
4.2
0.7
Table 
of sequences
0
Now
Relevance Pointer (index)
Tim
e  P rog re ss io n
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and therefore describes a possible outcome in the future, as seen from the current time.
In Illustration 7.3, the similarity is illustrated using colours, representing the individual
events.  Note that the last  two colour blocks are  purple and green,  incidentally  very
similar to the two blocks just prior, and hence the sequence following only two steps
behind the present has a high relevance, “4.3”. The second most relevant sequence is in
the very beginning of the history database, but the blue is not quite the same as the
purple, hence the lower relevance of “3.3”, still high.
As these scenarios are inside a history database, populated by the past experiences of a
specific run of the AI implementation, this represents the AI system’s own “personal”
experience. Each sequence represents an option for action (the one taken at that point, or
shortly thereafter, in the past), and also represents a possible outcome arising from the
combination  of  the  current  situation  and the  action.  Assuming that  events  occur  in
regular intervals, say of one second, then for every second that elapses in the “outside
world” the index component of all sequences must be incremented, and the relevance
score should also be updated based on the similarity of current events to the next event
is the history database at the sequence's new “present”. Hence this is not a static data
structure, but requires ongoing maintenance, to keep it “in the now”.
Typically a “table” would have 20-40 sequences in it. This data type is novel in that it is
designed to imitate the way that multiple thoughts drift in and out of consciousness –
therefore the sequences have no clear (abrupt) beginning or end (see section 7.5.3.1). In
a sense the table as a whole represents the “consciousness”, and the relevance scores
represent  “how conscious” the system is  of a particular  train-of-thought  or  scenario
from the past.
Technically,  the sequences in the table each consists of a relevance score and an index
pointing  into a  specific  time in the  past,  that  are  part  of  a  sequence of  events  that
resembles current events. These pointers move forward in time in sync with the present
time.  The  relative  salience  of  each  sequence  to  current  events  is  measured  by  the
“relevance”  score  (maintained  next  to  the  pointer  in  the  table).  This  relevance  is
adjusted gradually, according to the similarity of current events to the events in the past
sequence, so these sequences fade in and out in terms of their applicability to the current
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situation.
Occasionally  the  least  relevant  sequences  are  discarded  from  the  table,  as  their
relevance score drops below a certain threshold.  Once the table  is  depopulated (say
below 10 sequences) it is replenished (this is a computationally expensive operation, see
section 7.5.3.5).
Looking at Illustration 7.3, we can see 8 sequences in a table (on the left), each with a
relevance score, and a pointer or index into a (greatly truncated) history database of all
events (represented as coloured blocks) from the beginning of the run until the present
moment. Assuming that the relevance score is overwhelmingly influenced by the last
two events, you can see that the scores reflect how similar (or not) the last two blocks in
a sequence are to the most recent two events in the chart, at the bottom of the coloured
history database.
7.5.3.3 Decision process
A word  is  due  about  relevance (mentioned  above)  and  desirability,  which  is  the
expected score over time in the future, based on a specific sequence of events in the past
(“line”).
These two key notions are similar, yet in a sense mirror-images of each other:
The “relevance” of a line is determined by how similar events in the past have been to
current  events.  In  a  sense  it  is  simply  the  (discounted)  extension  of  the  notion  of
“similarity” over time. Similarity is always already determined in the past – since we do
not know the future we can not  compare future events to the “future” of a line-of-
thought. So “relevance” is in the past and plays a corresponding role to similarity, and is
constituted from similarity. The difference is that relevance is stretched over time.
On the  other  hand,  “desirability” is  the  expected value  “promised” by each of  the
“lines”, in the future. It is calculated from the “score” events in the “future” of each line,
and is recalculated for the most relevant lines at each iteration. Desirability represents
what the (naïvely) expected reward is in the case in which we end up repeating the same
scenario.  The  AI  system can  “push”  the  present  situation  towards  a  repetition  of  a
specific scenario by choosing the same actions that it took in that past relevant scenario.
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In a sense, this is the whole point of the “intelligence” of this design: Try to repeat
successful scenarios from the past. This is not dissimilar to CBR.
The decision process is as follows. For each action/output required:
◦ The top (say 10) most relevant lines are selected from the table.
◦ These lines are sorted by desirability, and the top (say 4)  most desirable
lines are further selected.
◦ A specific sequence (or random action)  is  chosen in  a  repeated round of
coin-throwing,  similar  to  AIF0.  At  a  low probability  a  random action  is
chosen.
◦ The action taken in this past sequence is duplicated (or a random action).
The random element  (like in  AIF0) allows novel  actions  to  be tried out  within the
normal process of responding to the environment, in contrast to many learning systems
that have a distinct “learning” and “doing” phase.
Several possible future variants will be discussed in section 8.2.
7.5.3.4 More details of AIF2’s implementation
As we see from the above discussion of the design and from Illustration 7.3, there are
many details missing from the picture. For now, let's assume that we have a sequence
(or a table of them) already set up, and all we need to do is maintain these, and take
decisions.  Illustration  7.3 assumed  that  only  about  2  events  (the  current  and  one
previous) make the lion's share of the “relevance” of a sequence. 
Every instant in time (the  coloured blocks in Illustration 7.3) is an event. An event can
either be an input from sensors, or an action that the AI algorithm outputted, or a score
event.
At the base of this design is a similarity function, taking two events as arguments, that
returning  a  value  between  zero  and  one  that  represent  how similar  they  are,  1  for
identical and 0 for completely dissimilar. The similarity function's exact implementation
is not part of the specification of AIF2. This function can be hand-tailored or evolved
using some learning algorithm.
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Relevance is calculated as the previous relevance times some discounting factor, plus
the current similarity minus 0.5. Note that relevance is not bounded in any range. If
relevance  drops  below  some  threshold (another  parameter  of  the  design),  then  the
sequence is dropped from the table. If a table is no longer sufficiently populated (drops
below a certain amount of sequences) then it is repopulated, see below. This is the re-
population threshold.
7.5.3.5 Dynamics of the scenario table
To populate a table of sequences (either initially or when the number of sequences drops
below the re-population threshold), a scan is performed of the entire history database to
find any consecutive events that would have high relevance,  based on the currently
recent N events, this N being the “look_back” parameter. In principle, if computational
time were not an issue, such a scan should be done frequently, maybe with every input,
so that any sequence that is relevant enough goes into the table, however, considering
that sequences stay in the table for a while, it may be enough to scan for new pertinent
sequences only occasionally. This also reflects the introspective observation that not all
relevant scenarios from out past are always considered, we often forget things, in ways
we do not understand. Matching this forgetfulness to the computational high price of
repopulating the table is an opportunistic approximation – there is no good reason to
think that these would match up, but we need to approximate in order to code (see
section 6.3.5.2). 
Because of the computational cost of scanning all the memory for populating the table,
we  can  maintain  a  bigger  table  of  scenarios  than  would  be  warranted  by  the
introspection (say 20-40), and select only the top (say 10) “most relevant” scenarios
every time we need to make a choice about an action. To choose an action from one of
these 10 most relevant scenarios, we sort them by expected score (“desirability”), and
like  AIF0  select  the  best  in  50% of  the  cases,  and  so  on  for  4  scenarios,  with  a
possibility of a random action (see AIF0 in section 7.3).
Note that the active “scenarios” drift in and out of this “top 10” category, as they are
selected from a bigger table. Also “scenarios” do not have predetermined beginnings or
ends – when a situation (in the present) is similar enough to a situation from the past in
the table it drifts into the high-relevance end of the table, and when a scenario drifts so
- 186 -
low in relevance it is silently dropped, but only a few iterations after it is no longer
considered a “top 10” scenario. This gives this design some “softness” – mental events
are rarely abrupt23. A sudden change in the environment would cause most if not all
sequences to drop out of the table rapidly, leading to a re-population of the table that fits
the new circumstances. 
7.5.3.6 Initial conditions and decisions
Similar to AIF0, it is not a problem for a new instance of the system to act pretty much
at random until it accumulates enough experience to draw from, so the initial conditions
of  the  design  are  of  secondary importance;  we can assume that  we have  at  least  a
minimal database of past events, including a record of inputs, actions and score events.
This initial experience can be accumulated by simply letting the design flail around,
randomly, for a while. We can also assume the table has been populated as per section
7.5.3.5. We must recall here that a complex system such as AIF2 may, like the “blue
brain”  project,  often produce  a  non-functioning  intelligence,  or  an  intelligence
uninterested in learning the tricks we present to it, see section  6.4, and the examples
below.
7.5.3.7 Further Parameters
Many parameters are involved in this AI algorithm. Here is a partial list of issues and
parameters that need to be tweaked is provided in order to demonstrate the complexity.
In the experiments run so far many of these were assigned arbitrary numbers, and many
(including the weights of the similarity function) were tuned using a genetic algorithm.
In terms of calculating “desirability” (see section 7.5.3.3):
• look_ahead – determines how many events in the "future" to consider when
calculating desirability
In the context of choosing the sequence to use to guide current action, I have so far
spoken of four iterations of coin-tossing at a 50% chance each. These numbers can vary
from one run to another:
• decisiveness - the factor in the random decision, typically 0.5 .
23 Husserl's “extension” comes to mind.
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• max_cases - how many times to try the coin tossing (and thus the chance of
exploratory moves), typically 4.
The “decisiveness”  parameter  may change in  time during  run-time, following some
function – for example it could become linearly higher. 
• var_decisiveness - (boolean) use variable decisiveness
• algebraic_form- the equation for variable decisiveness, typically linear
• vd_parameter_a- the first parameter for calculating variable decisiveness
• vd_parameter_b - the second parameter for calculating variable decisiveness
In terms of table management, we also have:
• table_length - the maximum length of the table
• think_about- the maximum number of events to enter a non empty (and non
full) table
• init_relevance- initial relevance of events that enter the table
• max_relevance - max relevance of events in the table
• recent_prior -  (boolean)  do  recent  events  have  priority  (in  the  similarity
function)
There  are  several  more  parameters.  The  point  here  is  that  the  complexity  of
introspective algorithms is larger than those produced by mathematical models (Markov
chains, GOFAI) but it is still manageable. As mentioned in section 3.2.1, the fact that
human-like AI is difficult should not stop our exploration.
7.5.4 AIF2 Example runs
Some example runs are documented in three videos found in http://tinyurl.com/hycenh9
The same videos are found in the attached CD, as “.avi” files.
The three videos show the performance of AIF2 in a car-driving game, approximated
from the work of Togelius, Lucas, & Nardi (2007). The purpose of these examples is to
give  a taste of what is achievable with AIF2, and more generally with introspection-
based AI. Proper controlled evaluation and discussion of these results lies outside the
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scope of this work, see section  1.2.1.  Note that, as was expected, and as explained in
section  6.4, relatively few runs learned at all. The examples below were selected for
emphasising specific points, rather than for being typical.
The game in these examples consists of a “car” on a “track” that needs to race and
accumulate as much distance in a given time. In the usual case (presented here) the car's
driving software is entirely naïve at the beginning, and learns solely by getting a +1
score on moving in the right direction, +10 for passing a way-point at a predetermined
proximity, while moving forwards (there are 8 of them, marked in blue, except the next
one which is brown). The agent gets -10 points for colliding with a wall.
The car has 6 directional sensors (no diagonal sensors in the back) that feed in the
distance to the nearest obstacle, and a directional (polar) feed pointing at the next way-
point. 
7.5.4.1 Learn 1
Discussing the experiment recoded in the video “learn1.avi” (see link on the top of
section  7.5.4, or the attached CD): In this simulation there was a bug in the physics
engine (leading to an undefined state) so occasionally the car-racing game is reset to its
initial state, without resetting the AI software. The question of how skills are learnt best,
in an ongoing engagement with the problem or with repetitive re-starts remains open.
Note that the car initially flails about, starts improving slowly, and by 1:35 manages to
get beyond the “choking point” above the top right corner. By 2:30 some skill in not
crashing begins  to  emerge,  but  mostly the car  still  crashes  a  lot.  Around 3:30 it  is
completely  lost.  Around  4:30  it  develops  a  (bad)  habit  of  crashing  into  the  wall
repeatedly, but by 5:00 it rather suddenly starts to drive skilfully with no crashes for
65% of the round, recovers from a bad spell after a crash and completes several full
rounds, with few crashes. The rounds complete at 5:26, 5:37, 5:48, and 5:58.
The learning process  is  reasonable,  in  terms  of  our  expectations:  it  is  cautious  and
experimental. The system has initial difficulties, and finds the top-right corner, which is
tight,  more  difficult  than  the  others.  Once  a  full  round  is  completed,  the  skills
accumulated in traversing the beginning seem to kick in and serve to support the future
circumnavigation of the track. The algorithm is behaving as expected.
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7.5.4.2 Learn 2
Discussing the experiment recoded in the video “learn2.avi”: The physics engine was
fixed, so there are no “reset”s. Note that the track is a bit more difficult, with some more
obstacles  on the  outer  side of  the  track.  After  initially  flailing  about,  going mainly
backwards, at 0:14 the player gets into a strange mode of banging itself against a wall
(in reverse). At about 1:00 it discovers that staying still is better than getting repeatedly
penalized, and at about 1:05 it starts racing (quite wildly) towards the way-points. Other
than another spate of banging against the wall at around 1:45, it learns to run around the
track with less accidents, until the end of the video clip. It is interesting that “learn1”
learned  step-by  step  with  great  caution,  while  “learn2”  spent  much  time  being
unproductive, but was significantly more reckless and “enthusiastic” in learning for the
rest of the time.
The repetitive behaviour is interesting, not in being repetitive (that is something that
most software does),  but  in being able to  break away from the repetitive behaviour
without any explicit intervention. Even after a pattern of behaviour establishes itself, the
algorithm can break away from it. Here we see the benefit of the “random action”. Once
the programs gets out  if  this  repetitive phase,  its  learning seems to display far  less
caution than “learn1”.
7.5.4.3 Learn 3
Discussing the experiment recoded in the video “learn3.avi”: It is a different track, and
as usual the player flails about. However, in this case it develops a strange waltz-like
strategy, of going around in arcs backwards, and only occasionally going forward just to
collect the score at the way-point. It also (like “learn2” at 1:00) discovers at 1:35 that
staying still is an option that is better than bumping into walls, but not as satisfying as
getting more way-points. This “waltz” strategy works, but is suboptimal. In this it is like
many habits of intelligent creatures.
7.5.5 Discussion of AIF2
Each of these runs develops its own way of doing things, like a “personality”24. These
idiosyncratic  development  patterns  are  very  encouraging  in  terms  of  producing
24 A highly  qualitative  observation  is  that  the  player  or  “car”  in  these  videos  seems  (to  several
observers) to be rather “cute” - whatever that means. Exploring this question is outside the scope of
this project.
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anthropic  AI,  since  humans  are  also  diverse,  non-optimal  creatures  (Ariely,  2009).
Another point of similarity with the human condition is that there is no pre-knowlegde
of the range of scores – AIF2 learns by preferring the better, not by aiming for the best.
One may raise the classical problem of “credit assignment” in AI – how does this
design attribute the good or bad scores it may get from the environment to particular
causes? This does not arise, since there are no cause-effect pairs, even statistically, like
in a Markov chain data type (see section 7.6.1). The score events are simply registered
as part of the history, and will sit there until that part of the history database becomes
part  of  a  relevant  sequence,  in  which  case  the  scores  will  be  part  of  a  desirability
calculation, and hence will “motivate” the action taken at the time either positively or
negatively.
-
AIF2 demonstrated a complex design, that deepened the introspection in the face of the
failure  of  the  previous  design  (AIF1).  Using  introspection  as  a  basis  for  AI  is  not
guaranteed to work, but in this case it did. This design is introspectively much richer
than  any  other  design  encountered  in  the  literature.  Moreover,  the  introspected
mechanisms as implemented in software present some surprisingly realistic behaviour,
delivering some evidence for the anthropic approach (see section 3.2). Anthropic AI was
defined  as  pre-programming  only  the  basic  intelligence,  without  any  cultural
commitments,  and  letting  each  instance  of  the  program  learn,  or  develop,  its  own
“culture”.  The  above  runs  demonstrated  that  a  game  can  be  learned  from scratch,
displaying a diverse range of responses to a similar environment. This diversity also
speaks to the human-like character of this model.
Even though AIF2 is the last model in this document, it is not the end of the exploration.
It should be seen as a basis for further development, see section 8.2
7.6 Consequences of the examples
7.6.1 AIF is more like CBR then like reinforcement learning
The  AIF2  design  can  be  seen  as  similar  to  reinforcement  learning  (RL),  in  that  it
navigates  a  situation  using  a  closed  list  of  actions,  and  takes  feedback  from  the
environment.  It  can  also be  seen  as  a  similar  to  Case  Based Reasoning (CBR, see
- 191 -
section  7.2) since it uses stored episodes as “solutions” for future situations. The RL
paradigm includes the notion of a Markov chain, and of a closed universe of states that
can (at least in principle) be explored exhaustively. CBR on the other hand is more open
ended,  and  more  modest,  in  that  it  does  not  aim  at  an  overall  solution  (a  fully
understood Markov chain) but at “the best we have”. In this sense it is closer to the AIF
family,  which  being  introspective  does  not  aim  (even  theoretically)  at  infallibility.
Moreover, the AIF family of designs has as its main data store a historical database, like
CBR’s store of “cases”, and not some statistical summary of weights or probabilities
like RL. AIF0 even retains the separation into discreet “cases”.
7.6.2 The “sequence” data type
Probably the most interesting technical contribution that AIF2 makes is the introduction
of the “sequence” data type as a building block for AI systems, see section 7.5.3. This
allows the representation of multiple fading trains of thought that originate from the
memory of past experiences. 
Even if AI practitioners were to ignore all the arguments presented in this thesis, and
will  not  consciously  seek  to  use  introspection,  the  mere  introduction  of  such
subjectively-informed designs into the discourse will broaden the field of “allowed” or
“respectable”  discussion.  Considering  how  infrequently  non-philosophers  read
philosophy, probably that is the most that can be hoped for in terms of any impact of
this work on the technology debates and marketplace, at least in the short term.
7.6.3 Dynamic symbols
Consider AIF2 as a model of the working of the mind. It can be viewed as matching
events from the past to the present, if you will “interpreting” the present using the past
as the source of possible scenarios with which to understand the current situation. Each
AIF2 run creates its own history database which it uses to interpret future events. 
In classic AI designs, the symbol-system in terms of which the world is construed is
pre-determined by the programmer or knowledge-engineer using a fixed vocabulary.
The Classic AI system does not “grope around” looking for a vocabulary through which
to construe a situation. Neural nets (in the learning phase) do “grope around” and are
adaptable  in  unpredictable  ways,  but  we  cannot  see  (at  least  usually)  a  signifier-
signified relationship at all. In AIF2, conversely, the very terms of understanding are a
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product of the lifetime of the system itself. AIF2  understands the current situation in
terms of its previous memories. A past memory that is used often can be construed (by
us,  as  observers)  as  serving as  a  symbol,  a  concept  or  a  metaphor  “describing”  or
“interpreting” the present.
It  is  as  if  Classic  AI's  version  of  the  human  has  been  given  a  language  by  some
supernatural being, and the designed “mind” is confined to use only that language while
AIF2's “mind” evolves its own concepts to deal with any situations that it encounters
with any regularity. This development of the mind may even occur socially, in future
settings. This is reminiscent of COG (see section 3.2.6).
This has technical and philosophical consequences:
Technically:
• Since there is a symbolic relationship, there is an “understanding X in terms of
Y”, one can debug such a system more intuitively than a neural net, without
committing to the rigidity of a predetermined set of symbols.
• A system  that  has  both  plasticity  and  sentence-like  structures  can  adapt  to
cultural factors that are particular to the environment of every particular run,
even in a temporary manner. Classic systems have little plasticity, and Neural
nets have nothing that resembles sentences or structures that could accommodate
the cultural transmission of habits, see also section 5.2.
• A more  sophisticated  system  based  on  this  approach  also  would  allow  for
reflection  on  its  own  practices:  introspection  by  the  AI  rather  than  by  the
developer (contrast with section 3.1.2)
Philosophically, this notion of viewing past sequences as representations of sorts can be
an interesting input to the debate on representations  (Shanon, 2008): In a new sense,
AIF2 harvests it's own symbols, turning past events into symbols and past sequences of
events into representations for understanding the future and speculating about it (see
also section 8.4.4).
7.6.4 How AIF2 is Gadamerian
AIF2,  as  presented  above  (section  7.5),  reflects  many  of  the  characteristics  that
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Winograd & Flores  (1986) view as interesting in Gadamer's hermeneutics. Recall the
introduction to hermeneutics given in sections  2.4.1 and  2.5. This avenue of research
(though  explicitly  suggested  in  (Winograd  &  Flores,  1986))  seems  to  have  been
neglected in the AI literature.
AIF2 does  little  but  match  previous  episodes  from memory to  the current  evolving
situation. Even doing just that can be seen as interpretation of a crude type, a bit like
CBR interprets the situation as being similar-enough to a past “case”. But AIF2 goes
further, and allows the current situation to be matched with more than one sequence,
and thus be interpreted and reacted to using a blend of previously experienced scenarios.
Recall  the name of  Gadamer's  magnum opus  (2004) -  “Truth  and Method” -  Truth
stands for the brute facts of the text (or the “sense data”), and Method is all the wisdom,
methodology and experience the reader brings to bear. Every person's “method” is a
result of their own life experience, education and other memories – ultimately these are
all  stored  in  the  individual's  memory  (discounting  any  Jungian-type  “collective
unconscious”).  So  according  to  Gadamer,  all  interpretation  is  done  using  the  past
memories  of  the  individual  –  and the  AIF family  of  designs  provide an  underlying
mechanism for implementing such a system. Recall also that Gadamer viewed the act or
interpretation as a “merger of horizons” - the horizon of “truth” - sense data, and the
internal horizon(s) – of “method” or memory. Gadamer also stressed the unavoidable
existence of “prejudices” - and we can see even in AIF0 (section 7.3) that once a “habit
of thought” is established it is difficult to dislodge.
7.7 Examples  of  introspection  being  used  for  AI  design:
summary
I have argued for introspection-based AI, and showed some designs as examples, and
also  showed  that  the  more  sophisticated  example  design  (AIF2)  may  have  some
interesting  potential.  Since  this  thesis  is  in  philosophy  of  technology,  the  ultimate
purpose is to make a contribution to technology. 
Note also that this entire chapter of examples is nothing more than a down-payment
towards further development and a more thorough evaluation of such algorithms, which
I outlined as the “third volume” of this project, in section 1.2.1. The main body of this
document is the middle volume in the outlined trilogy. 
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8 Conclusion &  possible consequences
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This last chapter concludes (section 8.1) and discusses the possible consequences of this
work: 
• For AI Practitioners, future possible extensions of the AIF family of algorithms
are presented in section 8.2.
• For Cognitive  scientists,  the  possible  impact  of  this  research  is  discussed in
section 8.3.
• The manner that introspective ideas developed here may serve to “underpin”
some ideas in philosophy is presented in section 8.4.
• Some more general outstanding questions are left for section 8.5
In discussing  possible  consequences (future work), the arguments are less conclusive
than in the main part of the thesis.
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8.1 Conclusion
This thesis argued, in the field of technological AI that introspection is recommended
for anthropic AI. It explored the conceptual space between phenomenology and AI,
mainly classic AI.
A double crisis exists in AI: there is a dearth of new conceptual frameworks (section
1.1), and there is a neglect of the actual complexities and paradoxes of human thought
(as revealed subjectively) in favour of a rationalistic viewpoint (section 2.4).
The project of this thesis was to mitigate the faults of excessive rationalism using the
subjective  (standing  with  Dreyfus  and  Winograd  &  Flores,  against  Simon  and  his
followers). This turn to subjectivity is done while still being committed to producing
concrete working software (standing with Simon and the mainstream AI community,
against Dreyfus).
Human-like AI  was  discussed  as  distinct  from the  ideal/rational  type  following  S.
Russell & Norvig (2013) (my section 3.2.1). Human-like AI is required for applications
where smooth interaction between unskilled people and robots is key (section  3.2.2).
Human-like  AI  has  so  far  received  far  less  attention  that  ideal/rational  AI,  both  in
research  and  in  education.  Technological  AI  was  distinguished  from  scientific  AI
(section 1.5) - this thesis focused on human-like AI as a technology.
Within  the  context  of  the  search  for  human-like  AI,  Anthropic  AI was  defined  as
emulating the fundamental intelligence inherent in humans that makes the learning and
acquisition of culture possible. This was contrasted with the “western, modern, well-
trained and adult” intelligence that is so often sought after in AI, but is a contingent fact
which is only true of our particular current culture (section 3.2.4). COG and CYC were
recognized as earlier efforts that initially constructed a fundamental intelligence, and
then aimed to  acquire  the  necessary  skills  and/or  knowledge by a  learning process
(section  3.2.6).  Scientific  models  of  the  human  mind  (available  for  technological
implementation)  provide  only  models  that  are  “too  high”  (like  logic  and  cognitive
simulation) or “too low” (like neural nets) for the purposes of anthropic AI.
Starting the work of rehabilitating introspection for the purposes of AI, subjectivity was
shown to be a valid angle of research for AI (section  3.3.1), and some examples of
cognitive science touching on subjectivity were presented (section 3.3.1.4). Within the
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subjective realm, the phenomenological critique led by Dreyfus was surveyed (section
2.3),  and  critiqued  for  being  only  negative,  not  producing  any  concrete  software
designs.
Perhaps the most subjective approach of all, Introspection was discussed and shown to
be suspect not only for reasons given by J. B. Watson (1913), but also in-principle: It is
impossible to make neutral, interpretation-free observations in the natural sciences, so
we have no reason to  expect  the  situation  to  be  any better  in  the  subjective  realm
(section 3.3.3.4).
Regardless of the above, cognitive science treats introspection as being an illegitimate
method (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; J. B. Watson, 1913, 1920). Bringing in the distinction
between the context of discovery and the context of justification, any source of ideas in
science is legitimate, so introspection is rehabilitated as a legitimate source of discovery,
of ideas, for science (section 4.2.4). Moreover, the level of truth required for technology
is significantly lower than for science (sections 1.4, 4.2.5) so introspection (for AI) has
been  fully  rehabilitated  from  the  traditional  20th century  view  that  it  is  “wrong”,
“disallowed”, or illegitimate for some other reason. Somewhat strangely, AI researchers
have used introspection, not least Herbert Simon (section 4.3). However, they have not
used introspection full-bloodedly – they most often tend to expunge any reference to
introspection  from peer-reviewed publications,  and deal  with  it  sparingly  and shyly
(sections  4.3,  4.6).  Sherry  Turkle’s  description  of  how  the  field  of  AI  relates  to
introspection (section  4.3.1) came nearest to my analysis, but it remains sociological
and factual rather than analytical. Phil Agre also gave an outline quite close to mine, but
shied away from introspection as such, eventually trying to create Heideggerian AI, but
“by his deictic representations, Agre objectified” the ready-to-hand, thereby missing the
phenomenological  point  (Dreyfus,  2007).  Agre  did not  do introspection  for  AI as  I
propose (see section 4.3.2).
Chapter  5 showed that introspection is a positively  plausible basis for AI, since it is
used  reliably  in  education.  In  teaching  skills,  in  order  to  generate  their  narrative,
instructors either recall the narrative used to instruct themselves years before (unlikely),
or generate a narrative by self-observation. When the skill being taught is a mental skill,
this involves mental self observation – introspection. The success civilisations have in
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transmitting mental skills from one generation to another serves as testimony that this
kind of introspection works, i.e. introspection is efficacious in transmitting skills from
one  human  to  another,  and  therefore  introspective  reports  contain  some  sort  of
information that may well be efficacious in replicating human mental skills in software. 
In the examples (chapter 7), the use of introspection as a basis for designing AI software
was  demonstrated,  and  the  new  possibilities  allowed  by  the  rehabilitation  of
introspection for  the  development  of  AI designs  were  shown.  Previously,  insofar  as
introspection  was  used  at  all  in  AI  designs,  it  was  used  as  a  basis  for  a  single
mechanism, which was later integrated into the mainstream mathematical framework of
the discipline. The examples given (in chapter 7) showed that multiple mechanisms can
usefully be adapted from human introspective reports  into an AI system. Sometimes
where  one  or  two  mechanisms  fail  to  produce  a  useful  result,   going  for  more
introspection rather than less allows for the creation of a working system. This was
impossible while introspection was minimized, treated as somehow illegitimate in AI
research contexts.
An advanced example (AIF2, in section 7.5) was described that brings forth a novel data
type that not only represents past episodes, but in a sense allows them to be re-enacted
in the mind, in sync with current experience. Multiple such trains of thought fade in and
out  of significance.  This  was analysed (section  7.6.3) in  terms of  representations,  a
central area of debate in cognition, and the notion of “dynamic symbols” was defined.
These symbols are used in systems that understand the world through a vocabulary that
is  not pre-defined.  This was shown to be a concept that fits in with the Gadamerian
world-view (see sections  7.6.4,  8.4.2), thereby providing a concrete manifestation of
one of Winograd & Flores’s desiderata. This can be seen as a step towards Heideggerian
AI (see section 2.5.2), since Heidegger himself viewed Gadamer’s work as a detailing-
out of his own work in hermeneutics.
The subsequent sections of this chapter will examine the impact this work could have on
AI, cognitive science and philosophy.
The Appendix is US Patent No. 8,660,670, detailing the engineering novelty of AIF2.
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8.2 Future technical work
Beyond AIF2 as presented in  section  7.5,  the following variants  could be of future
interest:
1. The internal parameters of the algorithm may vary over time. For example, this has
already been implemented regarding the weights of the randomised selection. This
can make the algorithm more “decisive” or “conservative” - i.e. more likely to select
the better episodes over time. This is based on the introspective observation that with
skill less experimentation is done, and the external observation that people (and other
mammals) become more conservative as they age.
2. The set of actions (available in the environment) may vary over time, or as a result of
developments  within  the  game/environment.  This  is  planned  to  accommodate  the
discovery over time that some actions are not available, or the stumbling on to new
options. This further moves away from classic AI's Markovian assumption that the
group of possible actions is an (often small) finite set.
3. The  score (given by the environment) is  currently a simple number indicating an
overall  assessment  of  the  outcome,  and  could  be  comprised  of  a  few  separate
components,  for  example,  indicative of progress  towards  low-level  and high-level
goals, or short-term and long-term goals. This is an attempt to deal with the existence
of several goals, perhaps on different scales, simultaneously.
4. Even  in  the  case  of  a  random  action,  various  actions  correlated  to  particularly
undesirable outcomes may be  excluded from the range of options (“Panic mode”).
This is  based on the observation that we may be adventurous only within certain
bounds, and not only reward-seeking, but also catastrophe-averse.
5. The history database may be entirely “real” (derived from the current run) or may be
a  “manufactured  history”  including  “transplanted  experience”  from  another  run,
and/or a manually encoded history, to provide the algorithm with a starting baseline
of  experience. This is to allow for pre-taught robots, or for Chomskyan (or Plato's
Menon) pre-known skills25. The transplanted history could also be derived from some
25 This is a bit reminiscent of the “young earth” argument trying to reconcile the geological record of
life existing for millions of years with the biblical story that makes the earth under 6,000 years old.
This theological  exercise points out that  God could create the world with all  this record already
embedded in it. Likewise, an AIF application instance could have a past memory that did not actually
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process, such as crossing between two “parents”, providing a new medium for genetic
ideas.
The idea of starting afresh while being “convinced” that there is a lot of history is
reminiscent of how computer systems resume after being “hibernated” (as opposed to
“suspended”).
6. Pruning of the historical database can be performed on the basis of discarding the
oldest  data  (suitable  for  rapidly changing environments),  or  on the basis  of other
criteria such as discarding historical episodes which resulted in mediocre desirability
of the outcomes. These (mediocre) memories would not be particularly useful either
for  re-use  or  for  avoiding  past  mistakes.  This  is  based  on  the  introspection  or
observation that we forget mainly the mundane.
7. Federating – This algorithm may be used in multiple instances, sharing the same
time-line and history database. This could be useful for example to control different
time-resolutions,  or  to  have  some  “controller”  select  which  of  several  machines
implementing different skills/strategies should be used at any time. This is also an
attempt to deal with the existence of several-scale goals simultaneously, and other
possible complexities.
8. The parameters of the similarity function may be tuned by a genetic algorithm. This
is to address the fact that we have no special insight (introspective or otherwise) into
the well-known problem of defining similarity.
9. The other (“technical”) parameters of the algorithm may also be tuned genetically.
Examples  of  such  parameters  are  table  size,  thresholds  and  the  parameters  for
randomised selection. This is not introspectively motivated, but comes to tune the
many  arbitrary  decisions  made  during  the  process  of  approximating  from  the
introspection towards a formal algorithm.
10. The time  parameters  could  be  made  more  continuous,  in  a  sense  using  real
numbers as time indexes.  This would move further away from CBR, in that time
becomes less atomic. It would also require the similarity function to compare not
atomic events, but “moments” that would perhaps have some duration26.
occur within the run, but was preloaded. 
26 This again is reminiscent of Husserl’s extension and protension.
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11. So far, sequences are recalled in “real time”, the sequences being advanced by
one time unit every for every time unit elapsing in the external world. Allowing some
flexibility will allow for slowing down or speeding up the memories. This will allow
the AI to experiment with applying skills at varying rates.
12. In a sense, in AIF2 the sequences of memory are themselves being experienced,
in that they “play out” in sync with the unfolding (real) events, and move in time. But
in deeper sense, this mere following-along is part of the interpretation, but not part of
the experience being interpreted, in that the recalled sequences never move into the
“current sense data” that is compared backwards to previous sequences in memory.
One could envisage such a system, where we explicitly make the contents of past
sequences  being recalled  part  of  the  “present  sense  data”.  This  would  be  a  most
interesting  area  of  research,  since  this  opens  up  the  possibility  of  an  AI  system
recalling “that it had such a combination of thoughts before” and suchlike. This may
also be the beginnings of self-reflection, perhaps  machine-consciousness  (Gamez,
2008), and perhaps even introspection-by-the-AI, see section 3.1.2.
8.3 Possible consequences for cognitive science
8.3.1 Models for scientific psychology
An important distinction used to build this thesis can now be relaxed a bit, in order to
show more potential utility from this work. Parts of chapter 1 were spent making a clear
distinction between technology and science, and some of chapter  4 (especially section
4.2.4) presented the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of
justification in science.  I claimed that introspection was a legitimate source of ideas
because it was only used in the context of discovery, and moreover it was only being
used (in the main body of this thesis) for technology. We can now relax this a bit and
discuss  the interaction between these.  In  a  sense we “must throw away the ladder”
(Wittgenstein, 2001b, sec. 6.54).
Recall that:
1. All ideas are allowed in the context of discovery even in science, that is where
this distinction originated from.
2. Psychology already uses some AI programs as models, or sketch-theories about
- 201 -
how  cognition  works  (Sun,  2008),  as  Simon  predicted  that  “...theories  in
psychology will take the form of computer programs” (Simon & Newell, 1958).
AIF2 (and other introspection-based AI designs) may be used as theoretical tools in
psychology. In being introspective, these theories perhaps would have a better chance
(than for example neural nets) to bridge the cognitive and personal-analytical branches
of psychology.
8.3.2 A response to Dreyfus's critique  of AI
AIF2 (section  7.5) uses dynamic symbols (section 7.6.3) “mined” so to speak, out of
the input stream, to signify / interpret other events in the input stream. Unlike Simon's
classic AI, there are no pre-fixed symbols, but nonetheless there is a certain notion of
representation (see also section 8.4.4).
Classic  AI,  insofar  as  it  used  introspection,  used  it  both  sparingly  (simulating  one
mental mechanism at a time) and in an idealised manner. However, they did produce
concrete working systems.
Dreyfus seems to get carried away with the “what computers can't  do” slogan. His
argument would have been better served by being called “What can't be formalized”.
But heavily informal systems, such as global weather, can be simulated by computer to
any precision we choose. His argument that a 100% emulation of a human mind in a
computer  is  impossible  should  not  stop  us  approximating.  My  thesis  agrees  with
Dreyfus that if one is looking to get to the moon one should stop climbing the nearest
tree,  and  get  into  a  warm  room  for  some  deeper  planning.  However,  Dreyfus's
discussion doesn't elevate us towards the moon even the few meters that the tree would,
since  no working software  is  produced by his  approach at  all  (Dreyfus,  2007).  All
Dreyfus  does  is  show why Platonism/intellectualism will  not get  us  there.  He stops
there, without proposing any concrete alternative that is better than that first tree.
This  is  why  I  attach  working  examples  to  my  argument.  Dreyfus’s  founding
contribution to philosophy-of-AI is not being belittled, but it is time to move forward to
a more positive contribution, and show what can be done, not just what can't be done.
8.3.3 Natural language processing
An interesting application of the AIF family could be in natural language processing.
- 202 -
Again, no strong claim is being made at this speculative stage that my suggestion would
be better than any other – only that this is worth exploring.
A more  advanced  version  of  AIF,  where  there  would  be  (at  least)  two  AIF2-type
mechanisms  cooperating  could  be  used  to  produce  language –  with  one  engine
following structure (including syntax), producing (more-or-less) grammatical sentences,
while another instance deals with the content, bringing up the relevant semantic fields –
and somehow cooperating in producing the eventual sentence. Such sentences would
hopefully be  mostly but not completely grammatical,  mostly but not completely on-
topic – quite like human speech.
Conversely, in terms of understanding natural language, a more advanced edition of the
AIF  designs  could  also  be  used  to  understand  different  aspects  concurrently  –  for
example following the various grammatical rules and customs on the one hand and
helping build a mental “picture” using the meaning of words by placing the various
recalled  meanings  in  the  correct  relations  to  each  other  (as  the  previously-learned
grammar  dictates).  This  would  require  having  some  “Cartesian  theatre”  or
“imagination” able to draw mental pictures, and the ability to react to these pictures in
relation to the external reality.
8.3.4 Cognitive models
AIF2 is entirely consistent, as an example for introspection-based AI, with some of the
most popular views in cognitive science. The “predictive brain” concept (Clark, 2013)
argues that the main (if not only) function of the brain is to predict the environment and
to manoeuvre the person's body in such a way as to both minimize prediction error and
produce the best possible results. 
8.4 “Underpinning” models in philosophy
In this section I will show how AIF2’s “dynamic symbols” (section 7.6.3) can also be
seen  as  underpinning  various  ideas  in  cognition  and  philosophy.  I  use  the  term
“underpinning” specifically to make a different point than “support”. One supports a
world-view  with  arguments,  showing  why  one  should  accept  or  believe  in  some
position. When I say “underpinning” I mean that one could construct a software model
that would operate in a way similar to the intellectual idea being examined. In a sense,
- 203 -
this  allows  a  philosophical  model  to  “come  to  life”  in  silico.  In  another  sense,
“underpinning”  is  a  software-based  experiment,  somewhat  similar  to  a  thought
experiment. Like the thought experiment device, it may lend support to a model, but that
would require clear argumentation. I will here argue that AIF2 or subsequent members
of this family of designs can be used to underpin several philosophical concepts:
• Wittgenstein’s “aspects”
• Gadamer’s “prejudices”, or “method”
• Dreyfus's demands from AI
• Wheeler's “action oriented representations”
• Indian philosophy's adhyasa
The  sections  below are  dedicated  to  showing  how,  perhaps  with  some  imaginative
license  allowing  for  future  research,  the  above  philosophical  concepts  may  be
underpinned by an AIF2-like mind. Again,  none of this  is to claim that AIF2 or its
derivatives are true, correct, or even superior to any other designs, past or future. The
sole purpose is to show how in a wide range of senses introspection-based designs can
be useful.
8.4.1 Wittgenstein's aspects
In  (Wittgenstein, 2001a, p. 166) we are introduced to the duck-rabbit drawing. When
presented  with this picture, people usually either persistently say that it is a rabbit or a
duck, or that they see that both can be seen in the same picture.  Most people after
discussing the dual nature of the picture can see the duality.
Many AI programs that are logic or statistics based (say an expert system) would assign
a  higher  probability  to  one  or  the  other  interpretations,  by  some function.  Perhaps
indeed the picture in (Wittgenstein, 2001a, p. 165) is by some objective measure more a
duck than a rabbit, but that is not how it is  for us humans. AIF2, on the other hand,
would either have past experiences of seeing the picture as a rabbit or as a duck, and
would repeat that habit, probably (just as a human) until shown the other option, and
would then alternate between the two haphazardly. The very structure of AIF2 is similar
to Wittgenstein's  “seeing as” -  it  acts  in any specific situation X based on one of a
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number of  similar situations in the past. In that sense, AIF2 sees the current situation as
equivalent to that past scenario.
8.4.2 Gadamer
Gadamer’s view of hermeneutics is that we use our memories of the past (which form
our “prejudices” or “inner horizon” or “method”) to interpret the present (termed “truth”
or “outer horizon”). We do not interpret the present using only one memory at a time as
in CBR, but use a blend of the memories available to us. AIF2 is to the best of my
knowledge the first attempt to bring to bear on AI decisions such a time-based blend.
For more details of how AIF2 is Gadamerian see section 7.6.4.
8.4.3 Dreyfus's demands from AI
As we saw in section  2.3 Dreyfus's critique of AI is broad, and unrelenting  (Dreyfus,
2007). Dreyfus also teaches us the dangers of “first step” fallacies (2012), so I cannot
even claim that AIF2 or the whole introspective approach is a good “first step” towards
appeasing his demands. What I can claim, that it is  a step, perhaps “up a tree”, but at
least up a taller tree than existing AI, at least in the following sense.
In (Dreyfus, 1979, p. 253), within a complex and broad context, Dreyfus outlines one
specific element of what a more human way of doing things might be, in one type of
skill acquisition:
Now  suppose  that,  in  this  random  thrashing  about,  I  happen  to  touch
something,  and that  satisfies  a need to  cope with things…. I  can  repeat
whatever I did, this time in order to touch something…. This is presumably
the way skills are built up. (stress in the original).
AIF2  does  nothing  if  not  “thrashing  about”  and  later,  in  encountering  similar
circumstances recalling the better and worse outcomes that were obtained in the past,
and  giving  a  higher  chance  to  “repeating”  the  beneficial  action  in  the  future.  Like
Dreyfus's description, there is no sharp distinction between a “learning phase” and a
“using” of some formal stored “knowledge”. AIF2 therefore implements discovering
skills and learning to use them in a more Dreyfus-like way than anything  done before
in AI (as far as I could discover).
If that were the entirety of Dreyfus’s world-view, one might be tempted to say that it is
similar  to  reinforcement  learning,  but  in  Dreyfus’s  critique  it  is  part  of  a  broad
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Heideggerian world-view. The view presented in this thesis is quite Gadamerian (see
section  7.6.4),  and  again,  Gadamer’s  hermeneutics  is  only  one  element  of  the
Heideggerian  world-view.  So  yes,  perhaps  even  every  element in  our  AI  could  be
compared to existing systems, but the power of AIF2 is specifically in the blending, and
the power of this thesis is in showing how we can use introspection to generate many AI
designs.
In showing that AIF2 makes a step towards answering Dreyfus's concerns, I have shown
that  one example of  introspective AI made one step, and hence one could plausibly
expect further engagement with introspective AI to make some more positive steps. Not
only is AIF2 interesting to this debate per se, introspection-based AI is a generator of
interesting AI designs, and hence “recommended for developing anthropic AI” as per
my main thesis, and a substantive response to much if not all of Dreyfus’s critique.
8.4.4 Wheeler's action-oriented representations
Wheeler  (2005, pp. 195–196) recalls that orthodox representation theory (such as in
classic AI) calls for representations that are “essentially objective, context independent,
action-neutral, stored descriptions of the environment”. He contrasts that with Brooks's
“situated  robots”  that  have  no  representations  as  such  (recall  Brooks's  paper  was
entitled “Intelligence without representation” (1991)).
Wheeler mentions  Clark’s (1998, pp. 47–51) action-oriented representations as being
half-way  between  mirroring  the  world  and  prescribing  action.  However,  Wheeler
critiques this “mid-way” approach: the living organism has no interest in representing
the  world  objectively-as-it-is,  but  only  in  terms  of  (ego-centric)  actions.  The
representations of actions-and-outcomes do indeed reflect something of the world, but
that “purely academic” part is of no interest to the living creature - “it is by adaptively
mediating between sensing and movement that such inner structures earn their keep”
(Wheeler,  2005,  p.  197).  Wheeler  also  points  out  that  these  structures  represent
knowledge-how, not knowledge-that (see section  3.2.7). Note also that such a direct
association between sensing and moving, without much if any intellectual content, is
also fundamental to O’Regan’s (2011) sensory-motor theories.
AIF2's “sequences” and “dynamic symbols” (sections  7.5,  7.6.3) are good candidates
for the role of Wheeler's action-oriented representations, at least as far as technological
AI is concerned. They are used to predict possible consequences if certain actions are
taken, based on the system's own past experiences. Arguably that can be found even in
CBR, not only in the AIF family. Unlike CBR, in AIF2 the representations/sequences
can fade in and out and “cooperate” or “blend” – they are “softer” and allow for more
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subtle skills, and skill combinations.
8.4.5 Adhyasa / superimposition
Adhyasa is the Sanskrit27 term for “superimposition” - it refers to people seeing in a
situation some thing,  distinction or  circumstance  that  is  not  in  the  actual  input.  An
example could be meeting a young person on campus, without conversation or prior
acquaintance,  and seeing  them from a distance,  perhaps  carrying a  computer,  as  an
undergraduate. This idea of the bureaucratic definition “undergraduate” is added by the
observer. Moreover, if you have just imagined the described situation vividly, you most
probably imagined either a young woman or a young man, and they had some other
specific features, like hair, clothing, etc. Not one of these details were in my description.
All these details are added by the listener, “superimposed” on the basic situation, not
really there. Similarly all social constructs such as belonging to a nationality etc. are not
part of the objective reality, but are superimposed by our understanding.
Again, like in the case of Wittgenstein's seeing-as, the case of adhyasa is also similar to
AIF2. The AIF2 agent is reacting according to the predicted consequences of its actions,
predicated according to past experience. It “sees” probable consequences before they
arise. They may well never arise, since the situation at hand may be entirely different
from the memories  of the AIF system. Again, no claim is being made that AIF is the
only  AI  concept  that  could  produce  such  behaviour.  In  the  case  of  adhyasa  the
phenomenon of “over-fitting” in machine learning comes to mind.
8.5 Open Questions
This thesis has been an exercise in inter-disciplinary work. I have already mentioned
several  areas  for  further  research,  much  of  which  could  be  done by experts  in  the
relevant specific fields. I am left with some observations and worries that do not fit
neatly in any one discipline:
8.5.1 Dilthey vs Gadamer
In section  7.6.4 I argued that AIF2 can be seen as a start in the pursuit of the long-
awaited Gadamerian AI. However, I did not advocate for taking phenomenological or
hermeneutic  texts  as  “gospel  truth”.  I  argued  for  personal  introspection  by  the  AI
27 Sanskrit is to India what Latin and Greek are to Europe.
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developer as a way to get at some mechanisms of the human mind in order to emulate
them in software. In a sense, I am promoting a Gadamerian approach for the content of
the AI software,  following Winograd & Flores  (1986),  but  I  promote a Dilthey-like
approach to obtaining the ideas for building the software. Recall (from section 2.5) that
Dilthey called for a balance (in the person trying to understand some historical text)
between  “living  experience”  and  critical  thinking.  For  Dilthey  “living  experience”
meant  that  one  should  allow oneself  to  imagine  what  it  would  be  like  to  be,  say,
Caligula in a certain situation, and try to use one's own reconstruction, like an actor's, to
understand the dynamics of the situation. He then called for critical thinking to restrict
those flights of fancy, and make sure that they make sense in the historical context, and
in whatever other constraints are known to apply in the historical situation (Ramberg &
Gjesdal, 2014).
In this thesis I suggest that one should use introspection in order to create in software
models of how we humans may think. I do not restrict this to “correct” introspection – I
explicitly allow “bad”, speculative introspection in (see section  3.3.3.5). This can be
seen as the equivalent of Dilthey's “living experience”. My version of the restraining
critical  historical  thinking  is  the  demand  that  specific  operational  systems  must  be
produced, run, and evaluated as a technology.
8.5.2 Further unexplored terrain
Two  unexplored  areas  in  cognitive  science  have  been  mentioned,  that  cry  out  for
exploration  –  perhaps  even  more  urgently  for  my  specific  interest  in   anthropic
technological AI.
1. First, Anthropology has been pointed out by Boden  (2008, Chapter 8) as “the
missing discipline” in cognitive science. My term “anthropic AI” only scratches
the surface, in that I am interested in humans-as-such rather than in “western,
modern, well-trained adults”. However there may well be some anthropological
literature  about  cognition  that  has  not  been  explored.  A  non-European
phenomenology would be fascinating, which brings up the next point.
2. The literature on the structure of the mind in Sanskrit is vast. This is difficult to
explore since beyond being mostly untranslated, these Indian traditions do not
separate psychology, metaphysics and religion to any degree that even begins to
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satisfy our western, modern expectations. Again, something being difficult is no
argument  for expecting it  a-priori to be wrong. Specifically for our interest in
AI specifically and cognitive science in general the Buddhist tradition has an
obsession  with  enumerating  lists  of  mental  components  of  various  mental
mechanisms, if “mechanisms” is indeed the correct term. 
Final words
This thesis argued that “introspection is recommended for development of anthropic
AI”. This should perhaps be the beginning of a retreat from science’s domination over
other  areas  of  thought,  specifically  our  thinking  about  human  nature,  but  also  our
thinking about technology.
In cognitive science, as Searle (1992, p. 115) put it, we should (supposedly) “carve off
and eliminate the subjective experience”. I call for a moderation of that programme.
Little be it for me to make direct recommendations about cognitive science in general –
but in the field of human-like AI as a technology, this attitude has surely outlived its
usefulness. Instead we should return to an age-old piece of wisdom: “It is the mark of
an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of
the subject admits” (Aristotle, 2009). By all means we should render unto science that
which belong to science, but let’s move on with the technology. We needn’t wait for
scientific precision.
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9 Appendix - US Patent No. 8,660,670
This is presented as further evidence of the novelty of AIF2 (see section 7.5)
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